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ABSTRACT 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW MIDDLE EASTERN LEADERS: AN 
OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH 
 
Canbolat, Sercan 
 MA, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Özgür Özdamar 
June 2014 
 
Political Islam and particular Islamist organizations have broadly gained 
strength across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the post-Cold War era. 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is viewed as the world‘s largest and most influential 
Islamist organization impinging upon the wider landscape of contemporary MENA 
politics. The psychological approach contends that the characteristics of leaders making 
foreign policy are crucial to understanding ultimate foreign policy outcomes (Hudson 
2005). In this literature, the study of leaders‘ beliefs is one the most progressive 
approaches to world politics which focuses on leaders‘ belief systems and their impacts 
on foreign policy-making (Leites 1951; George 1969). By utilizing the operational code 
analysis, this research aims to unravel the general patterns of Islamist foreign policy 
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manifested itself in three MB-affiliated MENA leaders‘ foreign policy behaviors in the 
post-Arab uprisings era: Egypt‘s Morsi, Tunisia‘s Ghannouchi, and Hamas‘ Meshaal. 
Two main hypotheses are posited in this thesis. First, the foreign policy beliefs of three 
MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not significantly different from the world leaders‘ 
included in the ‗norming group.‘ Secondly, it is hypothesized that foreign policy 
behaviors of three Islamist leaders designate uniformity pattern even though these 
leaders operate in quite different political and cultural settings. The analysis results 
yield that operational codes of three MB leaders are analogous to the average world 
leader‘s since there are only a few statistically significant differences. The findings also 
support the argument that despite operating in different political systems, all three MB-
Islamists exhibit similar foreign policy behaviors towards the ‗other‘ in a strategic 
environment. 
Key Words: Operational Code Analysis, Islamist Foreign Policy, Muslim Brotherhood, 
Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Leadership 
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ÖZET 
 
YENĠ ORTA DOĞU LĠDERLERĠNĠ ANLAMAK: OPERASYONEL 
KOD YAKLAġIMI 
 
Canbolat, Sercan 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özgür Özdamar 
Haziran 2014 
 
Siyasi Ġslam hareketi ve belli baĢlı Ġslami örgütler Soğuk SavaĢ sonrası dönemde 
Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika‘da muazzam bir Ģekilde güçlenmiĢlerdir. Müslüman 
KardeĢler dünyanın en büyük ve en etkili Islamcı hareketi olarak görülmektedir ve bu 
özelliği ile Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika politikalarının genel tabiatını ciddi Ģekilde 
etkilemektedir. Psikolojik yaklaĢım, karar verici durumunda olan liderlerin karakteristik 
özelliklerinin dıĢ politika çıktılarını anlamada çok kritik bir önemi olduğunu iddia eder 
(Hudson 2005). Bu literatür içerisinde, liderlerin inançlarının dıĢ politika yapımına 
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etkisi çerçevesinde çalıĢılması dünya politikalarını anlama gayesi ile geliĢtirilen en 
yenilikçi yaklaĢımlardan birisidir (Leites 1951; George 1969). Bu çalıĢma Operasyonel 
Kod Analizi kullanarak, Muhammed Mursi, RaĢid GannuĢi ve Halit MeĢal‘ın dıĢ 
politika davranıĢlarında kendisini gösteren Ġslamcı dıĢ politikanın genel motiflerini 
ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde iki ana hipotez öne sürülmektedir. Birincisi, 
Müslüman KardeĢler örgütü ile ilintili olan üç liderin dıĢ politika inançları ile ‗standart 
örneklem‘ içerisinde yer alan dünya liderlerinin inançları arasında kayda değer bir 
farklılık bulunmamaktadır. Ġkinci olarak, tamamen farklı siyasal ve kültürel yapılarda 
yer almalarına rağmen üç Ġslamcı liderin dıĢ politika davranıĢlarının tam benzerlik 
modeline iĢaret ettiği varsayımında bulunulmuĢtur. Analiz sonuçları iki örneklem 
arasında sadece birkaç ve istatistiksel olarak çok önemli olmayan farklılık olduğunu 
saptayıp, üç Müslüman KardeĢler lideri ile ortalama dünya liderinin operasyonel 
kodlarının birbirlerine yakın olduğunu ortaya koymuĢtur. Ayrıca, araĢtırmanın bulguları 
farklı siyasi sistemde hareket etmelerine rağmen üç Ġslamcı liderin stratejik çevre 
içerisinde tanımladıkları ‗ötekiye‘ karĢı birbirine benzer dıĢ politika davranıĢları 
gösterdiği argümanını desteklemektedir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Operasyonel Kod Analizi, Ġslamcı DıĢ Politika, Müslüman 
KardeĢler, DıĢ Politika Analizi, Siyasi Liderlik 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Any approach to foreign policy decision-making that dismisses the critical role of 
individual leaders and their cognitive systems, albeit being parsimonious, is destined for 
explanatory deficiency. Structural and state level constraints notwithstanding, each and 
every foreign policy decision is made by human actors. Former US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger recognized that fact when he said, ―As a professor, I tended to think of 
history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the 
difference personalities make.‖1 Building on Kissinger‘s observation, if every single 
foreign policy outcome must materialize through human agency, then it is high time to 
acknowledge that a leader‘s cognition is the part and parcel of understanding foreign 
policy making since all individual leaders are psychological beings. 
However, proponents of structural and rationalist approach argue that although 
individual leaders occupy decision making settings, their particularities make little 
                                                          
1
An interview with Henry Kissinger that took place in January 1975, as quoted in Walter Isaacson, 
Kissinger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 13. 
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difference when they confront with insurmountable structural limitations and the 
rationality barrier in international politics (Waltz 1979). The early generation of 
political psychologists weighed in on the debate by arguing that structural forces are not 
always critically significant and a decision maker can be ―incapable of making 
objectively optimal choices‖ due to his/her ―bounded rationality‖ (Simon 1985). 
Moreover, although the cognitive paradigm gives credit to realist assumptions of 
rationality and systemic structure in the study of foreign policy, it accentuates the role 
of human actors in interpreting those structural constraints and making an idiosyncratic 
cost-benefit calculation. As Wolfers (1962: 42) pointed out, ―factors external to the 
actor can become determinants only as they affect the mind, the heart, and the will of 
the decision maker.‖ Similarly, it is also argued that foreign policy studies focusing 
exclusively on structural and situational variables are inherently underspecified since 
these factors do not always trump leaders‘ beliefs and perceptions. Particularly, Brecher 
et al. (1969) emphasized the analytical necessity of focusing on leaders‘ individual 
psychologies including the ‗psychological climate‘ and the ‗attitudinal prism‘ of leaders 
which function as a causal mechanism to understand foreign policy making. In other 
words, a leader‘s personality and beliefs are of paramount importance in analyzing 
decision-making process because the outside world ―does not exist independently from 
actors‘ subjective beliefs about how the world works and how they could best achieve 
their goals within this world‖ (Malici and Buckner 2008: 787). 
In fact, in addition to constructivists, contemporary rationalists of many stripes 
do recognize an important role that psychology plays in the explanations of foreign 
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policy. Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (1997: 16) concur that ―uncertainty and 
the subjective beliefs of actors are essential features of the choice process, and … that 
uncertainty makes the question of differences in perceptions central.‖ Despite that 
acknowledgment, Young and Schafer (1998) argue, the rationalist camp emphasizes 
expected perceptions, a ‗proxy variable‘, to analyze leaders‘ cognitions rather than 
making effort to ‗get into the heads of leaders.‘ According to Young and Schafer (1998: 
64), the fallacy in this approach is that ―blanket assumptions about international actors 
do not hold… because all leaders do not think about power in the same way. Moreover, 
interests vary by individual statesmen, let alone by state.‖ 
From the vantage point of psychological approach, cognition of a leader is 
instrumental in explicating his/her behaviors in the foreign policy realm since 
cognitions lay the basis of human behaviors in politics and how humans perceive and 
interpret the outside world. In this context, the essential concepts e.g., power and 
interest that constitute the heart of the study of international relations are subjective 
interpretations of the political universe. Both conceptions stem from the decision 
makers‘ personal beliefs and perceptions and therefore they are cognitive in nature. For 
instance, while Mao had a belief that the political power arises from a rifle barrel, 
Gandhi squarely thought otherwise and these two national leaders triggered very 
different and consequential political transformations in their countries (Young and 
Schafer 1998). 
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1.1. Significance of the Study 
 
Since the second half of the 20
th
 century, when Snyder et al. (1962) formed the 
foundation of foreign policy analysis (FPA) field, the study of decision makers in the IR 
discipline has developed to a great extent. Preston (2010), in his review of the 
leadership studies literature, pointed out the most vibrant research programs regarding 
leaders psychologies as cognitive mapping, image theory, leadership trait analysis, and 
operational code analysis.
2
 Similarly, through using one of these leadership assessment 
tools, this study subscribes to the contention that the human actors constitute the heart 
of international politics (Hudson 2005). Nevertheless, this thesis also shares the 
scholarly concerns that while the bulk of FPA-style leadership studies focusing 
excessively on Western international relations, the scientific studies on non-Western 
countries and leaders are very rare (Kesgin 2011; Özdamar 2011; Özdamar 
forthcoming). 
Political Islam and Islamist groups have reasserted themselves as resilient actors 
of world politics since the late 20
th
 century both within democratic systems e.g., Refah 
Partisi or AKP in Turkey and also through resistance movements and terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda (Rubin 2011). The old and deep-seated grievances of Muslim 
communities against the Western colonization which still lingers in different forms such 
as superpower penetration into the region and also secular nationalistic parties‘ 
ineptitude to accomplish political and economic development must have contributed to 
the ascent of the Political Islam in MENA (Özdamar 2011). After assuming the political 
                                                          
2
For other reviews of the leadership studies literature, see also Schafer and Young (1998), and Rosati and 
Miller (2000). 
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power, while some ‗neo-Islamist‘ (and/or post-Islamist) movements opted for a 
peaceful integration to the domestic and international system and exhibit cooperative 
behaviors such as AKP in Turkey, many other Islamist movements did not take part in 
democratic politics and proved rather confrontational toward established orders. 
Considering the Islamist movements together, however, the MB holds the 
distinction of being the oldest, largest and most powerful Islamist group operating in the 
Muslim world (Leiken and Brooke 2007). Despite its significance in the MENA and 
world politics alike, the MB‘s political leadership style and its conceptualization of 
foreign policy are understudied within the IR discipline. The bulk of studies analyzing 
the MB lacks ‗realistic empathy‘ since the field of Middle Eastern studies is fraught 
with political and cultural biases of the Western world (White 1991). The field is also 
devoid of rigorous scientific methods to understand both the sources of Islamist foreign 
policy and the leaders of MENA region. In addition, there is a dearth of studies in the 
literature of foreign policy analysis (FPA) focusing on political Islam and its new 
leadership as a distinct political philosophy with idiosyncratic foreign policy 
preferences. Lastly, North American FPA approaches are geographically bounded and 
not frequently applied on the non-Western cases due to theoretical and methodological 
issues (Kesgin 2011; Özdamar forthcoming). 
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1.2. Research Questions and Overview  
 
This research attempts to bridge these gaps in the literature with the aim of expanding 
the geographical coverage of Western-originated operational code approach. 
Particularly, this study hones in on three MENA leaders, Morsi of Egypt, Ghannouchi 
of Tunisia, and Meshaal of Gaza as the representatives of the new generation of 
Islamists. This thesis utilizes the operational code construct as its leadership assessment 
tool to examine foreign policy belief system of the new MENA leadership imbued by 
the MB-style political Islam (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969; Holsti 1977). 
Operational code analysis is a method designed particularly for studying key political 
beliefs of a decision maker and addressing the question of ―what the individual knows, 
feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in human affairs‖ (Schafer and Walker 
2006: 29). Modern operational code research program employs the Verbs in Context 
System (VICS) to measure an individual leader‘s operational code beliefs (Walker et al. 
1998). 
The relative dearth of systematic studies on non-Western leaders and the sources 
of Islamist foreign policy in MENA prompted particular research interests and therefore 
laid the foundations of this study. The research puzzle is searching for a casual linkage 
between Islamist leaders‘ ideological beliefs and their foreign policy preferences. This 
line of inquiry sparked the author‘s attention on further questions and determined the 
direction of research. How do political Islamists e.g., the Muslim Brothers make sense 
of international relations? What are the general patterns of Islamist leaders‘ 
conceptualization of foreign policy? What is the MB leadership‘s image of ‗other‘? 
7 
      
How do MENA leaders make foreign policy decisions and do they differ from the 
average world leaders? 
After a review of the leadership studies literature and studying operational code 
approach, the sketchy inquiries above morphed into three systematic and interrelated 
research questions. First, what are the philosophical (diagnostic) and instrumental 
(prescriptive) beliefs of three MENA leaders? Second, how do three MB-affiliated 
MENA leaders compare to the average world leader? Third, what are the foreign policy 
strategies of three Islamist leaders: is the new MENA leadership‘s approach to foreign 
policy rational/pragmatic or ideological/revolutionary? Building on these research 
questions, this study posits two main hypotheses to be tested with data. The first 
hypothesis is that the foreign policy beliefs of MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not 
different the beliefs of world leaders (predominantly operating in the West) included in 
the norming group (Walker and Schafer 2006). Second, the foreign policy behaviors of 
three Islamist MENA leaders are very similar although they operate in quite different 
political, economic, and cultural settings. The analysis results first show that the 
operational codes of three MENA leaders are analogous to the world leaders‘ scores 
since there are a few statistically important differences. The results also confirm the 
second hypothesis that despite operating in different political systems, three MB-
affiliated MENA leaders exhibit similar foreign policy behaviors especially in terms of 
tactics and strategies they pursue towards ‗other‘ to achieve their objectives. Similarly, 
an analysis of belief systems of three Islamist leaders from 2011 to 2013 reveals some 
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general patterns in how MB-driven political Islam reasserted and articulated itself as an 
ideological source of foreign policy. 
 
 
1.3.  Organization of the Chapters 
 
The structure and central arguments of this thesis are as follows. The next chapter first 
provides a comprehensive overview of the foreign policy analysis literature and briefly 
reviews, the relevant literature, leadership studies and explicates the methodological 
background and coding procedures of the chosen ‗at-a-distance‘ leadership assessment 
tool: Operational Code Analysis. In this chapter, the upsides of using this particular 
psychological approach along with a few operational code studies on MENA leaders are 
discussed. Then, chapter 3 focuses on the origins of the MB movement and its evolution 
from social charitable organization to a powerful political actor in MENA and world 
politics. This chapter also presents a concise psychobiography of each Islamist leader to 
take a snapshot of the three leaders‘ personal backgrounds and political profiles in their 
adult life. The use of leader‘s psychobiography particularly allows testing the 
hypotheses of operational code construct against the qualitative observation and factual 
information on leaders‘ personal backgrounds.  
Next, the fourth chapter sets the research design and methodology of this study 
in which the research questions and hypotheses are broached. In this chapter, the nuts 
and bolts of research design are explained in details including the relevant research tools 
employed, VICS and Profiler Plus, temporal and spatial domain of the study, data 
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sources, and the case selection. This part also introduces the dependent and independent 
variables of the research with an emphasis on how they are conceptualized and 
operationalized in the operational code literature. 
The following two chapters, chapters 5 and 6, respectively put the operational 
code profiles of three MENA leaders into broader and comparative perspective and they 
attempt to establish a linkage between leaders‘ operational code beliefs and their foreign 
policy behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings era. The latter chapter concentrates heavily 
on the explaining the real-life foreign policies of three MENA leaders one by one so as 
to show to what extent their political belief systems are substantial to their foreign 
policy decision-making. Lastly, the concluding chapter discloses the crux of Islamist 
foreign policy under new MENA leadership by presenting the general patterns of MB-
affiliated Islamist leaders‘ foreign policy behaviors. This part also puts forward a few 
broader policy-relevant recommendations for US foreign policy towards the MENA 
region and briefly discusses the insights of this research for future studies in the field. 
This study has added value to offer both in the leadership studies and foreign 
policy analysis field due to several reasons. Initially, it challenges the conventional 
wisdom concerning the MB movement and its leaders whose images portrayed in the 
West as hostile, ideology-bounded and irrational actors. To test the Western-embedded 
narrative on Islamist leaders, this study aims to show how international relations are 
perceived from the MB-affiliated leadership‘s standpoint. It examines foreign policy 
behaviors of three MENA countries from the vantage point of their leadership. Thus, 
this research follows the lead of pioneering studies in the relevant academic niche 
10 
      
during the last decade (Malici and Buckner 2008; Kesgin 2011; Özdamar 2011; 
forthcoming). 
Second, this study makes a notable contribution to FPA field since in the 
rational actor paradigm the beliefs and perceptions have become significant elements in 
the realist modeling of strategic interactions between states (Lake and Powell 1999). 
This research shift led to departures from the premises of conventional rational actor 
approaches. These approaches e.g., game theory take the actors and their preferences as 
given and assume the structure of the game as external to the strategic interaction 
between players. Contrary to these approaches, this study does not take decision makers 
and their preference orderings as given but instead it draws them from a rigorous and 
independent cognitive theory. Third, another meritorious aspect of this research is its 
attempt to expand the North American leadership assessment methods to the study of 
three strategically important countries in the MENA. With its original research design 
to use in MENA cases, it aims to challenge the argument that North American FPA 
approaches are geographically and methodologically bounded and they are not 
frequently applied to the non-Western political systems (O‘Reilly 2007; Kesgin 2011; 
Özdamar forthcoming). 
In broader terms, finally, this thesis makes a noteworthy contribution to making 
sense of MENA politics from the standpoint of new political leaders affiliated with the 
strongest Islamist force in the region. Despite the plethora of commentaries, and 
descriptive studies on Egypt, Tunisia, and Gaza Strip, there are very few systematic 
studies focusing on the political leaders of these countries and assuming Islamism as a 
11 
      
distinct political philosophy with its idiosyncratic foreign policy preferences. With its 
extensive coverage of Egypt‘s, Tunisia‘s and Gaza‘s Islamist leaders and their foreign 
policy behaviors in the aftermath of Arab uprisings, this study sets forth a nuanced 
approach to understand new MENA politics that increasingly impinges on today‘s 
world politics. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1. Overview of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) Literature 
 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature as a subfield of International Relations (IR) 
can be traced back to the late 1950s and 1960s although FPA-style studies have been 
around so long as there have been diplomats and scholars who have aimed to 
comprehend why leaders have made the choices they did with regards to interstate 
relations. Basically, Hudson (2007: 12) conceptualizes FPA as ‗‗the subfield of 
International Relations that seeks to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign 
policy behavior, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, 
acting singly and in groups.‘‘ In the early 1950s, however, most of the studies were 
based on system-level explanations without necessarily referring to the cognitive, 
psychological and social factors that matter in the decision- making processes of 
decision makers. The study of foreign policy, prior to the 1950s, was generally 
dominated by single case studies which were limited in time and space and with their 
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idiographic nature they could not generate theoretical generalizations that may be 
applicable for other contexts and time frames.  Thus, Levy (2003: 255) describes the 
foreign policy studies before the 1950s as ‗‗more descriptive, policy driven, and 
interpretive rather than theoretical.‘‘ 
In retrospect, it is observed that the bulk of theoretical studies in IR hinge on 
states as their grounds and all decision making units, whether be it a group, a single 
leader, or a state, are approximated to the unitary rational actor which primarily refers to 
the state itself (Hudson 1995; 2005; 2007). Namely, this approach is known as ‗black-
boxing‘ of the state (Hudson 2007: 3-4), or as a ‗billiard ball model‘ of state interactions 
in international politics which can also be termed as ‗actor-general theory‘ (Waltz 1979; 
Clarke and White 1989). In this context, FPA comes into prominence in the IR 
discipline with its assumption that human decision makers, act singly and/or in groups, 
are the ground of all that occurs between nations. Therefore, FPA-style scholarship 
offers a development of actor-specific or actor-oriented theory
3
 which may pave the 
way for the realization of generalizable insights at the level of middle-range theory
4
 
(Rosenau 1966, as cited in Hudson 2005). 
According to Hudson (2005; 2007),  three paradigmatic works, including the 
works by eminent scholars like Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954; 
1962),  James Rosenau (1966), Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956; 1957; 1965), have 
                                                          
3
In this study, the terms actor-specific and actor-oriented  theories are used interchangeably that both  
refer  to a form of middle-range theory. 
4
Here, whereas actor-general theory accounts for the behavior of actors in general (i.e, game theory), 
actor-specific and/or actor-oriented theory explains the behavior of particular actors in a detailed manner 
(such as FPA theory). 
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laid the base of the FPA research program. Decision Making as an Approach to the 
Study of International Politics (1954; also see Snyder et al. 1962; 2002) by Snyder and 
his colleagues prompted scholars to consider below the nation-state level of analysis 
and the individuals involved in decision-making process: 
We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we 
have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing 
decision-making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the 
determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society 
(Snyder et al. 1954: 53). 
 
Particularly, Snyder et al. (1954) have underscored the decision makers‘ 
preferences and perceptions that are necessary to be included in foreign policy 
explanations by referring to the ‗dual-aspect‘ of decision making process.  By doing so, 
they brought in the FPA‘s hallmark of particular emphasis on foreign policy decision-
making as opposed to foreign policy outcomes (Hudson 1995; 2005).  Here, they 
(Snyder et al. 1954: 12) contend that ‗‗if one wishes to probe the ‗why‘ questions 
underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, 
then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary.‘‘ 
The milestone work of James Rosenau aimed at the development of actor-
oriented middle-range theory which can be accomplished through a robust aggregate 
statistical exploration and confirmation. In taking this approach, Rosenau (1964; 1966) 
also underlined the need for integrating information at several levels of analysis in 
understanding foreign policy which bequeathed to FPA its thrust for multi-level and 
multi-causal explanations of the decisions. Particularly, Rosenau‘s pre-theorizing 
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approach inspired researchers to lay bare cross-nationally applicable generalizations 
about the foreign policy behavior of countries in a rigorous and systematic fashion. As 
Rosenau (1966: 98-99) commented: 
To identify factors is not to trace their influence… To recognize that foreign 
policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend 
how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one 
predominates over the other… Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive 
systems of testable generalizations… Foreign policy analysis is devoid of 
general theory. 
 
With their seminal work, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) maintained that 
sticking merely to the analysis of power distribution within an interstate system, without 
references to foreign policy undertakings, understanding foreign policy outputs was 
misled. Here, the Sprouts (1965: 225) associated the policy undertakings with 
intentions, strategies and decisions of the human beings and ‗‗there can be nothing to 
explain or predict, let alone the achievement in foreign policy-making, unless there is an 
undertaking.‘‘  
They contributed to the development of the field by also suggesting that 
researchers need to pay attention to the ‗psycho-milieu‘ of the individual decision 
makers and groups involved in foreign policy decision-making process.
5
 Here, it is 
important to note that particular discrepancies between the real and perceived 
operational environment may transpire which possibly beget to suboptimal decisions in 
                                                          
5
The term psycho-milieu can  be defined as  the international and operational environment or context as it 
is perceived and interpreted by individual decision makers and groups. Also See Hudson (2005 and 
2007). 
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foreign policy-making. The Sprouts (1965: 118) also revealed the conspicuous 
difference between FPA and the aforementioned actor-general theory by arguing that: 
Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual‘s probable 
motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual 
processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to 
the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, 
the cognitive behavioralist undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how 
specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies. 
 
In a nutshell, the insights of these three works can be boiled down to a single but 
an incisive message: ‗‗the particularities of the human beings making national foreign 
policy were vitally important to understanding ultimate foreign policy choice‘‘ (Hudson 
2005: 7). However, these particularities should be incorporated to the larger theory-
building project which employs multiple levels of analysis, spanning from the most 
micro to the most macro, and cross-national explorations. Additionally, it has been 
accentuated that the process of foreign policy decision-making is at least significant, if 
not more, than the foreign policy decision as an ultimate output (Rosati 1997). In that 
sense, these three groundbreaking works established three main areas of research in 
FPA literature that zero in on respectively: the decision-making of small/large groups, 
comparative foreign policy (CFP), and psychological/sociological explanations of 
foreign policy.  
That said, given the intricacies involved in foreign policy decision-making 
stipulate the need for having a particular approach to FPA focusing exclusively on the 
decision making which is imperative to a holistic understanding of foreign policy 
behavior (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). To that end, FPA is furnished with several models 
17 
      
and theories which enable us to comprehend how domestic politics, various decision 
making units, biases and misperceptions and also uncertainty in international politics 
can impinge on the ultimate decisions. Kinder and Weiss (1978) argued that the 
academic literature on decision making has been divided into two competing camps: 
studies based on rational actor model (RAM) and works aimed to challenge that 
dominant paradigm. By the same token, more recent scholarly studies within FPA field 
can be defined and categorized as an internal and/or external critique directed towards 
the rational choice school.
6
 
 
 
2.2. Rational Actor Model 
 
First of all, RAM has been acknowledged as the dominant paradigm of IR discipline 
and the linchpin of foreign policy decision-making. MacDonald (2003: 551) claims that 
RAM is seen ‗‗as the post plausible candidate for a universal theory of political 
behavior, whose simple and intuitively plausible assumptions hold the promise of 
unifying the diverse subfields of political science.‘‘ However, the rational choice 
paradigm approaches to the study of foreign policy without saying anything about the 
particularities of individual decision makers since most of the scholars of decision-
making embark on their analysis with the ‗rational actor‘ assumption. This approach 
stems directly from the realist paradigm which assumes states as unitary actors acting to 
                                                          
6
Internal critique of  rational actor model comes from  again rational choice scholars like Allison and 
Zelikow(1971), Halperin (1974) who introduced bureaucratic politics, organizational process model  and 
bounded  rationality whereas cognitive/psychological paradigm raises a strong external critique to 
discredit the hegemonic discourse of  rational choice school. 
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maximize their power and security and minimize losses because they operate within an 
anarchic international system (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1995).  
This realist rationale generally is seen as ideal type of state interaction in the 
‗self-help‘ system and thus underpins the most optimal form of decision making (Neack 
2008; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Here, realist scholars conflate decision makers with 
state in accordance with the basic presumption that realists make about leaders: ‗‗any 
and all leaders act in ways consistent with the long-term and persistent national interests 
of the country and since the national interests do not change, changes in leadership have 
little consequence‘‘ (Neack 2008: 31). Thus, the set of decisions made by the individual 
leaders are conceived as the decisions of the state in the realist school. One of the 
leading realist scholars Hans Morgenthau (1948: 5, as cited in Neack 2008) made a 
point regarding the linkage between national interest and decision makers that directly 
shapes foreign policy: 
We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, 
and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows 
us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman --past, present or 
future— has taken or will take on the political scene… Thinking in terms of 
interest defined as power, we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps 
better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself. 
 
Moreover, the literature on RAM to foreign policy sets forth an anti-thesis to 
cognitive leadership studies by assuming that all leaders are constrained by the 
international system in the same way so that individual differences are washed off by 
overriding systemic forces (Waltz 1979). Accordingly, in order to downplay the 
influence of human-agency on foreign policy decisions, the protagonists of rational 
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choice tend to use the word ‗regime‘ in lieu of ‗individual.‘ McGinnis (1994: 69) points 
out that: 
Any individual who attains a position of major foreign policy responsibility 
will have been socialized through education and processes of political 
selection to pursue some set of common goals. Individuals differ in their 
perception of the national interest but role expectations reinforce a sense of 
common interests.  
 
The decision-making models that offered by RAM have been devised as a ‗black 
boxes‘ in which a very basic economic utility calculation is made by the insiders 
(regimes, decision makers, bureaucracy) that react to their political environment and 
make decisions in the same way. In essence, RAM argues that individual leaders use 
similar cost-benefit calculation strategies to analyze all options at hand and then choose 
a policy to maximize their payoffs rather than following strategies in accordance with 
their perceptions and beliefs (Bueno de Mesquita 1997; Fearon 1998). This decision-
making framework, however, was not fully systematized until Allison and Zelikow 
(1971) constructed their ‗rational choice model‘ that provided no room for decision 
makers‘ personalities, perceptions, defected information processing (and consequential 
miscalculations) and other psychological variables
7
  
Accordingly, proponents of RAM eschew to focus on individual leaders except 
to the degree that they are seen as all calculating and rational individuals whose primary 
aim is to stay in power. Therefore, this paradigm prioritizes the ‗expected utility theory 
(EUT)‘ which stemmed from the studies of von Neumann and Morgenstern in the late 
                                                          
7For the further inquiry of whether rational choice research agenda pays attention to decision makers‘ 
personalities and perceptions see also Steinbrunner (1974). 
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1940s (as cited in Neack 2008). EUT, grounded on the basic tenets of microecenomics, 
argues that ‗‗the decision maker is assumed to be able to rank preferences according to 
the degree of satisfaction of achieving these goals and objectives‘‘ (Sage 1990: 233). In 
other words, this paradigm suggests that all leaders, with different individual goals, risk 
tendencies and preferences, are still expected to do what will be in their prime interests 
that is mostly understood as ‗leader‘s political survival‘ (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; 
2009).  
For all of its merits, the rational choice paradigm continues to attract a myriad of 
criticisms on the grounds that it gives no attention to the leaders‘ personalities, biases 
and political beliefs and how these particularities may influence both countries‘ foreign 
policy choices and international relations in general. Following this aim, the next 
section teases out the literature on cognitive/psychological school of FPA and its 
criticisms on the hegemonic paradigm, RAM.  
 
 
2.3. Cognitive Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy 
 
Psychological and cognitive characteristics of decision makers have been a part and 
parcel of decision-making research agenda since its inauguration as a sub-field of FPA, 
and many of the ground-breaking studies of this literature give psychological approach 
a paramount place in their analyses (Jervis 1976; Leites 1951; Smith 1968; Snyder et al. 
1962; Sprout and Sprout 1965; Khong 1992). Building on these classics, numerous 
research programs, focusing on different psychological factors, have been formed in the 
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FPA literature. Scholars have analyzed the linkages between foreign policy decisions 
and images (Boulding 1956; Hermann 1985; M. Cottam 1992; 1994; Schafer 1997), 
operational codes (George 1969; Holsti 1970; Walker 1977; Walker et al. 1998), 
perceptions and misperceptions (Cottam 1977; Holsti 1972), integrative complexity 
(Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977) and several personality traits of decision makers 
(Etheredge 1978; Weintraub 2003; Hermann 1970; 1977; 1987; 1999; Schafer 1999).  
The usage of psychological variables in political science can be traced back to 
the Harold Lasswell‘s vital work Pyschopathology and Politics in 1930 which 
introduced political psychology as an academic field in social science (as cited in 
Hudson 2005). In the 1950s and 1960s, some scholars including Snyder and his 
colleagues (1954; 1962), Sprout and Sprout (1956)
8
, Brecher et al. (1969) and Brewser 
Smith (1968) provided important studies regarding to the influence of psychological 
factors on foreign policy decision-making. Particularly, Brecher and his team (1969) 
elaborated on the Sprouts‘ (1956 and 1965) original thought of ‗psychological milieu‘ 
by delving into the decision makers‘ psychological environment including their elite 
images and personal attitudes. Brewser Smith (1968, as cited in Rosati 1997) focused 
on other psychological factors such as ‗ego-defense mechanism‘, ‗object appraisal‘, and 
also ‗engaged attitudes.‘ 
According to Levy (2003), there are two waves of decision-making studies that 
help indicating the extents of cognitive school‘s influence in FPA-style works. In the 
first wave, which commenced by the work of Snyder and his colleagues in 1954 and 
                                                          
8
The insights of twoprominent works penned by Snyder et al. (1954; 1962) and  the Sprouts (1956) were 
explored  in details in the first section of the literature review.  
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continued until 1971, there were more rooms for cognitive approach to become 
effective since scholarly studies on the importance of information and communication 
in foreign policy decision-making and decision makers‘ definition and interpretation of 
the political environment dominated the FPA research agenda. However, there was a 
dearth of rigorous theorizing about the psychological factors in the decision making 
process (Rosati 1997). Therefore, it is fair to say that early scholars missed the 
opportunity for an outright incorporation of psychological variables in FPA tool-kit. 
With the inception of second wave, which emerged with the important work of 
Allison and Zelikow (1971) on the bureaucratic politics and organizational process 
models of foreign policy decision-making, there was even less leeway for cognitive 
tools in the area of foreign policy studies. Here, the decision making process is shaped 
either by pre-specified routines and standard operating procedures or bureaucratic 
actors‘ organizational roles  that overlook different belief systems, personalities, and 
information processing styles of decision makers (Halperin 1974; Levy 2003).  
However, two groundbreaking works of Jervis (1976) and Steinbrunner (1974) 
which were the products of the ‗cognitive revolution‘9 initiated the new research areas 
regarding psychological approach and successfully integrated this research program into 
the study of foreign policy. First, Levy (2003: 255) discerns not only the 
underperformance of early works but also a major breakthrough in cognitive decision 
                                                          
9The phrase ‗cognitive revolution‘ is used to describe the intellectual movement which started in the 
1950s and the academic trends in this era are also known as ‗cognitive sciences.‘ An underlying logic 
behind the cognitive revolution was the idea that it is possible to make testable inferences about human 
mental processes through developing rigorous functions in computer science and artificial intelligence. 
See Pinker (2002) for further information. 
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making literature by arguing that ‗‗psychology had little direct influence on early 
decision-making models in IR literature, and that the turning point in the systematic 
development of a cognitive paradigm of FPA came with Jervis‘s (1976) seminal study 
of Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics.‘‘  
Many scholars agree on a point that the literature on political psychology and its 
relevance for the study of foreign policy were brought together and early insights turned 
into a ‗systematic cognitive paradigm‘ of foreign policy decision-making by Jervis‘s 
innovative work (Rosati 1997; Levy 2003; Lebow 1981). Basically, Jervis (1976) 
contributed to development of cognitive approach by providing a comprehensive 
synthesis of theory and empirical evidence from various perspectives in social 
psychology supported by a good number of historical examples. Jervis‘s study also 
showed, for the first time in literature, that ‗‗many policy outcomes predicted by 
psychological models could also be explained by systemic and/or domestic political 
models‘‘ (Levy 2003: 261). Hence, his call for alternative explanations made a vital 
methodological contribution which was a great leap forward in the project of applying 
psychological models to foreign policy behavior.  
More specifically, Jervis (1976) has debated thoroughly how decision makers‘ 
attitudes change, how decision makers learn lessons, if any, from history, how cognitive 
consistency influences leaders, and an analysis of common patterns of misperception 
regarding decision makers. As Jervis (1976: 28) encapsulated: ‗‗it is often impossible to 
explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers‘ beliefs 
about the world and their images of others.‘‘ Rosati (1997: 53) gives credit to Jervis‘s 
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study by arguing that ‗‗not only did he illustrate the relevance of a cognitive approach 
for FPA and IR, he also used such perspective to critique what he saw as simplistic 
assumptions of both deterrence theory and the spiral model of state interaction in world 
politics.‘‘ In this respect, Jervis‘s foray gave rise to many more specific research areas 
and accelerated some others in IR discipline such as the study of threat perception and 
cognitive biases (Lebow 1981; Holsti 1970; George 1979).  
Second, Steinbruner‘s (1974, as quoted in Rosati 1997) study The Cybernetic 
Theory of Decision is acknowledged as another landmark in cognitive school of foreign 
policy which originated a ‗cognitive theory of decision.‘ With this model, Steinbrunner 
(1974) illustrated that the RAM
10
 ‗‗has great difficulty in explaining governmental 
decision-making and performance, especially under real-world conditions of complexity 
and uncertainty‘‘ (as cited in Rosati 1997: 54). Also, Steinbruner (1974) offered a 
coherent and rigorous theoretical framework for the psychological study of foreign 
policy by discussing how individuals make consequential decisions within the cognitive 
process model and how the model works under a wider collective decision-making 
context as generally occurs within the government. As Steinbruner (1974: 14) argued 
that: ‗‗In essence, it is cognitive operations of human mind working in interaction with 
the organizational structure of the government which set workable limits on highly 
diffuse decision problems.‖ 
Another vibrant research program within the cognitive school is an ‗analogical 
explanation (AE)‘ of foreign policy decisions which introduced by Khong‘s (1965; 
                                                          
10In fact, Steinbrunner (1974) named  the dominant approach in IR as ―the analytic paradigm‘‘ instead of  
saying ―rational actor model.‘‘  
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1992) work Analogies at War. With this paradigmatic work, Khong examined the use of 
analogies particularly in foreign policy decision-making and also in international 
politics through a specific framework called AE. Substantively, Khong‘s AE model is 
consistent with the extant theories of cognitive science since this model embraces the 
canonical principle that individuals are dealing with a complex environment and 
massive information. The AE model reduces a plethora of stimuli to a basic analogy 
which renders the elusive information much more simple and comprehensible for 
decision makers. However, Khong (1965: 45; as quoted in Levy 2003: 267) argues that 
analogies are often, but not always, misemployed by political elites because ‗‗particular 
policy preferences may lead decision-makers to select those analogies that support their 
positions, either subconsciously because of cognitive consistency, or deliberately for 
leverage in political debates.‖  
In his study, Khong cites a number of examples to support his proposed 
decision-making model including the US grand strategy regarding Vietnam in the late 
1960s. Khong uses his model to reveal the analogy between Neville Chamberlain‘s 
appeasement policy towards Hitler‘s Germany in the 1930s and American foreign 
policy behavior with respect to Vietnam impasse in 1965. The AE model argues that 
such an analogy does suggest the eschewing of appeasement strategy and therefore 
prescribe swift escalation to avert a communist expansion in Asia which prevailed 
within the preference orderings of President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
regarding Vietnam conflict (Khong 1965). 
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Ultimately, Khong makes a vital contribution to the cognitive paradigm by 
arguing that decision makers‘ beliefs and reading of a particular historical case through 
the lenses of analogical reasoning can shape their foreign policy preferences (Levy 
2003). Khong (1992), therefore, devised a robust decision-making model to deal with 
these impediments to valid inference and warned researchers to be cognizant of the 
cognitive and motivated biases of leaders in foreign policy decision-making. 
 
 
2.4. Leadership Studies in Foreign Policy Decision Making 
 
The provenances of leadership studies literature date back to the 19th century that can 
be found in Carlyle‘s ‗great man theory of leadership‘ (Carlyle 1888, as cited in Rosati 
1997). Here, the key contention of Carlyle‘s theory is that world history can be virtually 
explained and understood by the impact of ‗great men and/or heroes‘, who innately 
have political skills and power, on the historical developments and the political system. 
Therefore, Carlyle (1888: 2, as quoted in Rosati 1997) argues that ‗‗the history of the 
world is but the biography of great men.‘‘ The studies that employ the ‗great man 
theory‘ use biographies of great leaders such as Napoleon of France and Churchill of 
Britain which were limited in their scientific basis and methodological rigor (Segal 
2000). More importantly, this anecdotal and methodologically-flawed theory is not 
rightly applied to today‘s research designs since there is an inadequate empirical data 
and scientifically weak case studies. 
27 
      
Broadly speaking, it can be argued that there are two potential divides that the 
literature on leadership studies can be grounded and discussed most effectively (Schafer 
2000; 2010)
11. These are ‗methodological‘ and ‗psychological constructs‘ cleavages 
which correspond to differences between: (1) idiographic vs. nomothetic researches and 
(2) personality/unconscious vs. cognitive/conscious characteristics. Firstly, idiographic 
research focuses on single or a few research topics and its added value is appraised by 
the extent to which this research can delve into the details of research subject. 
Idiographic approaches are characterized by the holistic or depth-psychology analysis of 
subjects, so that they utilize ‗psychobiography‘ as a research tool to probe the leader‘s 
whole life in depth to predict general patterns of his/her political behavior (Greenstein 
1969; Schafer 2000; Winter 2003). The psychobiographies involve various specific 
methods such as interviews, biographical materials, and behavioral analysis that come 
from the psychology discipline. The prominent idiographic works include Leites‘s 
(1951; 1953) analysis of Soviet Politburo; the Georges‘ (1956) on Woodrow Wilson; 
Erikson‘s (1958) study on Martin Luther; Glad‘s (1980) on Jimmy Carter; Post‘s (1993 
and 2003) Saddam Hussein; and Renshon‘s (1996) on Bill Clinton.  
Nomothetic approaches, however, aim to derive broad and generalizable patterns 
from a greater sample of subjects and wrestle with the basic question that ‗‗how one or 
a few psychological characteristics typically manifest in political behavior across a 
variety of individuals‘‘ (Schafer 2010: 7).  The research methods used in a nomothetic 
approach primarily involve content analysis, survey research, laboratory experiments. 
                                                          
11
 In order to highlight the literature on leadership studies I decided to borrow and use Mark Schafer‘s 
method for dividing and analyzing the existing studies on individual-level psychology. For further 
insights, see Schafer (2000; 2010). 
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Particularly, the method of content analysis has become increasingly prevalent in FPA-
style works and eventually bore fruit with the development of ‗at a distance approach‘ 
which enable researchers to employ available tools to detect psychological indicators in 
subjects without having direct access to the subjects (Hermann 1980; Schafer 2000; 
2010).  
The latest generation of FPA scholarship is laden with nomothetic approaches 
that mostly employ at a distance and quantitative methods in their studies. Some 
examples of such approaches are: Axelrod (1972; 1976) and Bonham et al. (1978) on 
cognitive maps; George (1969; 1979) Walker et al. (1998; 1999; 2003) on operational 
code analysis of leadership; Hermann (1980; 1984; 1987; 1997) on leadership trait 
analysis (LTA); Boulding (1956), Herrmann (1984; 1985), and Cottam (1985; 1992) on 
image theory.
12
  
Secondly, the divide, albeit an inchoate one, between personality/unconscious 
and cognitive/conscious particularities of subjects constitutes another watershed in the 
literature on leadership studies within FPA. It is an inchoate division because although 
several scholars within the field of political science (Schafer 2000; Schafer and Criclow 
2010) have thought the divide helpful, many psychologists have opposed this 
differentiation since they consider ‗personality‘ to be the most comprehensive notion 
for behavioral and mental functioning of human thinking (Greenstein1969). As Schafer 
(2010: 9) pointed out: 
                                                          
12
That list of the some nomothetic studies in FPA literature is not meant to be exhaustive but a short 
sample of important works that give birth to new research areas in the field. 
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Cognition is mental functioning that involves relatively conscious thinking 
about a subject or object: cognitive manifestations are such things as beliefs, 
prejudices, images, schemata, attitudes, and operational codes… Personality, 
on the other hand, is a combination of psychological factors generally 
considered to be more unconscious responses and reactions including such 
things as motives, ego-defense mechanisms, personality traits and other 
components of depth psychology. 
 
With regard to personality studies, leadership traits and motives have become 
the focal points in the research program. Winter (2003) argues that traits are the 
unconscious constructs that are relatively easily seen in individuals, roughly the things 
that visible upon first impressions. Likewise, motives are often conceptualized as an 
unconscious drives to realize wanted end states or to avert undesired end states and used 
interchangeably with the word ‗needs‘ (Winter 1980; 1987). The studies on leadership 
traits occupy a major place in the FPA-style scholarship such as ‗Big Five‘ traits of 
leaders (Digman 1990; Goldberg 1993; Winter 2003), ‗motive imagery‘ as an analytical 
tool in political psychology (Winter 1980; 1993).  
LTA is another significant research program in leadership studies which places 
itself upon the intersection point of two sides with its eclectic character.
13
 In other 
words, it draws its theoretical underpinnings from each camps of political psychology. 
Margaret Hermann‘s early studies (1974; 1980; 1984; 1987) built the foundation of 
LTA. Particularly, Hermann‘s later works (1999; 2003) are seen as a major 
breakthrough in showing how ‗at-a-distance approaches‘ can allow researchers to 
determine quantitative indicators of the leader‘s psychological traits which are 
                                                          
13
Here, I briefly broach LTA and Op-code analysis,  two leading research programs of leadership studies, 
because they are discussed in detail in next section of the chapter. 
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statistically linked with foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy behaviors of 
states (Schafer 2000; 2010). 
In conclusion, early studies on leadership analysis used biographies of leaders 
and used mostly qualitative methods to examine the personality of decision makers 
(Laswell 1977, as cited in Levy 2003). Accordingly, image theory, operational code 
analysis, and cognitive mapping are exemplified as the most successful research 
programs within the cognitive approaches on foreign policy decision-making.
14
 Yet, it 
can be argued that these models paid little attention to a leader‘s perceptions of the 
political universe let alone the change in the beliefs system of the individuals from time 
to time. The promising trend in leadership studies came with the studies that embraced 
the ‗at-a-distance method‘ that offers content analysis of leaders‘ speech acts to 
examine the leader‘s personality from a distance. There are several scholars who 
employed ‗at-a-distance‘ content analysis method which made a notable contribution to 
the actor-specific studies within FPA field (George 1969; Holsti 1977; Hermann 1980 
and 2001; Schafer 2000; Walker 1983; 1990).  
However, some scholars prioritized the qualitative analysis of leadership style 
and mostly used the psychobiographies of leaders or just their biographies which 
inevitably limit the generalizability of scientific findings of a study such as Post‘s 
analysis of Saddam Hussein leadership profile through his psychobiography (Post 2003; 
Hermann 1980; Hermann and Preston1994). Also, qualitative studies using only 
biographies of the leaders have commenced to lose their prominence and quantitative 
                                                          
14
The list of major works in the literature for each of the research programs is presented  under the 
discussion of idiographic vs nomothetic divide within the leadership psychology literature. 
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methods e.g., LTA and operational code analysis have been used more frequently since 
these approaches employ a quantitative method and have a broader range of 
applicability in almost every cases of foreign policy as long as there are available 
speeches made by decision makers.  
 
 
2.4.1. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) 
 
LTA is another line of at-a-distance inquiry within the leadership studies which 
concentrate on the decision maker‘s personal particularities such as motive, personality 
traits, and decision-making style in explaining foreign policy decisions (Hermann 1970; 
1980; 1999; 2003). Through an assessment of leaders‘ personalities LTA attempts to 
‗‗typologize leaders with specific reference to foreign policy dispositions‘‘ (Hudson 
2005: 11). Hermann conceptualizes leadership style in a way that account for how 
leaders come to terms with other individuals in the political universe including their 
advisors, constituencies, and political rivals and also how ‗‗they structure interactions 
and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions‘‘ (Hermann 
2003: 181). LTA research program determines different leadership styles in accordance 
with the answers given to following three questions: 
(1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment – do 
they respect or challenge such constraints? (2) How open are leaders to 
information coming from their environment? (3) What are the leaders‘ 
reasons for seeking their positions? Are leaders motivated by a cause, the 
desire for power and ideology or by an interest in building relationships? 
(Hermann 1999: 5) 
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Through seeking answers for these questions, Hermann‘s framework measures 
seven different psychological traits of leaders. These traits are: need for power, 
conceptual complexity, self-confidence, distrust, in-group bias, task vs. relationship 
orientation, and belief in ability to control events (Hermann 1999). Here, Hermann has 
constructed a coding scheme to calculate each trait of leader‘s personality and the score 
for each trait ranges from zero to one. Following this procedure, each leader can be 
placed into one of eight most general leadership styles: ‗‗evangelistic, expansionistic, 
directive, actively independent, influential, incremental, collegial, and opportunistic‘‘ 
(Hermann 2003: 185). In LTA project, leaders‘ profiles are determined via a 
comparison of their traits‘ scores to the ‗norming group‘ which includes the personality 
traits of a large group of world leaders. Thus, leaders‘ ranking in comparison to the 
‗norming group‘ prescribes how they are motivated towards the environment, will react 
to political constraints, and their sensitivity towards the incoming information.  
Hermann‘s typology has been acknowledged as instrumental in explaining many 
leaders‘ foreign policy decisions along with foreign policy decision-making and LTA 
has constructed a typology of world leaders‘ profiles which includes Bill Clinton, Hafez 
Assad, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush, Micheael Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, 
Tony Blair and also Tayyip Erdoğan and Tansu Çiller (Hermann 1999; 2001; 2003; 
Dyson 2006; 2009; Dyson and Billordo 2004; Görener and Ucal 2011; Kesgin 2012). 
More recently, proponents of LTA have studied the decision-making process in the US 
and Britain throughout the run-up to the invasion of Iraq which demonstrated how 
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leaders‘ personalities and decision-making style may have a consequential impact on 
ultimate policy preferences (Shannon and Keller 2007; Dyson 2009). 
Dyson (2009: 329) contends that LTA, as a method of leadership assessment, 
‗‗has led to multiple, fruitful lines of research and has been applied to many leaders 
around the world.‘‘ LTA‘s content analysis method based on the assumption that what 
individuals say to their environment and how they say verbal things is illustrative for 
their basic political psychology. Accordingly, this method maintains that decision 
makers‘ choices of specific words reflect their leadership styles. As the founder of LTA 
commented: 
In effect, the trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency 
counts. At issue is what percentage of the time in responding to interviewers‘ 
questions when leaders could exhibit particular words and phrases are they, 
indeed, used (Hermann 2003: 186). 
 
In essence, Hermann‘s method of leadership analysis has been acknowledged as 
modified operational code framework in conjunction with content analysis that enables 
researchers to compare and contrast world leaders‘ decision and interpersonal styles, 
motivations and some political beliefs (Young and Schafer 1998). It can be argued that 
the promise of LTA framework is its efforts to integrate the psychological 
characteristics of decision makers into a more comprehensive picture of leadership 
profiles that are statistically linked to several different foreign policy orientations 
(Hudson 1995; 2005; 2007) This framework, therefore, enables researchers to make 
specific educated guesses about leaders‘ reactions and decisions in multiple levels of 
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foreign policy decision-making and a variety of foreign policy cases (Levy 2003; 
Hudson 2005; Kesgin 2012).  
However, LTA method has been criticized on the grounds that it fails to explore 
the leader‘s personal characteristics in details and takes only a snapshot of a certain 
moment in foreign policy decision-making process (Rasler et al. 1980). Hermann (1980: 
69) addresses these criticisms by arguing that ‗‗personality can be contextually 
dependent and this can be determined by studying diverse material.‘‘ What 
distinguishes Hermann‘s framework from other leadership assessment tools is that this 
research program does not treat any of personality traits in isolation on the contrary it 
concentrates on how these psychological traits are linked with contextual factors 
(Görener and Ucal 2011). 
 
 
2.4.2. Operational Code Analysis  
 
In the aftermath of Cold War, there was a growing need for actor-specific analyses since 
both RAM and other mainstream IR theories failed to anticipate and account for the 
demise of one Soviet Union and the end of Cold War (Walker and Schafer 2006). In 
this context, operational code analysis has gained prominence in conjunction with other 
FPA-style studies. Operational code analysis is a classical approach to foreign policy 
within the cognitive/psychological paradigm that focuses narrowly on a leaders‘ 
political belief system or more broadly on a set of beliefs embedded in the character of a 
leader that is emanating from the cultural matrix of a society (Walker et al. 1998; 
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Walker 2000; Walker and Schafer 2006). Accordingly, the beliefs of political leaders 
are used as causal mechanisms to account for a set of foreign policy decisions (Leites 
1951, 1953; George 1969, 1979; Walker 1983, 1990; Walker and Schafer 2006).  
The core argument of operational code research program is that key individuals 
and their political beliefs highly matter in explaining foreign policies of states which 
were not addressed effectively by many IR theories and also decision-making 
approaches to foreign policy. While operational code approach argues that belief system 
of leaders may act as causal mechanisms in explaining why they prefer a certain foreign 
policy decision from a set of other alternative policies, rational choice paradigm ignores 
the differences in leaders‘ beliefs and perceptions and also their impacts on foreign 
policy decisions which were the reasons for its failure to foresee and explicate the end 
of the Cold War.  
 
 
2.4.2.1. Evolution of Operational Code Analysis towards the Leadership 
Assessment Tool 
 
The operational code research program was originally developed by Nathan Leites 
(1951; 1953) as conceptions of political strategy in Soviet ideology to examine the 
decision making style of the Soviet Politburo as a political unit. Leites explained Soviet 
Union‘s precarious relations and uncommon bargaining behavior with the US 
leadership by analyzing belief systems of Lenin and Stalin which, he claimed, had a 
profound impact on the mindsets of other Soviet leaders and thus shaped the modus 
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operandi of Soviet Politburo especially in foreign policymaking domain (Schafer and 
Young 1998; Schafer 2010). 
Next, the results of Leites‘s study were translated and categorized by George 
(1969) into answers to a set of questions regarding to philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs that make sense of the perceptions about the political universe, the role of the 
leader in that universe, and strategies aiming at the efficacy of various instrumental 
means. George (1969; 1979) elaborated on Leites‘ study by developing two main 
groups of political beliefs which are the answers to the ten questions posed in his 
ground-breaking study. Firstly, the five philosophical beliefs enable researchers to 
highlight leader‘s perceptions of the political universe and the role of ‗other‘ with 
whom the leader confronts in this universe. The second set contains five instrumental 
beliefs which show the image of ‗self‘ and provide a mapping of the means for the ends 
in accordance with the most optimal strategy and tactics for the achievement of foreign 
policy goals (George 1979; Walker 1990).   
These two sets of beliefs are used together to account for decision makers‘ 
tendencies and attitudes on foreign policymaking (Schafer and Walker 2006). Put it 
differently, George (1969: 200) argues that these ten fundamental questions ‗‗would 
capture a leader‘s fundamental orientation towards the problem of leadership and 
action.‘‘ The ten questions of operational code research program are listed below 
(George 1969: 200): 
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‗‗The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code are: 
P-1. What is the ‗‗essential‘‘ nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially 
one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one‘s political 
opponents? 
P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one‘s fundamental values and 
aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what 
respects the one and/or the other? 
P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? 
P-4. How much ‗‗control‘‘ or ‗‗mastery‘‘ do self and other have over historical 
development? What is self and other‘s role in ‗‗moving‘‘ and ‗‗shaping‘‘ history in the 
desired direction? 
P-5. What is the role of ‗‗chance‘‘ in human affairs and in historical development? 
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code are: 
I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? 
I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
I-4. What is the best ‗‗timing‘‘ of action to advance one‘s interests? 
I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one‘s interests?‘‘ 
 
George (1969: 202) further contributed to operational code approach by re-
conceptualizing the first two philosophical beliefs (‗‗What are the sources of conflict?‘‘ 
and ‗‗What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?‘‘) as ‗master beliefs‘ that 
functioned as a primary constraint on the belief systems and perceptions of the leaders. 
Following George‘s seminal work, a good number of qualitative operational code 
analyses were brought in the literature which employed George‘s theoretical template 
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and verified the causal mechanism offered by early scholars of the program (Johnson 
1977; Walker 1977; Stuart and Starr 1981; Walker and Falkowski 1984).  
Particularly, Walker‘s (1977) study on Henry Kissinger‘s leadership style was 
quite significant because he systematically analyzed the relationship between political 
beliefs and foreign policy behavior by exploring the interface between Kissinger‘s 
political beliefs and his bargaining behavior during the Vietnam impasse. This work is 
seen as ‗‗the most consistent attempt to connect the operational code to the policy 
behavior of a leader‘‘ (Walker and Schafer 1998: 73). Loch Johnson (1977) also 
contributed to the theoretical arsenal of operational code construct which laid the 
foundations for the development of quantitative approach within the research program. 
Johnson‘s  study of Senator Frank Church‘s belief system found that ‗‗the beliefs in 
operational code were arranged along a continuum making the answers to philosophical 
and instrumental questions applicable to interval-level scales, thus facilitate comparison 
among political actors‘‘ (Young and Schafer 1998: 70). 
Building on George‘s framework, Holsti (1977) constructed a leadership 
typology on the basis of leaders‘ operational codes by answering George‘s ten questions 
about philosophical and instrumental beliefs. He established six types op-codes (A, B, 
C, D, E, F) which were later reduced to four groups (A, B, C, DEF) by Walker (1983, 
1990). Holsti‘s typology is based on the nature (temporary or permanent) and the source 
(individual / society / international system) of conflict in the political world, derived 
from the ‗master beliefs‘ which are answers to the P-1, I-1 and P-4 questions. Table 1 
represents the revised version of Holsti‘s (1977) typology in details:  
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Table 1. Contents of the Revised Holsti‘s Operational Code Typology. Adopted from 
Walker (1983; 1990).
15
 
TYPE A 
Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit 
Conflict is temporary, caused by human 
misunderstanding and miscommunication. A 
―conflict spiral,‖ based upon misperception and 
impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. 
Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation 
and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a 
leader‘s ability and willingness to shape historical 
development. The future is relatively predictable, and 
control over it is possible. Establish goals within a 
framework that emphasizes shared interests. 
Pursue broadly international goals incrementally 
with flexible strategies that control risks by 
avoiding escalation and acting quickly when 
conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize 
resources that establish a climate for negotiation 
and compromise and avoid the early use of force. 
 
TYPE C 
Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit 
Conflict is temporary; it is possible to 
restructure the state system to reflect the latent 
harmony of interests. The source of conflict is 
the anarchical state system, which permits a 
variety of causes to produce war. Opponents 
vary in nature, goals, and responses to 
conciliation and firmness. One should be 
pessimistic about goals unless the state system 
is changed, because predictability and control 
over historical development is low under 
anarchy. Establish optimal goals vigorously 
within a comprehensive framework. Pursue 
shared goals, but control risks by limiting 
means rather than ends. Act quickly when 
conciliation opportunities arise and delay 
escalatory actions whenever possible. 
Resources other than military capabilities 
are useful. 
   
TYPE DEF 
Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit 
Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), 
nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power 
disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents 
may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness 
are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run 
and in the short run depends upon the quality of 
leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is 
limited, as is control over historical development. 
Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. 
Use military force if the opponent and 
circumstances require it, but only as a final 
resource. 
 
TYPE B 
Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit 
Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; 
miscalculation and appeasement are the major 
causes of war. Opponents are rational and 
deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding 
realization of goals. The political future is 
relatively predictable, and control over 
historical development is possible. One should 
seek optimal goals vigorously within a 
comprehensive framework. Control risks by 
limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic 
and resource may be appropriate, including 
the use of force when it offers prospects for 
large gains with limited risks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
In the revised Holsti (1977) typology, instrumental beliefs are highlighted as bold, and philosophical 
beliefs are not highlighted.  
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In the late 1990s, the turning point for operational code research program came 
with the paradigmatic work of Walker and his colleagues which paved the way for an 
excessive body of literature on leadership analysis to flourish subsequently. Firstly, 
Walker et al. (1998), that focused on the change in Jimmy Carter‘s political beliefs in 
the late 1970s, established an ‗at-a-distance‘ and quantitative operational code research 
agenda which ‗‗allowed for measurements of such things as the subject‘s view of 
conflict propensities in the world and the utility of conflict as a means of policy by the 
subject himself‘‘ (Schafer 2010: 11).  
To that end, Walker and his colleagues (1998) developed The Verbs in Context 
System (VICS) that is an automated content analysis system which draws inferences 
about a decision maker‘s operational code establishment basically from public sources 
that includes speeches, interviews or other public statements made by the leaders. The 
VICS, as a content analysis technique, is referred to a set of methods that are used to 
retrieve the patterns of beliefs from a leader‘s public statements and then draw 
inferences about public behavior which are consistent with these beliefs (Walker et al. 
1998; Walker and Schafer 2006). In order to locate leaders‘ images of the ‗self‘ and 
‗other‘ in one of the four quadrants of Holsti‘s typology, the VICS indices of the master 
beliefs (P-1, I-1, and P-4 scores) must be mapped on the horizontal (P-4) and vertical 
(P-1/I-1) axes in Table 1. Thus, a researcher can make educated guesses about strategic 
preferences over the goals of settle, submit, dominate, and deadlock (Walker and 
Schafer 2006). Table 2 provides the ‗nuts and bolts‘ for calculating the VICS indices for 
the master beliefs. 
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Table 2. The Verbs in Context System Indices for Beliefs in Leader‘s Operational 
Code
16
                                                          
 Elements Index Interpretation 
P-1 NATURE OF THE 
POLITICAL UNIVERSE 
(Image of others) 
%Positive minus %Negative 
Transitive Other Attributions 
+1.0 friendly to -1.0 
hostile 
P-2 REALIZATION OF 
POLITICAL VALUES 
(Optimism/ Pessimism) 
Mean Intensity of Transitive 
Other Attributions divided by 3 
+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 
pessimistic 
P-3 POLITICAL FUTURE 
(Predictability of others‘ tactics) 
1 minus Index of Qualitative 
Variation** for Other 
Attributions 
1.0 predictable to 0.0 
uncertain 
P-4 HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT (Locus of 
control) 
Self (P-4a) or Other (P-4b) 
Attributions (Self plus Other 
Attributions) 
1.0 high to 0.0 low self-
control 
P-5 ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence 
of control) 
1 minus [Political Future x 
Historical Development Index] 
1.0 high role to 0.0 low      
Role 
I-1 APPROACH TO GOALS 
(Direction of strategy) 
%Positive minus %Negative 
Self Attributions 
+1.0 high cooperation  to    
-1.0 high conflict 
I-2 PURSUIT OF GOALS 
(Intensity of tactics) 
Mean Intensity of Transitive 
Self Attributions divided by 3 
+1.0 high cooperation to   
-1.0 high conflict 
I-3 RISK ORIENTATION 
(Predictability of tactics) 
1 minus Index of Qualitative 
Variation for Self Attributions 
1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0    
risk averse 
I-4 TIMING OF ACTION 
(Flexibility of tactics 
1 minus Absolute Value [%X 
Minus %Y Self Attributions] 
1.0 high to 0.0 low shift 
propensity 
 a. Coop v. Conf tactics Where X = Coop and Y = Conf  
 b. Word v. Deed Tactics Where X = Word and Y = Deed  
I-5 UTILITY OF MEANS 
(Exercise of power) 
Percentages for Exercise of 
power Categories a through f 
+1.0 very frequent to 0.0    
infrequent 
 a. Reward a‘s frequency divided by total  
 b. Promise b‘s frequency divided by total  
 c. Appeal/Support c‘s frequency divided by total  
                                                          
16
All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1and I-2 varying between -1.0 and +1.0. P-2 
and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). The Index 
of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the 
maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the 
same number of variable classifications‘‘ (Watson and McGaw, 1980:88). 
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 d. Oppose/Resist d‘s frequency divided by total  
 e. Threaten e‘s frequency divided by total  
 f. Punish f‘s frequency divided by total  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that with the development of VICS the cognitive 
studies within the FPA literature has shifted from the qualitative operational code and 
LTA studies to more quantitative and more generalizable analyses which advanced the 
scientific rigor of cognitive research program within the FPA discipline. However, the 
controversial issue of when political beliefs matter in the decision making process has 
reflected a greater concern within FPA discipline regarding the actual linkages between 
leaders‘ beliefs and their foreign policy behaviors.  
In operational code research program, scholars chose to define and 
operationalize ‗beliefs as causal mechanisms‘ in order to inform game theoretical 
models by constructing a set of behavioral preference orderings that could reveal the 
instrumental links between beliefs and behaviors (Walker and Schafer 2004; 2006). 
These preference orderings are utilized to inform the scores attached to actors‘ 
sequential moves between conflict and cooperation strategies. Walker and Schafer 
(2004; 2006) refined these preference orderings that derived from the master indices of 
operational codes of the leader by establishing a ‗theory of inferences about preferences 
(TIP).‘ TIP is a deductive theory of preferences in which the inferences are made by 
comparing the subject‘s master belief scores (P-1, I-1, and P-4) with the norming group 
composed of world political leaders. The details of Walker and Schafer‘s TIP and also 
particular predictions about the leaders‘ preferences are provided in the following table. 
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Table 3. Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP). First (Basic) Version. Adopted 
from Walker and Schafer (2006).
17
 
Self Other Values      Preference Order in a 2 X 2 Strategic Game 
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & >      Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appease) 
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & =      Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Deter/Reward) 
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & >      Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Exploit) 
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & <      Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Bluff) 
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & =      Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Punish/Compel) 
I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & >      Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully) 
 
This renewed research program has led to a growing body of literature on 
operational code analyses of leaders and also novel research areas which include studies 
on change in political beliefs and its impacts on policy behavior, group decision making 
e.g., the relationship between leaders and advisors, political beliefs of rogue leaders, 
operational code and democratic peace theory, operational code and game theoretical 
models (Walker et al. 1999; 2003; Marfleet 2000; Walker and Schafer 2000; 2006; 
2007; Schafer and Crichlow 2002; Feng 2005a; 2005b; 2006; Schafer et al. 2006; 
Malici 2005; 2006; Malici and Buckner 2008; Criclow 2006; Drury 2006; Renshon 
2008; 2009; Winter 2011). Nevertheless, in comparison to other sub-fields of 
operational code research program, the literature on change and continuity in leaders‘ 
                                                          
17Note: ―+‖ indicates above and ―−‖ indicates below the norming mean, and ―<, >, =‖ indicate below, 
above, or within the norming average range, which is P-4a ±1 SD. The mean values for the norming 
group of world leaders are: P-l = +.30, SD = .29; I-1 = +.40, SD = .43; P-4 = .22, SD = .13) (Malici and 
Buckner 2008). 
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beliefs has been viewed as inchoate and limited in terms of its empirical footing 
(Renshon 2008). 
 
 
2.4.2.2. Change in Leaders’ Operational Codes 
 
Several studies within the cognitive paradigm have contributed to an understanding of 
change and/or continuity in leaders‘ political beliefs over time. Loch Johnson‘s (1977) 
Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior focused on the change 
and degree of change in the operational code of leaders stemming from changes in 
environmental aspects that fuel psychological pressure on foreign policy makers. 
Following Johnson‘s ‗research agenda-setting‘ study, several scholars examined 
whether there is a continuity or change in operational code of a number of political 
leaders, including J. Foster Dulles (Holsti 1967 and 1970), Henry Kissinger (Walker 
1977), Woodrow Wilson (Walker 1995) Jimmy Carter (Walker et al. 1998), Bill Clinton 
(Schafer and Criclow 2000), Fidel Castro (Malici and Malici 2005), Mao Zedong (Feng 
2005a and 2005b), George W. Bush (Renshon 2008), and more recently Neville 
Chamberlain (Walker et al. 2012). 
Cognitive theory, informed by the works on both schemas and cognitive 
consistency, based on the assumption that central/master beliefs are the most 
consequential in understanding the process of cognition and perception (Rosati 1997). 
As Milton Rokeach (1968: 3) summarized three main premises of cognitive theory: 
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First, not all beliefs are equally important to the individual; beliefs vary along 
a central-peripheral dimension. Second, the more central a belief, the more it 
will resist change. Third, the more central the belief changed, the more 
widespread the repercussions in the rest of the belief system.  
 
These central arguments notwithstanding, cognitive paradigm subsumes 
different accounts on the issue of change in leaders‘ belief systems and there are two 
competing theories within the cognitive approach that deal with the puzzle of continuity 
and/or change in political beliefs: (1) Cognitive Consistency Theory (CCT) and (2) 
Schema Theory (ST). Firstly, CCT underlines the overall rigidity of operational code 
beliefs due to their tight interconnectedness and, if the change occurs, it will be a 
sudden and all-encompassing belief system change in nature that impinge on all levels 
of foreign policy decision-making and the ultimate policy preferences (Rosati 1997). 
Jervis further elucidates the cognitive consistency by arguing that ‗‗if a person‘s attitude 
structure is to be consistent, then incremental changes among interconnected elements 
cannot be made. Change will be inhibited, but once occurs, it will come in large 
batches. Several elements will change almost simultaneously‘‘ (1976: 170).  
There are numerous studies that support Jervis‘s theoretical argument. For 
example, Holsti (1970) claim that Dulles‘s enemy image of the Soviet Union was 
fundamentally constant throughout his term in office. Heradstveit (1979) observed 
consistency in Israeli and Arab images towards each other during the 1970s. After 
Walker‘s work (1977), Starr (1984) also analyzed the political beliefs of Kissinger and 
found consistency pattern between his pre-office, incumbent office, and post-office 
beliefs. Moreover, Schafer and Crichlow (2000) argue that the operational code beliefs 
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of Bill Clinton remained stable during his terms of office despite a set of radical events 
in international politics that occurred in the 1990s. Thus, there is a growing body of 
literature in leadership studies which premised on cognitive consistency theory (Jervis 
1976; George 1969; 1979; Holsti 1967; 1970; Heradstveit 1979; Starr 1984; Ben-Zvi 
1978; Walker 1977; 2000; Walker et al. 1998; Walker and Schafer 2006; Crichlow 
1998; Schafer and Crichlow 2000 Feng; 2005a; 2005b; 2006). 
On the other hand, ST contends that political beliefs are much more isolated and 
inconsistent with each other which make them less resistant towards external stimuli 
and more open to incremental changes over time (Rosati 1987). Larson (1985) 
supported this causal mechanism by providing empirical evidence with her work on the 
origins of the Cold War in which she found constant change in the belief systems of 
Truman, Byrnes, and Harriman who incrementally but inevitably came to embrace a 
hostile image towards the Soviet Union. Similarly, Rosati (1987) also found a constant 
fluctuation in the beliefs of Jimmy Carter and also his foreign policy advisors 
Brzezinski and Vance between the years of 1977 and 1979 which marked with major 
belief changing events for the US leadership such as 1979 events: Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iranian revolution within the same year. To date, however, the 
literature on leadership studies, as informed by the cognitive theory, has suffered from 
the paucity of theoretical and empirical works on ST underscoring the increased 
frequency and consequential impact of changes in political beliefs rather than continuity 
and stability among them. 
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By reviewing the literature, it can be argued that although there are many FPA-
style studies that examine the impact of leaders‘ belief systems on foreign 
policymaking, there are limited number of studies that focus on change in a leaders‘ 
operational codes and its impact on foreign policy behaviors of countries in different 
time frames (Walker et al. 1998; Walker et al. 1999; Renshon 2008). One of the few 
examples is  Renshon‘s study (2008) which concentrates on the change in leaders‘ 
operational code that is rooted from the ‗belief changing events‘ but he prefers to name 
as ‗traumatic shocks‘ which refer to the threats of impending inter-state wars and major 
terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks on American homeland.  
Renshon (2008: 827) contends that only a few of the studies in the literature 
were designed in such a way so as to distinguish between multiple potential causes of 
belief changes and he adds that ‗‗although these researches supported the contention 
that operational codes were more flexible than initially posited, they could not explain 
why and how these changes materialized and influenced states‘ foreign policy 
behaviors.‘‘ For this reason, it is safe to argue that there are more studies in the 
literature which underline the stability of the leaders‘ operational code and most of the 
political beliefs of decision makers inclined to remain unchanged.  
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2.4.2.3. Applying the Operational Code Approach to the Study of Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) Leadership 
 
Despite the fact that Nathan Leites (1951; 1953) originally developed an operational 
code construct to analyze a non-Western political group (the Soviet Politburo), 
contemporary operational code research agenda mostly focuses on Western-based 
leaders and political groups because of its highly technical and automated methods that 
engender problems when employed to analyze different cultural and political settings 
(Özdamar forthcoming). Therefore, it has been relatively difficult to apply operational 
code approach to examine national leaders and decision-making groups which operate 
in non-Western political systems that have an impact on the dynamics of foreign policy 
behaviors of states in different parts of the world such as MENA region. Admittedly, 
Western-originated FPA theories have mainly suffered from ‗boundedness‘ and 
‗inapplicability‘ problems when used for non-North American cases and the operational 
code approach to foreign policy also could not break this ‗universal inapplicability‘ 
mold. As a result, there are very few FPA-style studies that zero in on non-Western 
cases and political Islam as a distinct political ideology with particular foreign policy 
behaviors (Crichlow 1998; O‘Reilly 2007; Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008; 
Picucci 2008; Jugaz 2010; Walker 2011; Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and Canbolat 2012; 
Özdamar forthcoming; Jacquier 2012). 
In retrospect, Western IR academia commenced to study the impacts of religion 
of Islam and religious political groups and/or leaders (e.g., the Mullahs) on foreign 
policy preferences in the aftermath of Iranian revolution of 1979. However, the early 
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studies were underdeveloped in terms of their methodologies and theoretical approaches 
that failed to examine the impact of political Islam on foreign policy (Dawisha 1985; 
Lewis 1991). Afterwards, the sources of foreign policy in the Islamic world have been 
studied by both Muslim scholars with an Islamic perspective to religion-foreign policy 
nexus and also by other scholars who applied Western-oriented geopolitical theories to 
expound MENA‘s international relations (Abu Suleyman 1987; Lewis 1995; Fuller and 
Lesser 1995). Although there has been an upsurge of scholarly interest in the Islamic 
movements and leadership in the wake of cataclysmic events such as 9/11 attacks, US-
led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the literature on Islamic leaders‘ influences on 
foreign policies choices of MENA countries can be, at best, defined as inchoate. Thus, 
this study aims to address the consequential gap in the FPA literature. 
The extant but limited literature on operational code analyses of MENA political 
leaders can be traced back to Criclow‘s (1998) study measuring  the operational codes 
Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres comparatively that shaped not only 
Israeli foreign policy but also Arab-Israeli peace process and so the Middle East politics 
from the 1970s to 1990s. Israeli political leaders were the first subjects of operational 
code research program regarding the application of operational code approach to 
MENA leadership cases. In his study, Criclow (1998: 623) observed that ‗‗both leaders‘ 
conception of their political environment changed over time, from conflictual in the 
1970s to neutral in the 1990s but unlike Rabin, operational code of Peres underwent 
acute fluctuations, in response to the perceived different situational context.‘‘ O‘Reilly 
(2007) focused on ‗rogue state leadership‘ in the world and used an operational code 
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analysis to explain the modus operandi of rogue states by analyzing belief systems of 
the leaders of those states. The author studied the political leadership of Muammar 
Kaddafi as a case study to shed some light on a rogue state of mind. O‘Reilly (2007: 24-
25) basically found out that ‗‗in examining the operational code of Kaddafi a distinct 
world view emerges dissimilar to that of the average world leader...the time cross-
sectional analysis of Kaddafi‘s operational code reveals transformations indicating 
learning did occur from 1993 to 2005.‘‘ 
Similarly, there were a few more FPA-style studies that focused on rogue 
leaders and their foreign policy behaviors especially in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and the global war on terror (GWOT). Malici (2007) and Malici and Buckner (2008) 
aimed at theorizing on the foreign policy preferences of rogue leaders by establishing a 
link between the levels of their frustration with the perceptions of hostile American 
foreign policy towards their regimes and, in return, their escalatory and aggressive 
foreign policy behavior. By examining the psychology of rogue leaders such as Kim 
Jong-il of North Korea he suggested a ‗realistic empathy‘ towards rogue leaders and the 
mutual advantages of pursuing engagement strategies rather than containment (Malici 
2007). Realistic empathy is defined as ―understanding how a situation looks like to 
another person or group. It does not necessarily imply sympathy, or tolerance, or liking- 
but simply understanding… trying to look at his situation through his eyes rather than at 
him as an individual (White 1991: 292). According to peace researchers, this concept 
stands as one of the greatest contributions of psychology into the field international 
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relations since it functions as ―the great corrective for all forms of war-provoking 
misperception‖ (White 1984: 160). 
Building on this theoretical template, Malici and Buckner (2008) elaborated on 
the psychological profiling of rogue leaders and broaden the research agenda on rogue 
leaders by examining the operational codes of two MENA leaders: Iran‘s Ahmadinejad 
and Syria‘s Al-Asad. Their study provides evidence against the conventional wisdom 
that Iran and Syria are antagonistic states headed by bellicose leaders and 
Ahmadinejad‘s and Al-Asad‘s uncompromising policy behaviors stem from their 
perceptions of ‗‗US actions towards their countries as highly hostile that threaten the 
survival of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus‘‘ (Malici and Buckner 2008: 798). 
Accordingly, analyzing the operational codes of these rogue leaders makes an added 
value to the literature since conflict resolution studies must include an analysis of the 
way in which the rogue regimes perceive the American foreign policy towards their 
countries and regions.  
In parallel with the study of rogue leaders, there have been a few studies in the 
late 2000s that utilize the operational approach in the study of terrorism and terrorist 
organizations mainly operating in the MENA region (Picucci 2008; Jugaz 2010; 
Jacquier 2012). These authors have the common starting point that ‗‗beliefs are central 
feature of terrorist decision-making and therefore to understanding their 
behaviors…Understanding the beliefs of terrorist organization is also therefore a crucial 
element in informing counter-terrorism efforts‘‘ (Picucci 2008: 117). However, contrary 
to conventional operational code approach these studies aimed to focus on political 
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actors (both individual leaders and groups) who do not take part in a state‘s leadership 
structure but continue to have an impact on MENA‘s international relations (Jacquier 
2012).  
The latest subject matters of operational code studies on terrorism have been the 
well-known terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (Picucci 2008; Walker 2011; Zugaj 2010), 
Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas (Picucci 2008), and the leaders of Al-Qaeda 
Osama Bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri (Walker 2011; Jacquier 2012). 
For example, Walker‘s (2011) study highlights significant differences between the 
operational codes of Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri which provides significant insights on 
Al-Qaeda‘s terrorist behaviors and strategies to achieve their political aims and the 
capabilities of the global jihadist movement. However, there is a growing critical 
perspective on these leadership studies using ‗at a great distance‘ theoretical approaches 
and methods that, albeit being parsimonious, are destined to be bounded in its scope and 
substance (Jacquier 2012; Özdamar forthcoming). 
More recently, there has been a bit resurgent interest in the MENA leadership 
and regional politics owing to the fact that popular uprisings in the Arab world pave the 
way for the reconfiguration of political power centers and make Islamist movements 
and their leaders an indispensable actor in understanding the changing character 
MENA‘s international relations. In the aftermath of Cold War, the Islamic movements 
resurged and manifested itself in both terrorist activities or resistance organizations 
against to expansionist states (Picucci 2008; Özdamar 2011) and also in democratic 
systems such as in Tunisia with the Ennahda Movement (Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and 
53 
      
Canbolat 2012; Özdamar forthcoming).
18
 In his study, Özdamar (2011) analyzes the 
operational codes of three Islamist leaders of MENA in a comparative manner: Erbakan 
of Turkey, Khomeini of Iran, and Kaddafi of Libya. The author then makes an assertion 
that although these MENA leaders have very distinct personal characteristics and 
political experiences, their approaches to foreign affairs show a notable uniformity. 
Here, Özdamar (2011: 13) underlines that while ‗‗all three leaders showed very negative 
and high scores of P1and very high scores of P4b (with low P4a scores)‘‘ that can be 
explained by their nations‘ early experiences of Western colonialism and imperialism, 
these leaders‘ foreign policy strategies ‗‗showed a mixed picture. The most general 
pattern is the Islamists see themselves as cooperative if opportunities arise.‘‘19  
Next, another study attempts to examine the operational code of political 
Islamist leaders operating in MENA to find a general pattern of foreign policy strategies 
of these leaders regarding contexts of action and tactics to accomplish political goals 
(Özdamar and Canbolat 2012). In this research, the authors attempt to make a 
comparative operational code analysis of two generations of Islamist leaders to question 
whether there are general patterns of belief systems about foreign policy among Islamist 
leaders of MENA.
20
  Accordingly, it is argued that the neo-Islamists have also similar 
operational code beliefs along with old generation of Islamist leaders and the empirical 
                                                          
18
Two of these three studies by Özdamar (2011) and Özdamar and Canbolat (2012) were presented at the 
annual meetings of the International Studies Association in 2011 and 2012. These researches are still in 
progress and not published. Özdamar (expected to be published in 2014) is a forthcoming book chapter 
project which summarizes main findings of previous two studies in a comparative manner. 
19Özdamar‘s (2011) empirical findings from  the operational code analysis of Political Islamists in MENA 
mostly overlap with Malici‘s (2007) and Malici‘s and Buckner‘s (2008) findings and concluding remarks 
about the rogue state leaders in MENA that increase the validity and reliability of both findings.  
20The first generation of Islamist leaders can be defined as ‗old generation‘ including Erbakan of Turkey, 
Khomeini of Iran and Kaddafi of Libya (Özdamar 2011). The second generation called neo-Islamists and 
the leaders are Erdoğan of Turkey, Ahmadinejad of Iran and Meshaal of Palestine. 
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evidence supports the early assumption that ‗‗political Islam as a distinct political 
ideology seems to have a rather unified worldview‘‘ (Özdamar and Canbolat 2012: 19). 
However, the authors also expected to find stark differences between the new and old 
Islamist leaders but there is no preliminary evidence that confirm this assumption up to 
this point. The only significant difference among the new generation of Islamists is 
found in Erdoğan‘s P4a (self-control over events) score which is markedly higher than 
all of the coded Islamist leaders of MENA.  
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
In brief, despite being fruitful and cutting edge sub-field of IR, the literature on North 
American FPA-style scholarship is associated with ‗boundedness‘ and ‗inapplicability‘ 
problems. Yet, as the final section of the chapter showcases, the operational code 
analysis stands out very useful in the study of Middle Eastern leadership and the 
Islamist philosophy on international politics. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the 
operational code approach to foreign policy can be applied to the MENA politics since 
it proved instrumental in analyzing the political belief systems of national leaders 
operating in the Non-Western context including MENA leaders cited in the preceding 
section. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD AND NEW MENA LEADERS 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the post-Arab uprisings era, Islamist movements have broadly gained strength and 
reasserted themselves across the MENA region. Among others, the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) holds the distinction of being the oldest, largest and most powerful 
Islamist group operating in the Muslim world (Leiken and Brooke 2007). The Egyptian 
MB‘s political wing Freedom and Justice Party has garnered 47 percent in the first 
parliamentary elections and his candidate Mohamed Morsi won the presidential 
elections in the post-Mubarak era while the MB offshoot in Tunisia has obtained about 
40 percent of the assembly seats in 2011. Furthermore, Hamas, a branch of the MB in 
Palestine, has been governing the Gaza Strip since June 2007.  
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To put the MB‘s popularity into perspective, in 2012 RAND analysts anticipate 
the North African MB membership to be hover over 600,000
21
 whereas MB leadership 
places the number at 2,000,000 plus followers in Egypt alone. Similarly, Barry Rubin, 
senior researcher at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), argues that ―today, the 
MB is the most important international political organization in the Arab-speaking 
world even as the organization lacked formal legal status in Egypt for almost sixty 
years.‖22 Yet, Munson (2001) points out that despite it magnitude and significance in 
the region, scholars still know very little about the origins, the political evolution of the 
MB and the characteristics of its leadership. This research aims to address this gap 
within the political science field with a focus on the foreign policy belief systems of the 
MB-affiliated leaders operating in MENA. Following this aim, first the historical 
background of the MB and its fickle relations with the relevant states of MENA is 
presented. In the next section, the psychobiographies of three political Islamist leaders 
are discussed to expound upon their personal backgrounds and political inclinations in 
their adult life. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
For further information on the MB membership in the Egypt, North Africa and MENA, see the 2012 
RAND report ―The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement‖ here: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1247.pdf (Last Access: 
18.05.2013). 
22Barry Rubin ―Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood‖ June 2012, Footnotes published by the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute. To reach the report, see: 
http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1708.201206.rubin.muslim-brotherhood.pdf (Last Access: 18.07.2013). 
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3.2. The History of Muslim Brotherhood in MENA 
 
The Egyptian MB
23
 was founded by Hasan al-Banna in March 1928 as an organization 
that acted out of the formal political system and aimed at the far-reaching Islamic 
reformation of the secular society and also the Egyptian state‘s modus operandi. Al-
Banna viewed the Western influence within Middle East as a ‗malaise‘ that would 
debilitate and eventually destroy the Eastern societies by alienating them from Islamic 
creed and ideals (Hourani 2002). Accordingly, the MB emerged as a resistance 
movement to foreign forces which spearheaded the local resistance against Western 
colonialism and imperialism along with the more secular and liberal segments of 
society. Another source of inspiration for the founding fathers of MB was the abolition 
of caliphate by the new Turkish republic which had lasted almost since the religion of 
Islam emerged many centuries ago. According to early MB leadership, therefore, there 
was an immediacy of restoring and re-asserting Islam into the heart of Muslim societies 
not only socially but also politically (Rubin 2011). 
The MB‘s most important venture to accomplish Islamic overhaul of the society 
was the Dawa
24
 movement which literally means the ‗religious outreach‘ and/or 
‗proselytism‘ through social services to address the needs of low-income families, as 
well as religious indoctrination within the society (Wickham 2011). Through the pursuit 
                                                          
23The original name of the organization was the ‗Society of Muslim Brothers‘ when it was established in 
1928 and then became known by a more name within Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. For further 
information on the early period of the Society of Muslim Brothers, see Edgar (1987). 
24
The Dawa is a contested term and it is still debated within the Islamic circles. The term is also translated 
into English as ‗‗to appeal to become a Muslim.‘‘ On this debate, see also Palestinian Media Watch: 
http://palwatch.org/STORAGE/special%20reports/Jihad_is_the_way_by_Mustafa_Mashhur.pdf (Last 
Access: 10.06.2013). 
58 
      
of Dawa, the organization‘s primary objective was not to seek power for itself 
immediately but rather to engineer an ideal Muslim community that would itself desire 
a political system and public sphere based exclusively on the ‗Shari‘a‘.25 In this context, 
The MB flourished very rapidly in the Egyptian society and gained tens of thousands of 
followers and opened a vast number of branch offices in the country during the late 
1930s (Cleveland 2004). The movement‘s popularity mostly stemmed from its 
comprehensive social programs and vibrant organizational structure. The MB gained 
further popularity in Egypt following the Great Depression of 1929 since the 
organization successfully mitigated the side-effects of economic slump by its social 
programs (Aknur 2013). Considering these reasons, Munson (2001) argues that the MB 
had five offshoot offices in 1930 which increased to fifteen by 1932 and the number of 
offices skyrocketed to three hundred by 1938 due to the meteoric upsurge in 
organization‘s membership. Although exact membership numbers are not verified with 
the historical data, it is claimed that three hundred branch offices represented 
approximately between 50,000 and 150,000 followers of the MB in the late 1930s 
(Mitchell 1969). 
In a similar vein, Ehrenfeld (2011) contends that the Brotherhood is a quasi-
conglomerate organization that has various offshoots worldwide while most of them are 
operating in the MENA region. Yet, this Islamist movement differs from a conventional 
international organization because it is more akin to a loose and heterogeneous religious 
                                                          
25Shari‘a (also spelled as Sharia) is the fundamental religious concept in Islam that refers to the moral 
code and law of Islam. However, in Arabic it literally means ‗the path leading to watering place.‘ For the 
discussion, see also: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/538793/Shariah (Last Access: 
20.12.2013). 
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coalition of Islamists that can have disparate political objectives and strategies to 
accomplish them (Ayoob 2008). For example, during the 1980s the Egyptian MB 
encountered with a fervent and far-reaching opposition from almost all of its branches 
in the MENA when it embarked on to establish a centralized platform between the 
MB‘s offshoots under Egyptian leadership.  
 Even though the MB was branded as an apolitical religious organization social 
reform-oriented society in its early years, the movement started to bear a political image 
in the late 1930s following a general strike transpired in Palestine during the same 
years. The MB leadership decided to play a direct role in Egyptian politics by 
announcing its own candidates for the parliamentary elections in 1941 for the first time 
in its history (Munson 2001). Then, the movement launched a massive electoral 
campaign and called for a political reform and an outright withdrawal of British troops 
from the country. This radical political move by the MB led to the protracted Egyptian 
government‘s crackdown and repression on the organization. In 1941, many MB leaders 
including the founder Hasan al-Banna were incarcerated and the MB‘s public rallies and 
demonstrations were outlawed.
26
 
 Afterwards, the Egyptian government disbanded the organization in 1948 due to 
its involvement in violent protests and anti-government activities that threatened the 
regime‘s survival. This move by the regime against the Islamic movement sparked a 
spiral of violence between two sides that resulted in the assassination of Mahmud 
                                                          
26Council on Foreign Relations: ―Three Myths about the Muslim Brotherhood,‖ Steven A. Cook. The op-
ed can be reached at: http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2012/06/27/three-myths-about-the-muslim-brotherhood/ 
(Last Access: 20.04.2014). 
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Fahmi an-Nukrashi, the Prime Minister of Egypt. In the same year, the top MB leader 
al-Banna was murdered by agents, who were believed to be hired by the government, in 
return for the death of al-Nukrashi. Consequently, the Brotherhood was cowed into 
submission by the government‘s crackdown and went down underground till Suez 
Crisis of 1956 during which it took part in guerilla warfare against the joined forces of 
Britain, France, and Israel (Nedoroscik 2002). 
 However, the turning point for the movement and its relationship with the 
government came with the revolution in Egypt in 1952.
27
 Here, the MB offered a covert 
support to Free Officer Movement led by Gamal Abdul Nasser and backed up the 
establishment of a new government under his leadership. However, although the 
relationship between the MB and Nasser‘s government could be construed as amicable 
during the early stages of Egyptian revolution, the organization soon discerned that 
Nasserist party was going to form a secular order undergirded by a nationalist doctrine 
(Fondren 2009). This rupture in the alliance antagonized both parties in a way that they 
were pitted against each other, time and again, in the political arena.  
After Nasser consolidated his grip on power during the early 1954, he initiated a 
massive crackdown on Islamist movements in Egypt and imprisoned many MB leaders 
without any charges lasting until his death in 1970. Paradoxically, this heavy 
clampdown on MB leadership by the Egyptian state led to the internationalization of the 
movement with the formation of offshoots in many MENA countries including Syria, 
Jordan and Palestine. While the MB‘s Egyptian top brass was forced to go into exile or 
                                                          
27Steven A. Cook, ―Three Myths about the Muslim Brotherhood‖ 
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underground in the late 1950s, with the help of Saudi kingdom they acquired financial 
aid and sanctuaries which enable the MB to establish a global structure of Islamist 
constituency (Wickham 2013). Apart from opening several branch offices in the MENA 
region, an Islamist network was formed in Europe which comprises religious cells in 
Germany, France and Switzerland and this emergent international structure help the MB 
to survive both in regional and international politics.
28
 These cells provided the MB 
with a solid base around the globe that would extend its political lifeline as a 
transnational religious movement. Overall, these developments enable the MB 
movement to become an important actor within the Muslim communities of MENA and 
then in the world. 
On the other hand, the MB leadership decided to step up its militancy and 
violent activities in line with the teachings of the movement‘s new ideologue Sayyid 
Qutb who has become very influential during the 1950s and 1960s with his seminal 
work called Milestones (1964). In his study, Qutb (1964; as cited in Cleveland 2004) 
elaborated on al-Banna‘s theoretical treatise on political Islam and radically altered the 
organization‘s moderate character by preaching the believers for a ‗jihad‘ which is 
defined as the revolutionary mission for destroying all ‗jahilliyya‘ polities in the region 
and establishing an Muslim states instead.
29
 Regarding to foreign affairs, the MB‘s old 
philosophy was imbued with an extreme anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism as the 
                                                          
28Barry Rubin, ―Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood‖  
29
Sayyid Qutb has a dichotomous approach regarding the nature of society which are Jahilliyya and 
Muslim socities. Whereas Islamic principles can be totally applied to Muslim socities thanks to Shari‘a, 
jahilliyya socities are deprived of such Islamic order (Cleveland 2004). Qutb called for a jihad which 
originally refers to ‗internal struggle‘ of individual humans rather than a ‗holy war against the Western 
world‘ According to Qutb the jihad aims to remove the jahilliyya societies in the Middle East and to build 
an ideal Muslim community instead (Qutb 1964). 
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early MB leaders defended violence against the US and terrorist acts against Israeli state 
whose right to exist was not acknowledged by the movement. The MB‘s approach to 
international relations is also influenced by a fierce criticism of Western life-style and 
‗modernism‘ and a virulent rhetoric on Western foreign policy towards Muslim world. 
Consequently, the early Islamists in the movement perceived Western countries and 
particularly the state of Israel as imperial oppressors and enemies of Islam (Mitchell 
1969). 
In 1970, Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency in Egypt and embarked on the 
process of ‗de-Nasserization‘ which changed the relationship between the Egyptian 
government and MB to a great extent. Sadat‘s policies emboldened the Islamist 
movements to resurface in Egyptian politics and help government to counterbalance and 
also contain secular voices which were associated with the Marxist and Nasserist parties 
(Aknur 2013). However, the government‘s decision to remove the Nasserist legacy 
which manifested itself in the lowering Egypt‘s close relationship with the Soviet Union 
and signing a peace agreement with Israel in 1978 after the Camp David summit did not 
receive an approval from the large segments of Egyptian society. As a result, the tacit 
alliance between the regime and organization disappeared rapidly which led to a new 
wave of confrontations.  
Meanwhile, violent Islamist groups reasserted themselves in the political arena 
due to the heightened tension in Egypt and militant Islamist‘s impatience with the 
incremental approach of the MB to come into power. In response to the militant 
resurgence, Egyptian government started to use the Shari‘a partially as the source of 
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legislation and jurisprudence. Although Sadat strove to portray himself as being a 
‗Believer President‘ and ‗Muslim Ruler‘, in October 1981 he was assassinated by the 
Islamist militants belonging to radical organization called al-Jihad (Albrect and Wegner 
2006). 
Hosni Mubarak became a president in 1981 following the assassination of Sadat 
who pursued different strategies towards the moderate Islamist movements primarily 
the MB and extreme groups like the Jama‘a Islamiyya. Mubarak regime allowed 
moderate MB members to participate in the parliamentary elections without forming 
their own party while subjecting them to a strict state surveillance. However, the 
president also ordered the imprisonment of leading MB leaders along with the arrest of 
radical factions in both 1995 and 2000 before the general elections. In the early 1990s, 
the surge in violent activities of militant groups led to abandonment of appeasement 
policies and the government once again started an oppressive campaign to debilitate 
radical factions‘ offensive capabilities. Disconnected from the political arena again, the 
MB demanded the government to make political openings for moderate Islamist groups 
and to minimize suppressive measures against the movement during the late 2000s.  
That highly bleak historical record notwithstanding, the wave of uprisings in the 
MENA provided the MB with a great opportunity to play a paramount role in the future 
of many Arab and Muslim countries and to shape the political landscape of the MENA 
region (Ehrenfeld 2011). Prior to the downfall of Mubarak regime, the MB held a low 
profile in the massive demonstrations took place in Tahrir Square and only after the 
popular uprising gained full momentum, its top leaders Yusuf al-Qaradawi and 
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Mohammed Badie called for the full participation of their followers. According to 
Rubin (2012), the MB leadership made a strategic move since having a high profile in 
the demonstrations would lead to a regime crackdown on the movement first and 
foremost if the popular uprising faltered and failed to put an end to Mubarak‘s grip on 
power. After Mubarak government was ousted by the Egyptian military, the MB 
increased its participation and emerged as one of the indispensable actors in the post-
Mubarak Egypt.  
In February 2011, the movement‘s top ideologist al-Qaradawi summoned more 
than one million MB supporters to launch a huge demonstration in Tahrir Square which 
overshadowed the joint campaigns of Egypt‘s secular and liberal in the same year and 
provided the MB with a leading role in the revolution (Wickham 2013). After winning 
most of the assembly seats in the parliamentary elections and then assuming the top 
executive office in the presidential elections, the MB took the center stage in Egyptian 
politics and it appeared to play a pioneering role in the post-Arab uprisings MENA. 
Moreover, Rubin (2012) argues that the Egyptian MB‘s power grab in 2012 had 
reasserted itself as the leader of a Sunni Islamist bloc in the Muslim world which 
comprises Meshaal‘s Hamas, Ghannouchi-led Ennahda party in Tunisa, the several 
local branches in MENA including Syria, Jordan, and relatively smaller offshoots in 
Libya and Lebanon. 
In Egypt, the candidate of the MB for presidential elections, Mohamed Morsi 
became the first democratically elected leader of Egypt despite the profound suspicion 
of the Egyptian military establishment manifested itself under the office of Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Nevertheless, the MB‘s grip on power was short-
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lived since its presidential nominee Morsi‘s ill-advised policies and incompetent 
leadership especially in the management of Egyptian economy and the surge of 
widespread public exasperation directed to the MB which prompted the military to put 
an end to the MB‘s political rule in June 2013 (Shama 2014). The military, led by 
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, also suspended the last Egyptian constitution made under 
the leadership of Mohamed Morsi.
30
  
Currently, the military-dominated Egyptian government declared the MB a 
terrorist organization by implicating its members to a car bombing targeting at the 
headquarters of the security services in the Nile region in December 2013.
31
 The 
government lastly passed a law that allows officials to confiscate the MB‘s financial 
assets and disband any public demonstrations of the group which, as Zachary Laub 
argues, impeded the likelihood of political dialogue and reconciliation between the MB 
and newly formed Egyptian government.
32
 Building on this historical background, a 
brief glimpse into personal profiles and political backgrounds of today‘s most 
prominent MB-affiliated Islamists leaders will help providing a snapshot of the new 
MENA leadership in the wake of 2011 Arab uprisings. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
The BBC News Portal, ―Egypt Crisis: Army Ousts President Mohamed Morsi,‖ can be reached at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23173794 (Last Access: 25.05.2014). 
31The Al Jazeera News Portal, ―Egypt Declares Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Group,‖ for further 
information see: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/egypt-declares-brotherhood-
terrorist-group-201312251544398545.html (Last Access: 27.05.2014). 
32For the most current developments in Egypt after the downfall of Morsi regime, see Zachary Laub‘s 
report published by Council on Foreign Relations in January 2014 from here: 
http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991 (Last Access: 20.02.2014). 
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3.3. Introducing Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated MENA Leaders: Morsi of Egypt, 
Meshaal of Gaza Strip, and Ghannouchi of Tunisia 
 
In this section, the psychological biographies of three MB-Islamist leaders are discussed 
in depth to shed some light on the leaders‘ political and socio-economic characteristics 
in their youth that have an imprinting effect on the current political profiles of three 
MENA leaders analyzed in this study. 
 
 
3.3.1. Mohamed Morsi 
 
Mohamed Morsi was born in August 1951 in Egypt‘s Sharqiya province on the Nile 
delta.
33
 He earned a Bachelor degree in Engineering from Cairo University in 1975, 
then a Master of Engineering in Metallurgy from the same university in 1978. He then 
received a PhD degree in Engineering from the University of Southern California in 
1982. Mr. Morsi worked as a teaching assistant and a lecturer at the Cairo University, 
Faculty of Engineering and also at the University of Southern California in the US. He 
then became a faculty member and assistant professor at the University of North Ridge 
in California between 1982 and 1985. His children were born in the US in the early 
1980s and they still hold US citizenship. Afterwards, he headed back to his home 
country and worked as a Professor and Head of Materials Engineering, Faculty of 
Engineering at Zagazig University from the late 1980s to 2010, during which he was 
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 His full name is Mohamed Mohamed Morsi Issa Hayat. His birth place Sharqiya province is situated in 
Nil Delta town Al Adwa on the north of the capital Cairo.  
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also elected as a member of the Faculty Staff Club at the same university.
34
  Apart from 
his academic occupations, moreover, he was also elected as a member of the 
International Conference of Political Parties and Organizations, and founding member 
of the Egyptian Committee for Resisting the Zionist Project that has many offshoots 
across the Middle East region.  
However, Mohamed Morsi‘s meteoric rise in Egyptian politics commenced with 
his five-year term in the People‘s Assembly of 2000- 2005 as leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood‘s parliamentary bloc.35 During his tenure in parliament, Dr. Morsi played a 
crucial role and he was praised as one of the most active members of People‘s 
Assembly and featuring in the most renowned questioning sessions in the assembly 
such as the notorious train crash accident of 2002 in which he placed the blame on the 
government and called for the entire council of ministers to step down immediately.
36
 
Morsi was arrested and held under detention numerous times by government forces 
because of his fervent opposition to oppressive policies and measures of Mubarak‘s 
regime. For instance, following the fraudulent elections in 2005 Morsi orchestrated 
popular protests in favor of judges asking for independence and rejecting referral of 
some judges to the Competence Commission to blacklist them for their statements 
against the obviously rigged elections. In May 2006, consequently, Morsi was arrested 
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along with 500 members of the MB after their demonstrations in front of the North 
Cairo Court Complex and imprisoned for seven months behind bars.  
Owing to his effective opposition in parliament, he was selected as the best 
parliamentarian during the years 2000-2005 by international monitoring agencies. 
Additionally, after his political success in the assembly, Morsi was chosen as a member 
of the MB‘s Guidance Bureau, the highest authority within the organization, by the 
group‘s Shura Council. Morsi continued his political ascent after his release in 2006 and 
was elected as the head of the Freedom and Justice party which is the political spin-off 
of MB organization. He was taken into custody again along with several MB leaders of 
Egypt on January 28, 2011 also known as the ‗Friday of Anger‘ that epitomized the 
revolution of January 25. The Mubarak regime aimed to prevent them from 
participating in the revolutionary protests across Egypt but failed in its last endeavors to 
contain Morsi‘s and his party‘s influences on the escalating popular unrest in the 
country. 
After the demise of Mubarak‘s rule, Mohamed Morsi received 24% of total vote 
in the first round of the presidential election in May 2012. Morsi competed with Ahmed 
Shafiq, a former chief of air forces and the last prime minister of Mubarak‘s regime, and 
managed to get 52% of the vote in the run-off election.
37
 Morsi was sworn as the fifth 
president of Egypt in June 2012 and became the first Islamist leader to hold the office. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Morsi was not the first choice of MB for presidential elections and 
nominated in the final days right after it became certain that MB‘s only candidate 
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Khairat al-Shater, a prominent magnate and deputy leader of the organization, would be 
barred from running for presidency by the SCAF due to technical reasons.
38
In that 
respect, it is also argued that Morsi‘s rapid rise to power within the MB and then across 
Egypt stems from his personal connection and allegiance to al-Shater who is 
acknowledged as the sole mastermind behind the MB‘s political strategies.39 
After assuming presidency, Morsi pushed the military, presiding over the SCAF 
and which acted as an interim government, out of the political arena. This move was 
welcomed by the many segments of Egyptian society including liberals and other 
Islamist groups who had showed their stark opposition to the military rule in the post-
Mubarak Egypt. However, Morsi‘s disastrous performance during his presidency 
especially his mismanagement of the Egyptian economy and authoritarian policies led 
to a widespread public resentment at him which reached its peak in June 2013 (Shama 
2014). Consequently, on July 3, 2013, Morsi government was officially ousted by the 
Egyptian army following the defense minister al-Sisi‘s ultimatum calling for Morsi‘s 
resignation from the presidency (al-Awadi 2013). The downfall of Morsi regime 
sparked a fierce turmoil in Egypt and armed skirmishes emerged between MB 
supporters and the Egyptian armed forces. In November 2013, the ousted president 
Morsi was put on trial for allegedly ordering the killing of many demonstrators in 
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December 2012. Most currently, Morsi‘s trial was adjourned until early 2014 due to 
―technical‖ reasons.40 
 
 
3.3.2. Khaled Meshaal 
 
Khaled Meshaal was born in 1956 in the village of Silwad, near the West Bank city of 
Ramallah, Palestine.
41
 Following the 1967 war his parents, along with many Palestinian 
families, moved to Kuwait where his father worked as a preacher in a local mosque. In 
the 1970s, the Gulf Emirate of Kuwait served as the hotbed of pro-Palestinian activism 
and Arab nationalism.
42
 In this context, Mr. Meshaal strictly committed himself to the 
Palestinian cause and Arab nationalism in his early ages and joined the local chapter of 
the MB in Kuwait in 1971. Afterwards, while Meshaal was studying physics at Kuwait 
University, he continued to take an interest in political Islam that manifested itself in his 
extracurricular activities.  
For instance, Meshaal established a radical student group known as the ‗List of 
the Islamic Right‘ in which Meshaal spearheaded a robust campaign against Yasser 
Arafat-led ‗Palestine Liberation Organization‘ on the university campus.43 He received 
a Bachelor degree in Physics from the same university and then started to teach in 
Kuwaiti schools. He got married in 1981 and has seven children, three girls and four 
                                                          
40BBC News Portal: ―What‘s become of Egypt‘s Morsi?‖ The piece can be reached from: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806 (Last Access: 25.03.2014). 
41
 For a more succinct version of  Meshaal‘s biography, see also Özdamar and Canbolat (2012). 
42
Al Jazeera News Portal: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/04/20086150597219693.html 
(Last Access: 22.05.2013). 
43
BBC News Portal: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3563635.stm (Last Access: 22.05.2013) 
71 
      
boys from that marriage.
44
 Meshaal-led student group was still operating in Kuwait 
while the, Palestinian resistance movement, Hamas was founded in 1987 after the first 
Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation known as the ‗first intifada‘. He also 
participated in the foundation of Hamas and became a member of the group in the same 
year. However, Meshaal decided to move to Jordan right after the invasion of Kuwait 
by Iraq in 1990 and he immediately became the leader of the Hamas branch in that 
country. Later, he became chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau in 1996 that 
criticized Yasser Arafat for his weakness and indecision vis a vis Israel‘s aggression 
and oppression of Palestinian community.  
In 1997, Meshaal became the target of an assassination attempt authorized by 
the Netanyahu administration of Israel who described that Meshaal was the leading 
figure in Hamas and blamed him for the murder of innocent Israeli civilians in 
Palestinian suicide bombings but Mossad‘s assassination plot failed in Jordan. King 
Hussein of Jordan, outraged by the Israeli plot in the Jordanian homeland, saved 
Meshaal‘s life by conditioning the release of Mossad agents -arrested by Jordanian 
police following the assassination attempt- to the Israeli government‘s handover of the 
antidote. 
Nevertheless, King Abdullah decided to disband all the offices of Hamas located 
in Jordan and Meshaal was shortly imprisoned and then deported in 1999.
45
After he 
temporarily resided in Qatar until 2001, Meshaal moved to Damascus, Syria where he 
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had resided until the outbreak of Syrian uprising in 2011. In the late 2011, Meshaal-led 
Hamas declared its allegiance to the Egyptian MB and formally joined to the movement 
in the aftermath of Egypt‘s revolution of 2011. In February 2012, as the popular unrest 
in Syria turned into full-blown civil war Meshaal left Damascus and reverted back to 
Qatar and he still lives there. In the same month, Meshaal and Hamas government in 
Gaza declared their support for the Syrian opposition against al-Asad government.
46
  
Mr. Meshaal is the third chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau after the 
assassinations of Hamas‘ founding leader Sheikh Yassin and then his successor al-
Rantissi and he still occupies the top executive office in Gaza (Özdamar 2011). Khaled 
Meshaal frequently publicized his ultimate political objectives concerning the 
Palestinian problem as follows: (1) to put an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
territories by crafting a ‗just peace‘ between the embattling parties and (2) to unify 
formerly invaded territories under the authority of one Palestinian state in accordance 
with the 1967 borders.
47
  
 
 
3.3.3. Rachid Ghannouchi 
 
In this study, although he has not assumed a public office and executive role yet, Rachid 
Ghannouchi is chosen as Tunisia‘s top political Islamist leader for three reasons. First, 
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he is both the top political leader of Ennahda movement and its chief theoretician who 
masterminded the organization for decades. Second, several experts on political Islam 
and Middle East who are well versed in Tunisia‘s political system and parties identify 
Ghannouchi as the leader controlling Tunisia‘s Renaissance Party from behind the 
scenes and take the reins of the current government.
48
 Third, Ghannouchi is the most 
prominent public figure that represents Tunisia‘s Islamist movement abroad and visited 
several countries as Tunisia‘s political leader where he made a dozens of public 
speeches. In that sense, the availability of leaders‘ public speeches is crucially important 
for the operational code research program. There is a paucity of public speeches made 
by Tunisia‘s Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh, who came into power in 2013, and the 
President Moncef Marzouki who is not affiliated to Ennahdha movement. Conversely, 
he is recognized as a secular and left-leaning liberal politician in Tunisia.
49
 
Tunisian politician and Islamic thinker Rachid Ghannouchi was born on June 22, 
1944 in a small village in the Gabes province that located in southeastern Tunisia, 
which was held under French rule in those days.
50
 Although he was born to a peasant 
family, his father was a memorizer of the Holy Qur‘an and one of the few literate 
persons in the neighborhood.  Ghannouchi was raised in a very religious household as 
the youngest one of the ten siblings and he studied in the conventional Az-Zaytouna 
schools where he was exposed to the impacts of Westernization and its secular nature 
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for the first time. Tamimi (2001) argues that this experience led to the incremental 
erosion of his Islamic piety and he even ceased praying and memorizing the all parts of 
the Holy Qur‘an in his childhood. After this watershed in his life, Ghannouchi became 
more interested in the socialist and secular ideas echoed by Abdel Nassir of Egypt but 
his commitment to these ideals did not last very long. When Ghannouchi travelled to 
Egypt to receive a Western university education, he immediately learned that 
Westernization in the Middle East was not what he had envisaged in his early ages and 
he left Egypt with a great disappointment.  
He then moved to Syria where he earned a bachelor degree in philosophy from 
the University of Damascus in 1968.
51
 Ghannouchi reverted back to Islam after his 
inconclusive attempts to join the nationalist movements during his stay in Syria. In his 
biography penned by Azzam Tamimi (2001: 18), Ghannouchi himself tells that the day 
of June 12, 1966 was the critical juncture in his life because ‗‗that very night I shed to 
things off me: secular nationalism and traditional Islam and I embraced what I believed 
was the original Islam, Islam as revealed and not as shaped or distorted by history and 
tradition.‘‘ 
In the aftermath of his graduation, Ghannouchi lived in France for one year 
during which he participated and became active in the Islamic Dawa movement known 
as ‗Tablighi Jamaat.‘52 In France, while Ghannouchi embarked on a post-graduate 
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education (Master‘s Degree), he also worked as seasonal laborer there. Ghannouchi 
headed back to Tunisia after spending one year in France which he describes this period 
as the hardest and most demanding year of his life. He commenced his academic career 
as a secondary-school philosophy teacher while he became more involved in Dawa 
Movement‘s activities in Tunisia. Subsequently, Ghannouchi founded a powerful 
Islamic organization called the ‗Islamic Tendency Movement (ITM)‘53 in 1981with the 
aim of challenging the secular policies pursued by the Egyptian government under the 
leadership of Habib Bourguiba. 
Ghannouchi-led ITM became a widespread and very influential Islamic 
organization at short notice that threatened the Bourguiba‘s grip on power. 
Consequently, Tunisian government banned the organization and imprisoned roughly 
500 members of the ITM including its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi. In 1981, he was 
charged with running an authorized and outlawed organization and sentenced to eleven 
year‘s confinement in return. He was released from imprisonment in 1984 but 
Ghannouchi did not abandon his confrontational stance against the oppressive policies 
of Bourguiba regime. Those frictions with the government engendered a massive 
crackdown on Islamic movement in Tunisia and led to the jailing and ostracism of 
numerous ITM leaders. Ghannouchi firstly received a life term of forced labor in 1987 
but this verdict was revoked a year later.  
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However, Ghannouchi decided to go into a voluntarily exile in London and he 
lived in Europe from the early 1990s to 2011. After the deposal of Tunisian dictator Ben 
Ali in January 2011, Ghannochi headed back to Tunisia on 30 January 2011 and 
galvanized the erstwhile dormant Ennahda movement into action for the country‘s 
recent elections. Currently, Ghannouchi is acknowledged as the top ideologue and 
political leader of Tunisia‘s Renaissance Party, the political wing of Ennahda 
movement, which is originally inspired by the Egyptian MB and branded as its local 
offshoot in Tunisia.
54
  
In October 2011, Ghannouchi-led Renaissance party outvoted its more secular 
and liberal competitors and received 37 percent of the popular vote and won the 
majority status in the parliament after getting 40 percent of the assembly seats.
55
 
However, the Renaissance party stepped down in January 2014 and handed power to a 
caretaker government after facing a popular unrest and rising terrorist attacks aimed at 
the Ennahda government.
56
 The root causes for public indignation at the Ennahda 
leadership were (1) the government‘s bad performance in managing Tunusia‘s already 
faltering economy and (2) the assassinations of two prominent political figures affiliated 
to the secularist camp in Tunisia.
57
  
In the literature, however, it is also argued that Ennahda party‘s Islamism and 
political strategies are more moderate and conciliatory than the original MB movement 
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and leaders of Ennahda party take Turkey as a source of inspiration, or model, and 
likened their organization to AK Party of Turkey.
58
 Here, Ghannouchi inspired from the 
success of Turkey‘s AK Party which embraces a secular system of government and 
underscores the separation of state and the religion to achieve a pluralist society and 
socio-economic rights of all citizens in the community.
59
  
In his works, Ghannouchi also expounded upon the problematique of 
reconciling the fundamental principles of Islam with the idea of progress and modernity 
and several scholars argue that he holds an unorthodox approach to several moot points 
discussed within Islamic world. For example, in contrast to Sayyid Qutb of the 
Brotherhood, Ghannouchi construes Islamic doctrines as an ideological and 
philosophical counterweight to Westernization in which the Islam is seen neither 
inferior nor superior to Western-monopolized modernity and he underlines the 
possibility of coexistence and cooperation between two different worlds.
60
 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion  
 
In summary, the historical record concerning the MB reveals the movement‘s 
transformation from a social charitable organization to a robust political force in the 
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MENA politics. The review of historical background of the MB and its leadership also 
shows the intricate relationship between the MB-led Islamist movement and MENA 
governments which can be likened to a ‗roller coaster‘ characterized with its ups and 
downs. In this context, Islamist groups have increased their political clout and visibility 
in the MENA since the second half of the twentieth century (Özdamar and Canbolat 
2012; Özdamar forthcoming).  
With the surge of political Islam, the MB has become the most influential 
Islamist movement operating in the Muslim world. Additionally, the MB has emerged 
as a strong international force with its vibrant network established within Europe and 
North America. Therefore, Rubin (2011) contends that because of its leading role both 
in the Sunni world and in many Muslim communities around the globe the MB is the 
most significant revolutionary organization in the world. Its gravity and importance in 
the MENA notwithstanding, the MB is still understudied within the IR discipline 
(Özdamar and Canbolat 2012; Özdamar forthcoming). Particularly, in the FPA literature 
there is a dearth of studies that zero in on the MB and its leadership as an idiosyncratic 
political ideology with specific foreign policy orientation. One of the objectives of this 
research is to address such a void in the FPA field.  
In the final analysis, the review of three MENA leaders‘ personal backgrounds 
and early political profiles reveals both a set of general patterns and differences between 
these leaders. The similarity pattern among the group can be dissected as follows: first, 
all of three MB leaders hail from very modest socioeconomic backgrounds. Second, 
they are all college educated, religiously raised and directly engaged with the religious 
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institutions. Third, all three leaders went up against established order in their respective 
countries and utilized religious affiliation and political Islamism as part of their political 
mobilization tactics.  
The dissimilarities, however, can be summarized by three main lines of 
argument. Initially, each leader of the MB, profiled in this study, operates in distinct and 
diverse political and socio-cultural settings in different three countries of MENA. In 
fact, the offshoots of MB-oriented political Islam have flourished and evolved quite 
differently in studied MENA countries because of the peculiar forms of relationship 
between the MB‘s local offshoots and the ruling regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Gaza 
Strip. While Egyptian MB and Tunisian Ennahda movements underwent tremendous 
state repression and political ostracism since their inceptions, Palestinian Islamist 
leadership enjoyed more political leeway during its early stages and managed to form 
their own state in Gaza at the expense of a secular Fatah in West Bank and hostile 
Israel. This subtle but significant difference must have contributed to Hamas chief 
Meshaal‘s perception of ‗other‘ and particularly the attribution of higher historical 
control to himself compare to Egypt‘s Morsi and Tunisia‘s Ghannouchi.  
Second, these three MB-Islamists hail from MENA countries that have different 
economic and industrial development levels and distinct colonial histories that have an 
impact on three leaders‘ conceptualization of ‗self‘ and ‗other.‘ Lastly, while Morsi of 
Egypt and Ghannouchi of Tunisia travelled to Western world and lived in Europe 
and/or in the North America, Meshaal of Palestine has never been in the Western 
countries that would provide him with a first-hand observation of Western ‗modernism‘ 
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and ‗life-style‘ which are heavily chastised by MENA‘s political Islamists. That said, 
Meshaal resided in several MENA countries during his protracted exiles in 1990s and 
early 2000s e.g., Syria, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan and formed Islamist networks 
between these countries and Gaza Strip. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is predicated on the contention that leaders‘ beliefs have paramount 
significance in affecting the foreign policy decisions of states and these beliefs can act 
as causal mechanisms in explaining why leaders opt for a particular foreign policy 
decision. The two underlying assumptions that underpin the argument above are (1) 
individual leaders matter in foreign policy decision making process (Hermann et al. 
2001) and (2) the belief systems of political leaders that hold top executive offices 
reflect the ‗cognition of the state‘ (Schafer 2000). In this study, therefore, the focus will 
be on analyzing the causal relationship between the mindset of a state‘s executive 
leadership and its foreign policy behavior as a process outcome.  
In this chapter, the research design of this project is discussed by touching upon 
the nuts and bolts of a study‘s methodological approach to the study of new MENA 
leaders. First, the research puzzle and research questions of this project are presented. 
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Second, it succinctly outlines the relevant research tools -Profiler Plus and VICS- of the 
leadership studies research program. Then, the chapter moves to expound upon the 
causal mechanism used in this study and particular methods for analyzing the data. This 
is followed by the brief discussion on the hypotheses tested in the following chapters. 
Next, the use of data sources and the selection criteria of speeches are specified. The 
penultimate section zeroes in on the case selection and why the author deems the 
subject matter vitally important. Lastly, a few points made regarding the additional 
value of crafting such a particular research design for the future studies in both 
operational code analysis and leadership studies research programs. 
 
 
4.2. The Puzzle and Research Questions 
 
The puzzle that prompted me to study the new generation of political Islamists and their 
foreign policy decisions is the intriguing causal linkage between an Islamist leader‘s 
religious and political ideology and his/her idiosyncratic foreign policy preferences. 
This puzzle led to many controversial and consequential questions that further appealed 
my attention on this foreign policy problematique. Some questions are: (1) How do 
political Islamists i.e., Muslim Brotherhood leaders make sense of international 
relations? (2) What are the patterns of Muslim Brotherhood leaders‘ conceptualization 
of foreign policy as a political organization and (3) How do non-Western leaders 
conduct their foreign policies and how they differ from their international counterparts? 
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After a distilling process on the research puzzle and a set of preliminary questions, 
this research will seek answers to the following research questions: 
1. What are the diagnostic (philosophical) and instrumental (prescriptive) beliefs of 
Morsi of Egypt, Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and Meshaal of Hamas? 
2. How do three Islamist leaders‘ operational codes differ among themselves? Put 
differently, do new MENA leaders speak with one voice in their foreign policy 
orientation despite their different country-wise backgrounds? 
3. How do three MB-affiliated MENA leaders‘ foreign policy belief systems 
compare to the average world leader? 
4. What are the foreign policy strategies of three MENA leaders: is the new 
MENA leadership‘s approach to foreign policy rational/pragmatic or 
ideological/revolutionary? 
 
 
4.3. Research Design and Methodology 
 
This research is based on the individual level variables in explaining foreign policy 
behaviors of states which is also acknowledged as the ‗first image‘ of analysis in the 
study of international politics (Waltz 1965). This study does not contend that the causal 
relationship between a top executive‘s belief systems and the state‘s foreign policy 
behavior will account for all foreign policy decisions as this disclaimer was stated by 
many scholars in the FPA discipline (Walker 1977; Rosati 1984; Kaarbo 1997). That 
said, the scholarly argument of ―who leads matter‖ in international politics has already 
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established within the leadership studies literature (Hermann et al. 2001). While Hudson 
(2005) claims that individual decision makers acting singly or as a group constitute the 
ground of international relations, this perspective does acknowledge numerous 
limitations imposed by other actors in the political environment and other factors 
(systemic or sub-systemic) that constrain the role of human agency in the conduct of 
foreign policy. 
 
 
4.3.1. Research Tools: Profiler Plus and VICS 
 
With the aim of finding answers to research questions, the Verb in Context System 
(VICS) is used in this research. VICS, as discussed in the literature review chapter, 
enables researchers to examine leaders‘ operational codes by drawing inferences about 
the leaders‘ political beliefs from their public statements. Introduced by Walker et al. 
(1998) in their paradigmatic work, VICS encodes all transitive verbs used in leader‘s 
public speech and group them into four categories: (1) self, (2) other, (3) cooperative, 
and (4) conflictual utterances of the speakers since ―these are considered to be a 
speaker‘s linguistic representation of perceived power relationships‖ (Malici and 
Buckner 2008: 778).  
Through following the VICS coding procedure, a researcher can quantify the 
value of each recorded verb and its linguistic context with regards to six attributes 
which are as follows: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, 
intended target, and context (Schafer and Walker 2006). Here, the calculated VICS 
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indices for the master beliefs P-1, I-1, and P-4 are used to locate leader‘s image of the 
Self and Other in one of the four quadrants in Holsti‘s (1977) typology. The three 
master beliefs are plotted on the vertical (P-1/I-1) and horizontal (P-4a/P-4b) axes on 
the revised Holsti operational code typology (Walker 1990). Building on the master 
beliefs scores, it becomes possible to locate a leader‘s image of Self (I-1, P-4a) and 
Other (P-1, P-4b) which allow scholars to make educated guesses regarding the decision 
maker‘s preferences from among the outcomes of settle, submit, dominate and deadlock 
(Walker and Schafer 2006). 
This thesis employs an automated content analysis program called ‗Profiler 
Plus‘ which codes the leader‘s use of verbs in speeches to reveal his/her self-other 
assessment and control over political events in the domain of foreign policy.
61
 The 
software Profiler Plus provides researchers with the operational code and also LTA 
indices after following a couple of coding procedures. In addition to a computerized 
content analysis technique, there is also a hand-coding technique available in the VICS 
methods‘ toolkit. In comparison to hand-coding technique which requires a researcher‘s 
individual coding of the text by reading it word by word, the Profiler Plus does the 
coding based on the pre-specified coding scheme and grammatical rules that are 
different for LTA and operational code research programs. Besides, since the 
procedures of coding are totally automated the users of Profiler Plus are able to 
guarantee 100% coding reliability in their analyses (Schafer and Walker 2006).  
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The content analysis software Profiler Plus program and VICS indices for operational code scores are 
courteously provided by Micheal Young of Social Science Automation (SSA), INC. In addition to SSA, I 
specifically thank to the Moynihan Institute fellow Hanneke Derksen for her help in providing the 
Profiler Plus and its toolkit. A trial version of Profiler Plus can be downloaded from 
http://www.socialscience.net (accessed 10. 10. 2013) 
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However, according to Malici and Buckner (2008), the biggest advantage of 
employing VICS procedures and the Profiler Plus is that foreign policy scholars do not 
need to base their study on extrapolations and interpretations to make any judgment 
about the political beliefs of leaders. In contrast, this particular method ―allows us to 
systematically produce statistical evidence for leaders‘ beliefs‖ and since ―the VICS 
procedures lead to quantified results and, it is also possible to engage in comparative 
statistical operations‖ (Malici and Buckner 2008: 788). Lastly, while for LTA studies 
the software program analyzes each word with its attribution to a leader‘s seven traits, 
for operational code research program it traces the leader‘s use of transitive verbs to the 
nature (positive or negative) of his/her self-other assessments and attributions of 
political power.
62
 
 
 
4.3.2. Temporal and Spatial Domains 
 
The temporal domain of the study is based on MB-affiliated leaders‘ terms in office as 
the ‗chief executive‘ of the country which allows us to examine the ‗cognition of states‘ 
in the MENA region (Schafer 2000). Three leaders‘ incumbency periods are listed 
below: 
1. Khaled Meshaal of Gaza: Chief of Hamas Political Bureau (April 2004- 
Present). 
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For further details about the Profiler Plus and its programming details, please see discussions in Young 
2001; Schafer and Walker 2006. 
87 
      
2. Mohammed Morsi of Egypt: 5th President of Egypt (June 2012- July 2013). 
3. Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia: Founder and Intellectual Leader of Ennahda 
party (October 2011- January 2014). 
However, these three leaders‘ speeches are mostly chosen from the late 2011 to 2013. 
The temporal domain, in this study, focuses on the period between the immediate 
aftermath of 2011 Arab-revolutions in North Africa and President Morsi‘s fall from 
power in July 2013.
63
 
Second, as reiterated above, the spatial domain of research is the three MENA 
countries and these are Egypt, Tunisia and Gaza Strip of Palestine. The first two 
countries are located in North Africa whereas Gaza Strip belongs to the Middle East 
region with respect to the contemporary definitions of both regions. One of the 
contributions of this study into the FPA literature is its distinct spatial domain that 
focuses on non-Western leaders and foreign policy cases which are understudied in the 
field. Additionally, this study hones in on these particular MENA countries in the post-
Arab uprisings era since all of them have been governed by Islamist leaders formally 
and overtly affiliated to the MB movement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63Leaders‘ speeches are mostly taken from the post-Arab uprisings period to generate a common temporal 
domain for the analysis of each MB-affiliated leader. 
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4.3.3. Data  
 
A wide collection of leader‘s speeches, press conferences and book chapters penned by 
leaders from the late 2011 to 2013 is compiled to measure the operational codes of 
Ghannouchi, Morsi, and Meshaal. This study uses various kinds of three MENA 
leaders‘ scripted and official statements that pertain to foreign policy issues. Since 
spontaneous speeches are not specifically used in the operational code research program 
(see Dille 2000; Renshon 2009), spontaneous statements made by those Arab leaders 
are excluded although these remarks focuses exclusively on foreign affairs.  
The transcripts of leaders‘ press conferences and interviews are drawn mostly 
from online documentation platforms such as websites of the CNN International, the 
BBC and Der Spiegel. Other scripted texts are accessed from several databases 
including LexisNexis, and Foreign Broadcasting and Information System. A couple of 
public statements made in English but most of them were already translated into 
English by the international media institutions. 
This research follows the speech selection criteria suggested by Walker et al. 
(1998: 182) which can be summarized as ―(1) the subject and object are international in 
scope, (2) the focus of interaction is a political issue, and (3) the words and deeds are 
cooperative or conflictual.‖ In addition to these rules, Schafer and Walker (2006) set 
further criterion that all coded speeches should contain at least 15-20 transitive verbs.  
Following these benchmarks, total of twenty six materials were coded in this 
research. Ghannouchi‘s speeches are taken from various sources including interviews, 
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his op-eds, and a book
64
 that includes his remarks on foreign affairs. Seven relatively 
long speeches were coded for Ghannouchi‘s profile and out of these seven statements 
the minimum number of verbs was 16 while the maximum number was 100. In total, 
464 verbs were coded for Ghannouchi‘s operational code. Khaled Meshaal‘s speeches 
are accessed from the websites of various international media organizations including 
Time, Spiegel, and Open Democracy and most of them are interview transcripts. In 
total, nine speeches were coded in which the minimum number of verbs was 52 and the 
maximum number was 179. For Meshaal, the total number of verbs coded was 816. 
 Lastly, due to his short term in presidential office, the preliminary assumption 
was that finding relatively long and foreign-policy focused speeches of Morsi would 
prove very challenging. Yet, since Morsi has paid numerous high level visits to other 
capitals and international organizations it was possible to find out ten speeches most of 
which are public statements given at international conferences and official meetings. A 
few of them are interviews and one is his address to the nation i.e., Tahrir square 
speech. Most of these sources are accessed from two databases LexisNexis, and Foreign 
Broadcasting and Information System. For Morsi, out of ten speeches, while the 
minimum number of verbs in a one speech was 28, the maximum number was 160 and 
the total number of verbs coded is 854. In this study, therefore, the total number of 
verbs coded for the three MENA leaders‘ operational code was 2134.  All the public 
statements processed in this research can be found at the index section of the thesis. 
                                                          
64
The book used for the data is Azzam S. Tamimi. 2001. Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within 
Islamism. New York: Oxford University Press. The speeches are taken mostly from Chapter 6: The 
Territorial State and the New World Order. 
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To prepare the fine data for Profiler Plus program, the author edited and cleaned 
all of the texts before running the software. All public statements of three MENA 
leaders are analyzed with an automated coding system, therefore this research assures 
strong coding reliability and the results can be compared to the norming group sample 
of world leaders which is also a computerized product (Walker and Schafer 2006). 
 
 
4.3.4. Methodology  
 
In this study, multiple methods are employed to examine foreign policy behaviors of the 
MB‘s political leadership in MENA in the wake of 2011 uprisings. The first method is 
using a psychobiography of each Islamist leader in which the personal background of 
the leader and his political career are discussed with an emphasis on leader‘s 
psychological characteristics. The use of psychobiographies enables researchers to 
make a qualitative assessment informed by a plethora of descriptive information on 
leader‘s personalities and ideological beliefs. By providing a brief review of three 
MENA leaders‘ biographies and their ideological beliefs, this study aims to generate a 
basis of comparison for the quantitative results derived from operational code analysis. 
This particular method allows us to test the hypotheses of operational code analysis 
against the qualitative and factual observation on leaders‘ personal backgrounds. In the 
literature, many studies used a leader‘s psychobiography as a research technique to 
predict general patterns of the state behavior in foreign affairs (Greenstein 1969; 
Schafer 2000). This line of literature also includes Nathan Leites‘ (1951; 1953) studies 
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on Soviet Politburo‘s negotiation style that laid the foundations of operational code 
research program. 
Second, the operational code scores of three MENA leaders are computed to 
profile MB-affiliated leaders by locating their images of ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ on the 
corresponding quadrants of a coordinate system. By profiling new Islamist leadership, 
the aim of this study is two-fold: (1) to search for general patterns in new political 
Islamists‘ conceptualization of foreign policy, and (2) to compare the operational code 
beliefs of three MENA leaders with a norming group of world leaders. 
Next, this research also uses case study method to add strength to the findings 
and analytical thrust of operational code analysis. The case study approach is a widely 
used research tool which can be defined as ―an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple source of 
evidence are used‖ (Yin 1984: 23). More specifically, this study draws on two levels of 
applications of predictions from an operational code analysis research program. First, 
the level 2 of applying operational code predictions is used which refers to ‗comparative 
case predictions‘ (Walker and Schafer 2006). Comparative case predictions allow 
researchers to compare the belief systems of one or more leaders over time and forecast 
corresponding differences and similarities in their foreign policy behaviors (Walker 
2000). By following the level 2 procedures, it is possible to pinpoint statistically 
important changes in leaders‘ philosophical and instrumental beliefs and predict shift 
propensities in their behaviors towards out-group. Walker et al. (1998) and Criclow 
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(1998) applied this comparative logic in their respective studies to analyze changes in 
operational code constructs of Jimmy Carter between 1977-1979 and 1980 and also two 
Israeli leaders Rabin and Peres between 1970s and 1990s.  
Second method employed in this research is ‗two-sided dynamic interaction 
predictions‘ which Walker (2000) calls it as level 3 in the application of operational 
code predictions. This level renders it possible to ―combine the VICS scores for 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs and make predictions about a leader‘s tactical 
initiatives over time and his/her solution strategies for strategic interaction episodes 
between ‗self‘ and ‗other‘‖ (Walker 2000: 27). The level 3 allows researchers to 
examine both the inclinations of the leaders (through the VICS indices for I-1, I-2 and 
P-4a) and also the key characteristics of the context for foreign policy decisions 
(through calculating P-1, P-2 and P-4b scores).  
Considering all the key VICS indices together, this analytical image helps 
researchers to observe a particular leader‘s ‗definition of the self-in-situation‘ (Walker 
2000). However, in level 3 three antecedent conditions must be met by a researcher to 
systematically test the operational code predictions. These categorical questions are 
originally posed by Brams (1994): (1) What is the ‗initial‘ state of relations between 
‗self‘ and ‗other‘? (2) What is the order and/or sequence of play? (3) Is cycling 
permitted in the relations between ‗self‘ and ‗other‘?  
Substantively, this research attempts to apply both the level 2 and level 3 in 
making operational code predictions regarding three MENA leaders‘ behaviors in 
foreign policy realm. While it adopts the level 2 to compare the operational codes of 
93 
      
three MB-affiliated leaders amongst each other and also with the norming group, level 3 
is utilized to link these leaders‘ operational code beliefs to their foreign policy 
behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings era. Building on these two levels, the study of 
Middle Eastern leadership from the vantage point of operational code construct and its 
application to three case studies –Ghannouchi‘s, Meshaal‘s and Morsi‘s foreign policy 
behaviors in the post-Arab uprisings MENA—will confirm that the operational code 
construct, a North American FPA theory, can be applied to a particular non-Western 
context. In these case studies, the operational codes of three leaders are used as causal 
mechanisms to account for their foreign policy behaviors at the every level of decision 
making process. Particularly, to pin down three MB-affiliated Islamists‘ most 
controversial and consequential foreign policy decisions, the focus will be, mostly, on 
the three MENA countries‘ bilateral relations with the important actors in MENA 
including the US, Israel, Iran, Syria, Gulf Monarchies, and the EU.  
 
 
4.3.5. Dependent Variable 
 
Foreign policy behavior of a state is posited as the dependent variable in this study. 
Particularly, foreign policy outputs of three MENA countries are analyzed by 
establishing a causal linkage between each Muslim Brotherhood leader‘s belief system 
and the state‘s foreign policy behavior under his stewardship. One of the most 
paramount advantages of using operational code analysis, however, is its analytical 
rigor that allows researchers to estimate the likely behavior of a leader at different levels 
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of decision. This additional advantage provides foreign policy scholars with a vantage 
point to observe all steps of decision making process separately rather than analyzing 
merely the foreign policy output.  
Figure 1. The ‗Causal Mechanism‘ Used in This Study.65  
Leader‘s Operational Code (IV)                            Leader‘s / State‘s FP Behavior (DV) 
 
In the cognitive literature, as Walker (2000) argues, the levels of decisions are 
conceptualized as follows: (1) behavior, (2) move, (3) tactic, (4) and strategy. Snyder 
and Diesing (1977; as cited in Walker 2000: 13) elaborated on the framework of 
leveling decisions with the formula that ―a set of behaviors constitutes one or more 
moves by one actor, a sequence of contingent moves between actors is a tactic, and a set 
of tactics is a strategy.‖ With the aim of illustrating the predictive power of operational 
code construct for every level of decision making, the chapter 6 focuses on three 
MENA leaders‘ actual foreign policy conduct in which all levels of the new MENA 
leadership‘s foreign policy decision-making are anatomized.  
 
 
4.3.6. Independent Variable 
 
The independent variable in this research is the operational codes of MENA‘s new 
Islamist leaders. More specifically, I operationalized the operational codes of three MB-
affiliated leaders of MENA to explain foreign policy behaviors of Egypt, Tunisia, and 
                                                          
65
The insights on causal relationship between political beliefs and leaders‘ foreign policy decisions are 
drawn from Walker (2000). 
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Gaza Strip in the post-Arab uprisings era. While Meshaal-led Hamas has been 
governing Gaza Strip since 2007, both Morsi of Egypt and Ghannouchi of Tunusia 
assumed the top executive offices only after the 2011 revolutions in these countries. 
Therefore, this study focuses on these three MENA states‘ foreign policy behaviors 
after 2011 Arab revolutions to form a common temporal domain and the data for 
measuring independent variables were chosen from the same time period. The data were 
drawn from foreign policy statements of three Islamist leaders under investigation in 
this research. The Profiler Plus program is employed to measure the independent 
variables—operational codes of new MB-Islamists operating in MENA—of this 
research with the help of its computerized-coding system. 
 
 
4.3.7. Hypotheses 
 
This study begins by deriving hypotheses from existing operational code literature and 
applying them to the data collected for three MENA leaders. In addition to hypotheses 
drawn from the extant literature, there are two main hypotheses with the scholarly aim 
of shifting the focus of North American operational code analysis towards the study of 
MENA and political Islam. 
Building on the research questions, the two major hypotheses constitute the 
nitty-gritty of this study‘s proposed contribution to the leadership studies and the FPA 
literature. First, it is hypothesized that the Islamist leadership in MENA does follow 
cooperative foreign policy behaviors very similar to their international counterparts.  
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Hypothesis 1a: The foreign policy beliefs of MB-affiliated MENA leaders are 
not significantly different from the political beliefs of world leaders included in 
the norming group. 
Second, since all the leaders analyzed here are hailing from the MB movement 
which embodied by a combination of religious, nationalist and anti-colonial 
provenances this study assumes that MB-affiliated leaders do have very similar foreign 
policy beliefs and they are expected to pursue particular foreign policy strategies as a 
group that resonate in harmony.  
Hypothesis 1b: There is uniformity pattern in foreign policy behaviors of three 
MB-affiliated Islamists even though these MENA leaders operate in quite 
different political and cultural settings. 
Yet, there would be a potential counter-argument for this contention on the 
grounds that these three MENA leaders operate in different political context and 
encounter very distinct limitations and/or leeway in foreign policy decision-making. 
This study will test the proposed hypothesis and its contender with the evidence readily 
available. 
Also, this study examines a group of hypotheses drawn from the operational 
code literature in chapter 5 which focuses on articulating and interpreting the leadership 
analysis results. The canonical operational code hypotheses are as follows (Walker 
2000; Walker and Schafer 2006):  
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Hypothesis 2a: P-1 (nature of the political universe) master belief positively 
correlates with a leader’s perception of the outside world as harmonious and 
peaceful. 
Hypothesis 2b: I-1 (approach for selecting goals and objectives) master belief 
positively correlates with a leader’s cooperative/positive-sum game tactics and 
strategies. 
Hypothesis 2c: P-4a (self-control over history) master belief positively 
correlates with a leader’s predisposition to pursue an escalatory foreign policy 
and brinkmanship tactics. 
Hypothesis 2d: P-4b (other’s control over history) master belief positively 
correlates with a leader’s tendency to follow de-escalatory foreign policy and 
risk-averse tactics. 
 
 
4.4. Case Selection: Why Political Islamists and the MENA region? 
 
This research aims to profile the new MENA leaders affiliated to the MB movement for 
several reasons. First is the conventional wisdom that Islamism and Islamist groups 
have broadly gained strength across the MENA in the post-Cold War era (Rubin 2011; 
Özdamar 2011). Among others, however, the MB is acknowledged as the world‘s 
largest and most influential Islamist organization that impinges on the wider landscape 
of MENA politics particularly in the wake of the Arab uprisings (Ehrenfeld 2011). In 
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this context, the newly elected Islamist leaders of the MENA and their foreign policy 
orientation have been drawing an increasing attention from both the IR academia and 
international foreign policy elites. Therefore, there is an urgent need to study MENA 
leaders‘ foreign policy behaviors and learn the strategies they embrace to realize 
political objectives. A systematic study of the new Islamist leaders will potentially 
produce an added value by suggesting novel theoretical insights for the leadership and 
FPA-style studies and also promoting foreign policy-relevant scholarship within the IR 
academia.  
Second, pursuant to the scholarly concerns of Malici and Buckner (2008) 
focusing on the belief systems of two MENA leaders, Iran‘s Ahmadinejad and Syria‘s 
al-Assad, this study is meant to help shattering the conventional images held in the 
Western world regarding the certain non-Western leaders and their psychologies 
including MENA‘s Islamists. Malici and Buckner (2008: 783) argue that: 
The conventional wisdom regarding Iran and Syria is that these are belligerent 
states headed by hostile leaders. Rarely do policymakers and security analysts 
make an effort to imagine how international politics are perceived from the 
Iranian or the Syrian perspectives. 
 
 Therefore, this thesis aims to evaluate these simplistic and popular arguments 
prevailing in the West and, if possible, provide scientific evidence for the counter-
argument that the MENA countries, under investigation here, are not necessarily 
governed by ‗hostile‘ and ‗rogue‘ leaders. Following this aim, this study goes to great 
lengths to explicate how the three MENA leaders perceive the political universe and 
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interpret the power competition between the ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ aiming at the control over 
history. 
Third, after reviewing the recent consequential events transpiring in MENA 
politics it is safe to argue that the cascading outbreaks of popular uprisings turned the 
whole region upside down and led to the formation of new political settings and power 
centers mostly spearheaded by political Islamists. Thus, this study postulates that the 
new MENA politics and particularly its foreign policy domain offer a very fruitful 
research area in which the study of foreign policy-making process becomes extremely 
significant and useful. In the literature, FPA scholars specify a set of particular 
conditions in which the decision making process is most likely to have an autonomous 
impact on the decisions. Hagan (2001) argues that decision making is vitally important 
when the political leaders (1) encounter a high level of uncertainty in responding to 
international security threats; (2) are constrained with trade-offs across competing 
goals, including that of political survival; (3) work in decision setting in which political 
authority is quite diffused and fragmented. 
The lack of solid information and the omnipresence of uncertainties complicate 
the decision making process and prevent leaders from maintaining a record of rational 
course of actions. In such circumstances, the decision hinges on ―how leaders perceive 
and interpret the threats based on their belief systems‖ (Hagan 2001: 11). Additionally, 
Hermann (1976) argues that another condition in which the decision making process 
becomes paramount is the time constraints imposed by foreign policy crisis. To deal 
with exigent foreign policy issues, leaders are forced to make hasty and impulsive 
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decisions with limited information and under the ‗fog of war.‘66 This political 
environment will beget to tremendous stress and misperceptions for the leaders which 
have an impact on the dynamics of regional and international politics (Janis 1982; Jervis 
1976). For these reasons, this study zeroes in on the decision-making processes leading 
to an Islamist foreign policy pursued by the MENA‘s new leaders with a particular 
focus on their conceptualization of international politics in the post-Arab awakening 
era. 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This research does not contend that all significant foreign policy decisions can be 
explained by using the causal relationship between leaders‘ political beliefs and the 
foreign policy behaviors of states. This disclaimer notwithstanding, the paramount 
significance of leaders in foreign policy has already underscored and supported by 
empirical data in the leadership studies literature. With this research, therefore, the 
author strives for expanding the systematic study of political leadership beyond the 
North American and European cases towards the three strategically important countries 
in MENA to broaden the geographical scope of cognition-oriented FPA theories. Last 
but not least, thanks to its original research design adjusted to MENA context, this study 
                                                          
66The ‗fog of war‘ is originally a military concept referring to the level of ambiguity in situational 
awareness experienced by participants in military operations. The term is often attributed to German 
military theorist Clausewitz and his seminal study On War republished in 2012 by CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform. In this study, however, it is used to describe a high level of uncertainty 
(due to the specter of war and conflict affecting the mindset of decision makers) existing in international 
politics that greatly influence foreign policy decision-making. 
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shows that the operational code analysis is a universally applicable research program in 
the study of political leadership and foreign policy decision-making. Informed by the 
canonical principles of political psychology scholarship, the operational code construct 
differs from other cognitive approaches to foreign policy especially with its superior 
predictive power and its versatile applicability to every level of decision-making 
processes.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
 
 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter expounds upon the belief systems of three MENA leaders by interpreting 
the data compiled in this research with a focus on two main research questions. First, 
how do three Muslim Brotherhood leaders‘ operational codes differ among themselves? 
Second, what are the operational codes of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated MENA 
leaders in comparison to norming group of world leaders? While addressing these 
questions in a systematic approach, this chapter tests all the proposed hypotheses to put 
the new MENA leadership into a broader analytical perspective. 
Following these aims, this section first discusses the quadrants where three 
MENA leaders‘ images of ‗self‘ and the ‗other‘ can be located which allow profiling 
each MENA leader and see whether they are ‗Venutian‘ (Leaders of Type A and C) or 
‗Martian‘ (Leaders of Type B and DEF) leaders (Malici 2006). Secondly, the first 
research question is addressed by highlighting the statistically important differences 
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between operational codes of three MENA leaders. Third part zeroes in on the question 
of where do the new MENA leaders stand in comparison to the ‗average world leader‘? 
Here, with the aim of making broader comparison between new MENA leaders and 
world leaders a ‗norming group‘ is included in the discussion. In other words, the use of 
norming group enables researchers to observe MB-affiliated MENA leadership from a 
broader perspective and analyze the new generation of Islamist leaders in comparison to 
the average ‗world leader.‘67 The norming sample comprises a broad collection of 164 
public speeches made by 35 different and diverse world leaders including leaders of 
both weak and strong states. Next, the strategic preference orderings of three Islamist 
leaders, as to the foreign policy decision-making, are discussed in details. This part 
confirms the contention that the operational codes of leaders can be used as causal 
mechanisms to explicate and predict leaders‘ policy preferences at every level of 
decision making from behaviors to moves and from tactics to strategies (Walker 2000). 
 
 
5.2. Data Analysis Results: The Belief Systems of Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated 
MENA Leaders  
 
The operational code analysis of three MB-affiliated Islamist leaders yields both 
intriguing and consistent results which provides researchers with an analytical guideline 
to unravel MB-affiliated Islamists‘ conceptualization of foreign policy. First of all, all 
three MENA leaders‘ self-image falls under the quadrant A which means that 
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See Malici and Buckner (2008) for the use of Norming Group data which was obtained from Professor 
Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida. 
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Ghannouchi, Morsi, and Meshaal‘s conceptualization of the ‗self‘ is characterized with 
a low historical control (P-4a) and a highly cooperative nature of the preferred strategies 
(I-1) ranging from somewhat cooperative (Meshaal and Morsi) to definitely cooperative 
(Ghannouchi).  
As indicated in the revised Holsti typology (Walker 1983), Type A leaders 
determine their goals based on shared interests and follow a set of ―choices and shift 
propensities that favor tactics of Appease and Bluff associated with ‗Appeasement 
strategy‘ in foreign policy‖ (Walker 2000: 16). Considering the philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs together, Type A leaders are pragmatic appeasers that pursue ―…a 
strategy of rewarding the opponent for cooperative behavior and avoidance of 
escalatory behavior in international relations‖ (Devlen 2010). Therefore, it is safe argue 
that the three MENA leaders having type A self-images will follow flexible strategies 
and emphasize cooperation wherever possible rather than promoting an escalatory 
foreign policy tactics and conflictual foreign policy behavior. 
The average I-1 score of Tunusia‘s Ghannouchi is the highest (0,57) among 
three Islamist leaders while his sense of historical control is the lowest (P-4a= 0,19). It 
could be argued that Ghannouchi‘s tactical intensity is definitely cooperative and the 
location of historical control is very low. Meshall, however, has the lowest I-1 (0,40) 
score for cooperative approach to foreign policy tactics while his sense of self-control 
over history (P-4a= 0,22) is the greatest. These differences notwithstanding, Meshall‘s 
self-image falls very close to Ghannouchi‘s and Morsi‘s in terms of the strategic 
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orientation barring the Hamas leader‘s predilection for ‗somewhat cooperative‘ foreign 
policy tactics.  
Morsi‘s self-image, on the other hand, is situated in between of the two other 
MB-affiliated leaders. He has a somewhat cooperative approach to tactics in the conduct 
of foreign policy (I-1= 0,45). According to Morsi‘s political mindset, the locus of 
historical control over foreign policy events (P-4a= 0,20) is also low like two other 
MENA leaders. To recapitulate, all three MENA leaders‘ images of the ‗self‘ fall within 
the type A leadership category on the revised Holsti typology (Walker 1983), while 
highest cooperative approach to foreign policy and lowest sense of historical control 
belonging to Ghannouchi. 
Table 4. P1, I1, P4a and P4b scores for Ghannouchi, Meshaal, and Morsi. 
 P1 I1 P4a P4b 
Ghannouchi 0.25 0.57 0.19 0.81 
Meshaal 0.18 0.40 0.22 0.78 
Morsi 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.80 
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Figure 2. Operational Code Scores of Average World Leader and Three MB-affiliated 
MENA Leaders Concerning Their Images of ‗Self‘ and ‗Other.‘ 
 
 
 
Table 5. The Indices for Interpreting Leaders‘ Three Master Belief Scores: P-1, I-1, P-
4. Adopted from Walker (2000). 
 
P-1 Nature of the Political Universe (Hostile/Friendly) 
Hostile  Friendly 
Very          Definitely         Somewhat        Mixed        Somewhat          Definitely                Very  
-.75               -.50                    -.25                 0.0              +0.25                 +.50                     +.75 
I-1 Direction of Strategy (Conflict/Cooperation) 
Conflict          Cooperation 
Very       Definitely           Somewhat       Mixed        Somewhat         Definitely                   Very 
-.75           -.50                      -.25               0.0              +0.25                +.50              +.75 
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P-4 Control over Historical Development (Very Low/Very High) 
Control        Control 
Very Low    Definitely      Somewhat       Mixed       Somewhat        Definitely           Very High 
-.75 -.50                 -.25              0.0            +0.25                   +.50              +.75 
 
According to analysis, Ghannouchi, Meshaal, and Morsi have a common 
perception of ‗other‘ in their encounters with the political universe and they all construe 
the ‗other‘ as type C leader. Leaders with Type C operational code pursue a relatively 
friendly strategic orientation and attribute relatively high sense of historical control to 
themselves (Walker 1983). Type C leaders are anticipated to show ―choice and shift 
propensities that favor the tactics of Reward and Deter associated with an Assurance 
Strategy‖ (Walker 2000: 16). In similar vein, they are inclined to view the state system 
as anarchical which overshadows the inherent harmony of interests between the states. 
For leaders with Type C philosophical beliefs, these common but elusive interests will 
be achieved through the restructuring of the state system, which in turn will avert the 
root causes of wars. Walker (1990: 411) argues that restructuring of the anarchical 
system is required because it is difficult to achieve one‘s international goals in the 
anarchical system because ―predictability and control over historical development is 
low under anarchy.‖  
Ghannouchi views political universe as somewhat friendly (P-1= 0,25) and the 
bulk of historical control over political events is attributed to the agency of ‗other‘(P-
4b= 0,81). Ghannouchi‘s scores suggest a partially benign perception of the outside 
world and a high degree of other‘s grip over political events which make his other a 
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Type C leader. Meshall has the lowest P-1 (0,18) and P-4b (0,78) scores among the 
group of MB-affiliated MENA leaders. While Meshaal‘s P-1 belief can be located 
between the mixed and somewhat friendly views towards political universe, Hamas 
kingpin‘s sense of other‘s control over political developments remains very high. 
Meshaal operational code suggests that he places the ‗other‘ in the quadrant C with 
somewhat positive view of political realm and a high degree of other‘s control. Morsi of 
Egypt, however, has the greatest P-1 (0,28) score but it also falls within the quadrant of 
somewhat friendly political universe. Morsi‘s operational code also shows that his P-4b 
(0,80) dwells in between of two other Islamist leaders suggesting again a high level of 
other‘s control in foreign affairs. Since Morsi‘s political beliefs reveal a rather benign 
view of the outside world and an acceptance of other‘s control in foreign policy, he 
locates the other under quadrant C.  
This thesis hypothesizes that ―the foreign policy behaviors of MENA‘s Islamist 
leaders demonstrate a pattern of uniformity even though they operate in consequentially 
different political and cultural settings.‖68 Building on the operational code analysis 
results, the first main hypothesis is substantiated with the empirical data as leaders‘ own 
words. As discussed above, the operational codes of three MB-affiliated MENA leaders 
are very analogous which put all three MB-Islamists‘ self-images into a Type A 
leadership who identify their foreign policy rivals as Type C leaders. Here, the bottom 
line is that Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi are expected to show very similar foreign 
policy behaviors. All three Islamists are expected to speak with one voice in their 
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This hypothesis (1-b) is broached and discussed in details in the chapter 4 titled ―Research Design and 
Methodology‖ Please see the Chapter 4, pages: 82-83. 
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conceptualization of foreign policy although three MENA countries‘ regime types are 
significantly different in which Islamist leaders encounter very distinct and diverse 
political and structural limitations existing at both the state and international levels. 
Political science literature on MENA countries suggests that Tunusia, Egypt, and Gaza 
Strip differ from each other in many ways e.g., the regime type, governmental setting, 
political culture, economic structure and etc.  
However, this study argues that since their political beliefs are molded by the 
same classic Islamic sources such as the Quran and the Sunna and the teachings of latter 
political Islamist doctrinaires like Seyd Qutb, Said Nursi, and Ali Shariati (Özdamar 
2011), the MB-affiliated leaders perceive the political universe as somewhat benign and 
friendly. They feel rather powerless in the international arena and always attribute lower 
levels of historical control to themselves and their senses other‘s historical control are 
generally very high. Lastly, since they are products of the same old MB ideology all 
three political Islamist leaders have very cooperative strategic orientations hallmarked 
by the Islamists‘ non-zero sum thinking on foreign policy.  
Additionally, the analysis provides consistent results as to the belief systems of 
new Islamist leadership in MENA bearing out a few canonical hypotheses established 
within the operational code research program. As stated in the methodology chapter, 
this research also attempts to test some extant hypotheses in the literature to 
demonstrate the universal applicability and generalizability of psychological approaches 
to foreign policy and decision-making. First, the comparative analysis of three MENA 
leaders‘ operational codes shows that the higher the P-1 master belief score, the more 
110 
      
benign and peaceful the leader‘s perception towards the political universe will be 
(Walker 2000). Particularly, this study hypothesized that Meshaal‘s P-1 score will be 
the lowest due to the tug of war between Israel and Hamas-ruled Gaza while Morsi‘s P-
1 score may be the highest among the group. Because, Morsi was elected to govern one 
of the most populous and powerful Muslim countries in MENA and his government 
received sizeable political and economic support from the region and the West that 
impinged upon his perception of the other actors. The analysis reveals that highest P-1 
score belongs to Morsi whereas the lowest to Meshaal within the group which 
substantiate the hypothesis that P-1 belief (nature of the political universe) positively 
correlates with a leader‘s view of the political universe as peaceful and harmonious. 
Second, in the literature it was posited that the more intense the tactical 
cooperation index, the more likely the leader‘s use of cooperative tactics and strategies 
in foreign policy-making (Walker 2000). In this study, although all three MENA leaders 
are expected to show similar foreign policy behaviors, it was postulated that Tunisia‘s 
Ghannouchi will be more prone to follow highly cooperative and de-escalatory foreign 
policy tactics especially vis a vis Meshaal. This assumption is based on the literature on 
Ghannouchi‘s psychobiography and political profile in which he is described as ‗A 
Democrat within Islamism‘ (Tamimi 2001). Therefore, his democratic approach to 
political Islam along with the moderate stance on secularism and the vision of power-
sharing and negotiation in governance should have contributed to his foreign policy 
beliefs. The results suggest that Ghannouchi‘s I-1 score is the highest while Meshaal‘s 
appears to be the lowest which implies that the I-1 (direction of strategy) master belief 
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positively correlates with a leader‘s tendency to pursue cooperative and positive-sum 
foreign policy strategies. 
Next, Walker and Schafer (2006) argue that leaders in the Type B and Type C 
quadrant are associated with higher sense of self-control over history in comparison to 
Type A and Type DEF leaders. Put it differently, the higher the locus of historical self-
control index, the more likely the leader‘s preferences favor escalatory foreign policy 
and brinkmanship tactics. Building on this hypothesis, Hamas‘ chief Meshaal is 
expected to have more inclination for brinkmanship strategy and zero-sum game tactics 
in comparison to Morsi and Ghannouchi. A quick glance on Hamas‘ history as a 
resistance movement and its relations with the Israeli state and major Western powers 
underpins the rationale behind such an educated guess.  
The analysis results are in line with the correlation established between the locus 
of historical control index and the nature of a leader‘s strategic orientation. Since 
Meshaal‘s P-4a score is the highest among the all three leaders, this study verifies that 
P-4a (self-control over history) belief positively correlates with leader‘s predisposition 
to conduct a rather escalatory foreign policy fraught with brinkmanship tactics. In a 
similar vein, P-4b (other‘s control over political events) operational code belief is 
associated with the de-escalatory foreign policy and the potential utilization of 
Appeasement strategy that prescribes the tactics of Appease and Bluff (Walker and 
Schafer 2006). Among the studied leaders, Ghannouchi appears to be more inclined to 
Appeasement strategy whilst Meshaal is hypothesized to adopt a more hostile strategic 
orientation towards his out-group due to the same reasons discussed above. Inextricably 
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related with the calculation and interpretation of the P-4a score, the analysis of P-4b 
belief yields very similar insights which support the final hypothesis drawn from the 
operational code literature: the P-4b belief positively correlates with a leader‘s 
preferences that favor non-confrontational foreign policy and the strategy of 
Appeasement.  
 
 
5.3. Comparing Political Islamists’ Operational Codes with Norming Group 
 
This section seeks answers for the research question: ‗How do three MB-affiliated 
MENA Leaders compare to the average world leader?‘ To perform this empirical 
inquiry, the public speeches of three Islamist leaders are coded and quantified thanks to 
the VICS coding guideline and the Profiler Plus. With the help of a broader comparison, 
both the new MENA leaders‘ perceptions of the ‗self‘ and the ‗other‘ can be understood 
more profoundly and the immediate policy relevance of this thesis can be better 
discerned. As stated in the methodology chapter, quantified and computer-coded data 
allow us to compare the results for MENA leaders‘ operational code with a group of 
world leaders so as to put the new MENA leadership into a broader perspective.
69
 The 
average operational code results of three MENA leaders and mean values for the 
norming group are illustrated in Table 5.
70
 
                                                          
69
The mean values for the norming group are (for N=35, P-1= +.30, SD= .29; I-1= +.40, SD= .43; P-
4=.22, SD= .13). Adopted from Malici and Buckner (2008). 
70
The norming group is composed of a collection of 35 different world leaders. Mean score for a sample 
(n-164) of public statements of world leaders from different regions and time periods (also cited in Malici 
and Buckner 2008). 
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Table 6. The Operational Codes of Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi Compare to the 
‗Norming Group‘71  
 
Norming 
Group Ghannouchi Meshaal Morsi 
Philosophical beliefs (n= 164) (n= 7) (n= 9) (n=10) 
P-1     Nature of political 
universe   
           (conflict/cooperation) 0.301 0.25 0.184 0.284 
P-2     Realization of political 
values     
           (pessimism/optimism) 0.147 0.09 0.044 0.231 
P-3     Political Future              
           
(unpredictable/predictable) 0.134 0.15 0.112 0.182 
P-4     Historical development 
           (low control/high 
control) 0.224 0.19 0.22 0.2 
P-5     Role of chance 
           (small role/large role) 0.968 0.95 0.975 0.96 
Instrumental beliefs     
I-1     Strategic approach to 
goals 
          (conflict/cooperation) 0.401 0.57 0.406 0.453 
I-2     Intensity of tactics 
          (conflict/cooperation) 0.178 0.2 0.22 0.258 
I-3     Risk orientation 
          (averse/acceptant) 0.332 0.45 0.183 0.233 
I-4     Timing of action     
           a. conflict 0.503 0.43 0.593 0.562 
           b. words/deed 0.464 0.26 0.69 0.545 
I-5     Utility of means     
           a. Reward 0.157 0.06 0.223 0.319 
           b. Promise 0.075 0.07 0.066 0.089 
           c. Appeal/support 0.468 0.65 0.413 0.454 
           d. Oppose/resist 0.154 0.11 0.158 0.176 
           e. Threaten 0.034 0.03 0.014 0.085 
           f. Punish 0.112 0.07 0.121 0.068 
 
 
 
                                                          
71
For mean scores for Norming Group, see Walker and Schafer (2006). 
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 Primarily, the table demonstrates that there are very few statistically important 
differences between new political Islamist leaders, on the one hand, and the average 
world leader, on the other. Ghannouchi views the nature of the political realm (P-1= 
0,25) a bit more hostile than the average world leader (P-1= 0,30). Likewise, Meshaal‘s 
perception of the nature of political universe (P-1= 0,18) is more conflictual than 
Ghannouchi and Morsi and the average world leader (0,30). Besides, although Morsi 
sees the political universe more friendly than his Islamist comrades, the P-4 score for 
average leader (0,30) is slightly higher than the former Egyptian president‘s score (P-1= 
0,28). 
 There are also compelling and consistent results with respect to the core 
instrumental belief (I-1). First, Ghannouchi‘s tactical intensity, is more cooperative (I-
1= 0,57) than the average leader‘s direction of strategy in foreign policy decision-
making (I-1= 0,40). Second, Hamas chief Meshaal‘s scores for tactical orientation is 
surprising owing to the fact that his I-1 score (0,40) is tantamount to mean value for 
average world leader‘s tactical preferences. Third, Morsi pursues a more cooperative 
approach to tactics in the conduct of foreign policy (I-1= 0,45) than both Meshaal and 
his tactical equivalent, the average world leader. 
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Figure 3. P-4a Scores for Ghannouchi, Morsi and Meshaal Compared to the Mean 
Score for the Norming Group.
72
 
 
                                    0,09                  0,19 0,2 0,22                          0,35 
                                                                (RG) (MM) (KM)  
                                                                                    (NG) 
 
The mean scores for self-control beliefs (P-4a scores) of MENA leaders vis a vis 
world leaders are presented in Figure 2.
73
 First, the locus of historical control in 
Ghannouchi‘s operational code (P-4a= 0,19) is slightly lower than the average score of 
the norming sample for self‘s control over historical development (0,22). Likewise, 
Morsi has a slightly low level of self-control over political events (P-4a= 0,20) in 
comparison to norming group and Meshaal of Gaza. Yet, Meshall‘s sense of historical 
control also overlaps with the norming group‘s average P-4a score (both are 0,22). This 
is one of the unlooked-for results in this research just like the overlap between 
                                                          
72
The average P-4a score for the norming group is 0,22 and the standard deviation (SD) is 0,13. P-4a 
scores are plotted on Figure 3 accordingly. The boundaries for P-4a distribution are calculated as 0,09 
(below the SD) and 0,35 (above the SD). 
73
The abbreviations used in Figures 3 and 4 and their meanings are as follows: RG=Rachid Ghannouchi; 
MM= Mohamed Morsi; KM= Khaled Meshaal and NG= Norming group of world leaders. 
Within the Standard Deviation 
SD = 0,13 Above the Standard Deviation 
Below the Standard 
Deviation 
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Meshaal‘s and average leader‘s master instrumental beliefs (I-1). In the final analysis, 
all three leaders‘ average P-4a scores are within one standard deviation (0,13) of the 
mean for the norming group (0,22).
74
 
Figure 4. P-4b Scores for Ghannouchi, Morsi and Meshaal Compared to the Mean 
Score for the Norming Group.
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                                         0,65                          0,78  0,8 0,81             0,91 
                                                                        (KM) (MM) (RG)  
                                                                        (NG) 
 
The Figure 3 demonstrates the average P-4b scores for MENA leaders‘ and 
norming group‘s perceptions of other‘s control over history and international politics. 
At first blush, it appears that all three MB-affiliated Islamist leaders‘ average P-4b 
scores are within one standard deviation (0,13) of the mean for the norming group 
                                                          
74Since this part of the chapter merely aims to compare three MENA leaders‘ belief systems with the 
average world leader, it focuses on whether there are statistically important differences between three 
MENA leaders (individually and as a group) and norming group of world leaders. For more information 
on this method, see Malici and Buckner (2008: 796), and Achen (1982). 
75
The mean P-4b score for the norming group is 0,78 and, like P-4a indice, the standard deviation (SD) is 
0,13. P-4b scores are plotted on Figure 4 accordingly. The boundaries for P-4b distribution are calculated 
as 0,65 (below the SD) and 0,91 (above the SD). 
Within the Standard 
Deviation  
SD = 0,13 
Above the Standard Deviation Below the Standard 
Deviation 
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(0,78). These particular results for P-4b scores are not unanticipated because Malici and 
Buckner (2008: 791) argue in their study that ―by definition, when P-4a is more than 
one standard deviation from the norming group‘s mean, P-4b is more than one standard 
deviation from the mean in the opposite direction and falls within one standard 
deviation when P-4a is also within one standard deviation.‖ Since formulas for the P-4a 
and P-4b indexes are interwoven, the analysis on three MENA leaders‘ P-4b belief 
scores do yield exactly same results and insights that are discussed above within the 
section on leader‘s P-4a scores. Therefore, the interpretation of analysis results for MB-
Islamists‘ P-4a scores above also applies to the discussion of their P-4b scores. 
In the final analysis, a comparison between the operational code results of new 
MENA leaders with the average world leader confirms the second main hypothesis of 
this thesis. Building on the results, it is scientifically tenable to argue that ―the foreign 
policy beliefs of MB-affiliated MENA leaders are not significantly different from the 
political beliefs of world leaders included in the norming group‖76 since they all identify 
themselves with Type A leadership and perceive the ‗other‘ in political universe as 
Type C leader. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76
The quoted statement is the first main hypothesis (1-a) posited in this study. It is discussed in detail in 
methods and research design chapter. Please see the Chapter 4, pages: 82-83. 
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5.4. An Essence of Islamist Foreign Policy: Strategic Preferences of New MENA 
Leadership 
 
This section deals with another significant question of MENA‘s international relations, 
‗What are the strategies of MB-affiliated MENA leaders and do they behave rationally 
in the art of foreign policy making?‘ With this focus, this part mainly investigates 
whether there are substantive and consequential statistical differences between three 
MB leaders, on the one hand, and the average world leader, on the other. In other 
words, it evaluates whether the operational code scores of three MENA leaders are 
below (<) or above (>) the average leader‘s scores (for P-1 and I-1 scores) or more than 
one standard deviation above (>) or below (<) or within (=) one standard deviation (for 
P-4a and P-4b).  
Decision maker‘s master beliefs indices allow researchers to put leaders‘ foreign 
policy leadership into a broader perspective and unravel not only their strategic 
preferences but also their perceptions of other‘s tactical intensity and foreign policy 
moves. Put it differently, ―indices of an actor‘s key beliefs define the strategic 
preferences of self (I-1, P-4a) and the perceived preferences of other actors (P-1, P-4b) 
regarding the political outcomes of domination, submission, settlement, or deadlock in 
world politics‖ (Malici and Buckner 2008: 791). In the literature, Walker and Schafer 
(2006) classified and theorized decision makers‘ strategic preferences and their sense of 
other actor‘s inclinations through the formulation of ‗The Theory of Inferences about 
Preferences (TIP).‘77 
                                                          
77
For more insights on the deductive theory of ‗Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)‘ and its 
applications see Walker and Schafer (2006) and Walker (2004a and 2004b). 
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Table 7. Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP). Adopted from Walker and 
Schafer (2006). 
                  Self     &    Other         Values      Preference Order in a 2 X 2 Strategic Game 
Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle >Deadlock>Submit>Dominate = (Appeasement) 
Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit  = (Assurance) 
Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit  = (Stag Hunt)  
Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, <), then Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock   = (Chicken) 
Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, =), then Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit   = (P. Dilemma)      
Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, >), then Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit   = (Bully) 
 
Table 7 shows the signs and indices for all master beliefs which enable 
researchers to observe whether one particular leader‘s P-1 and I-1 beliefs are below (<) 
or above (>) the mean score for the norming sample of world leaders. However, the 
signs for the P-4a and P-4b indices designate whether these beliefs are more than one 
standard deviation below (<) or above (>), or rather within (=) one standard deviation of 
the mean for the norming sample. The P-4 indices are particularly significant on the 
grounds that an individual leader with a higher P-4a value than one standard deviation 
above (>) the mean for the norming group of world leaders is expected to give more 
historical control to self rather than to other.  
Furthermore, if a leader has an average P-4a score located within (=) one 
standard deviation it means that he gives approximately equal amount of historical 
control to self and other. If the P-4a score of a leader is more than one standard 
deviation below (<) the mean score for the norming group it is predicted that such 
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leader will attribute most of the historical control to other than to self. Similarly, since 
P-4b score is equal to 1 minus (-) P-4a score, P-4b belief‘s locus can be calculated 
accordingly. By definition, when P-4a falls within (=) one standard deviation it means 
that P-4b is also within (=) one standard deviation and when P-4a is more than one 
standard deviation above (>) or below (>) the mean for norming group, P-4b is also 
more than one standard deviation above (>) or below (>) the mean but in the opposite 
direction (Schafer and Walker 2006; Malici and Buckner 2008). 
Based on Table 7, the first three (1-3) propositions indicate particular ranges for 
all master beliefs from which it is possible to infer cooperative strategies and the 
preference of ‗settlement‘ seen as the most likely outcome. In this set of cooperation 
strategies, as Malici and Buckner (2008: 790) argue, it is postulated that if the 
settlement outcome proves far-fetched, strategic interaction of the players will unfold as 
follows:  
(1) The stronger player will use its superior power to impose a domination or 
deadlock outcome in order to avoid submission; (2) equal players will use this 
parity to impose a deadlock and will accept domination in order to avoid 
submission; (3) the weaker player will seek deadlock but accept submission 
because it cannot dominate. 
 
The last three propositions (4-6), on the other hand, determine an area for the 
master beliefs that are logically affiliated with conflict strategies in which the 
‗domination‘ outcome ranked as the most probable preference. In the playbook of 
conflict strategies, if the domination outcome is elusive, the sequence of moves can be 
described as: ―(4) the weaker player will seek settlement but accept submission because 
it cannot deadlock; (5) equal players will seek settlement but accept deadlock in order to 
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avoid submission; (6) the stronger player will seek deadlock rather than accept 
settlement or submission‖ (Malici 2008: 790). 
Considering all the propositions (1-6) together, these predictions provide us with 
leaders‘ logical inferences about what is wanted and also feasible to attain in foreign 
policy statecraft which depend on the sense of historical power attributed to self (P-4a) 
and other (P-4b). According to Walker and Schafer (2006), the causal linkage 
established between these six propositions is rigorous and fairly consistent with the 
formal models of ‗subjective games‘ used in mainstream game theory applications with 
an emphasis on balance of power thinking as a causal mechanism. Therefore, the 
rationale behind these propositions is also consistent with the scientific results of formal 
model simulations of subjective games in which historical control, tactical intensity and 
perceptions of the players are manipulated (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Walker 1983).  
In this framework, it is now possible to address the last research question: what 
are the foreign policy strategies of three political Islamist leaders and do they behave 
rationally? Following the TIP procedures, three MENA leaders‘ average scores for their 
master political beliefs are utilized to determine the preference orderings of 
Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi along with their perceived policy preferences of the 
‗other‘. The average scores for Ghannochi are self (I-1= 0,57, P-4a= 0,19) and other (P-
1= 0,25 , P-4b= 0,81), for Meshaal the scores are self (I-1= 0,40, P-4a= 0,22 ) and other 
(P-1= 0,18, P-4b= 0,78), and lastly Morsi‘s belief scores are self (I-1= 0,45, P-4a= 0,20) 
and other (P-1= 0,28, P-4b= 0,80).  
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Firstly, while the I-1 scores of Ghannouchi and Morsi are greater than the I-1 
belief score for the norming group (0,40), Meshaal‘s I-1 (0,40) score is equal to the 
norming group value. Second, P-4a scores of all three MENA leaders are within one 
standard deviation (0,13) of the mean calculated for the norming group. Accordingly, 
for Ghannouchi and Morsi, these two scores are instrumental to pinpoint the preference 
ordering of the ‗self‘ which correspond to the ranges given in proposition 2 in TIP. 
Substantively, it means that Ghannouchi and Morsi are expected to pursue a 
combination of cooperative strategies in general and subscribe to a strategy of 
‗Assurance‘ in particular. Proposition 2 also postulates that these two leaders following 
assurance strategy do not necessarily see a disproportional power disparity between 
themselves and their counterparts. According to assurance strategy, Ghannouchi and 
Morsi are predicted to order their policy preferences as: settlement (4), over deadlock 
(3), over domination (2), over submission (1).
78
  
However, since Meshaal‘s I-1 score does not locate the self‘s preference 
ordering neither totally within cooperative strategies (propositions 1-3) nor  within 
conflict strategies (proposition 4-6), it is possible to assume that Meshaal‘s strategic 
orientation for the ‗self‘ is two-fold that can correspond to either proposition 2 or 
proposition 5 specified in the TIP. If we assume that Meshaal‘s score for I-1 is lower 
than the I-1 score for the norming sample (0,40) and his score for P-4a unchanged 
(0,22), it basically means that Meshaal tend to prefer conflict strategies and he will not 
perceive a significant power gap between the self and his other. These potential beliefs 
                                                          
78The numbers in brackets denotes the preference ordering for MENA leaders (for the self‘s strategic 
preferences) and their perceived preference order for their other (for the other‘s strategic preferences). 
The numbers are ranging from 4 as the highest preference to 1 as the lowest preference.  
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meet the conditions of proposition 5 of TIP in which Meshaal is likely to pursue a 
Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy towards his rivals in foreign policy domain. Lastly, if it is 
postulated that Meshaal‘s political beliefs are associated with the proposition 5 in lieu 
of the proposition 2, his new preference ordering is going to be: domination (4), over 
settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1). In other words, Meshall‘s 
operational code tells us that his strategic preferences are prone to alteration depending 
on the situational context and the character of ‗other.‘79 The two strategic interaction 
scenarios epitomizing Meshaal‘s changing perceptions towards ‗other‘ and two 
different preference orderings associated with his shifting operational code beliefs are 
depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Two Strategic Interaction Scenarios for Meshaal‘s Shifting Foreign Policy 
Preferences
80
 
Meshaal's 
Self-Image 
I-1 Score     
(P-4a= 0, 
22) 
Proposition 
(TIP) 
Preference Order Strategy  Other 
Scenario 1 I-1 > 0,40  
(0,41)* 
Proposition 
2 
Settle>Deadlock>Dominate
>Submit 
Assurance Egypt 
Scenario 2 I-1 < 0, 40 
(0,39)* 
Proposition 
5 
Dominate>Settle>Deadlock
>Submit 
Prisoners' 
Dilemma 
Israel 
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There is a scholarly debate regarding whether decision makers have a general and consistent operational 
code or whether there are different operational codes for different issues they are facing in foreign policy 
domain (Walker et al. 1998). 
80Table 8 demonstrates two possible scenarios regarding Khaled Meshaal‘s conceptualization of the 
‗self.‘ In this table, the asterisk symbols ―*‖ are used to indicate two hypothetical P-4a belief scores (0,41 
and 0,39) to determine Meshaal‘s multiple can-be preference orderings. To reiterate, this operation is 
undertaken because Meshaal‘s I-1 (0,40) and P-4a scores (0,22) are coinciding with the mean I-1 and P-
4a scores for norming sample which are taken as benchmarks of comparative statistical analysis. 
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On the other hand, while three MENA leaders‘ average P-1 scores are lower 
than the norming group‘s average P-1 score (0,30), their scores for P-4b belief is within 
one standard deviation (0,13) of the average score for the norming sample (0,78).
81
 
Building on these scores, it is possible to infer the new MENA leadership‘s perception 
of other‘s preference ordering which correspond to conditions stipulated in proposition 
5 of TIP. Analogous to Meshall‘s second perception of the self, three MENA leaders‘ 
perceptions of the other meet the conditions of Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy. 
Substantively, Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi perceive their other as hawkish leaders 
who always opt for a conflictual strategy despite the fact that the ‗other‘ does not exert 
an inordinate amount of historical power over the leaders of Tunisia, Gaza and Egypt. 
The perceptions of three MB-Islamists place the other‘s preference ordering into the 
game plan of Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy which prioritizes domination (4), over 
settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1). 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of three MENA leaders‘ philosophical and instrumental beliefs provides a 
few general patterns in how MB-incubated political Islam asserted and articulated itself 
as an independent ideology with particular foreign policy preferences. First, all three 
leaders place their self-image under quadrant A while they all perceive the ‗other‘ 
within the quadrant of C. Substantively, these leaders tend to follow Appeasement 
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Both P-4a and P-4b belief scores for all three leaders and the norming group together with the standard 
deviation value are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 of this chapter. 
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strategy which prescribes the tactics of appeasement and bluff but they attribute the 
tactics of reward and deter to other whose foreign policy behaviors are associated with 
an Assurance strategy. Second, the analysis reveals that there are a few statistically 
significant differences between the three Islamist leaders and the average leader 
specified within the norming group. The comparative analysis of these two groups 
confirms the second major hypothesis of this study which generates some policy-
relevant insights for international foreign policy practitioners.  
Third, the strategic preferences playbook of new MENA leadership is decoded 
by using TIP that yields many interesting, albeit a few inconsistent, results with regards 
to the three leaders‘ strategic behaviors. While the three MB-Islamists‘ preference 
orderings for the self mostly correspond to the conditions of Assurance strategy 
specified in proposition 2 of TIP, their senses of other‘s preference ordering meet the 
Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy given in proposition 5. Yet, due to their contested ranges, 
it can be argued that Meshaal‘s operational code scores render the strategic preferences, 
those he attributes to himself, fickle. In addition to Assurance strategy, Meshaal is 
expected to perceive also the Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy of proposition 5 as the 
preference ordering of self. Given the preference orderings attributed to self and other, 
barring Meshaal to some extent, new generation of Islamists in MENA tend to perceive 
the other as confrontational actors subscribing to brinkmanship strategies, but not vice 
versa. However, since the new MENA leaders do not impute a disproportionate amount 
of historical control to its out-group, they are anticipated to show a ‗conditional 
126 
      
cooperation‘ which recognized as the nitty-gritty of the Assurance strategy (Malici and 
Buckner 2008). 
Through following TIP procedures, it is possible to make solid predictions about 
a leader‘s moves, tactics, and strategies in a strategic interaction game. Particularly, the 
upside of TIP is its rigorous modeling of strategic interaction between states which 
based on the leaders‘ beliefs and perceptions or misperceptions (Lake and Powell 
1999). In contrast to the canonical assumptions of conventional game theory, 
operational code studies do not take leaders‘ profiles and preferences as given but 
systematically draw them from a discrete cognition-oriented decision-making theory 
(Malici and Buckner 2008). 
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
 
 ISLAMISTS’ BELIEFS AND NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN MENA 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Building on the discussion of three MB-Islamists‘ foreign policy strategies and their 
perceptions of other‘s intentions and strategic moves, this chapter focuses exclusively 
on the crux of second research question posed in this research: is the new MENA 
leadership‘s approach to foreign policy rational or impulsive? This question is tackled 
by linking the operational code beliefs of three MENA leaders with their countries‘ 
foreign policy behaviors during their terms of office as chief executives. In essence, this 
chapter aims to render the linkage between the operational codes of three MENA 
leaders and their foreign policy explicit. First, regarding the identification of a leader‘s 
‗other‘, the P-1 index interprets other actors in the political universe to be always the 
actors that a decision maker references in his public speeches (Walker and Schafer 
2006). In the case of MENA leadership, this study finds that all three Islamist leaders 
refer to the Israel and the US as their main competitors and make references to Jews, 
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Zionists, and Westerners as their out-group. The following sub-sections will elaborate 
on the real-life foreign policies of the three MENA leaders separately so as to show to 
what extent their political belief systems are substantial to their foreign policy decision-
making.  
 
 
6.2. Rachid Ghannouchi: A Moderately Moderate Islamist’s Foreign Policy  
 
Rachid Ghannouchi stands out to be the most ‗democratically oriented‘ Islamist leader 
studied in this research. Considering his moderate views on political Islam and 
conciliatory approach to power-sharing in Tunisian politics, Ghannouchi is 
acknowledged as a ‗democrat within Islamism‘ by regional and international academic 
circles (Tamimi 2001). The Islamist thought of Ghannouchi can be seen as an 
amalgamation of Western democratic ideals, objective of Islamic unity and solidarity, 
and the lofty idea of historical interconnectedness between Eastern and Western 
civilizations. Building on these beliefs, Ghannouchi conceives a possibility of 
rapprochement between Muslim world and the West through the act of bridging 
MENA‘s Islamic thought with the idea of progress and modernity embedded in Western 
civilization.
82
 
A few criticisms of Zionism and Western foreign policy notwithstanding, 
Ghannouchi overtly commends the Western world‘s advances in democracy and 
                                                          
82Rachid Ghannouchi‘s interview with Council on Foreign Relations. The transcript can be reached at 
http://www.cfr.org/tunisia/tunisias-challenge-conversation-rachid-al-ghannouchi/p26660. (Last Access: 
10.08.2013). 
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economic governance with an emphasis on the level of cooperation transpiring between 
the Western countries. He usually advocates for having the similar levels of economic 
and political development through creating venues and organizations for Islamic 
cooperation similar to Western-originated supranational economic and security 
platforms e.g., the European Union.  In that sense, Ghannouchi‘s rather idealistic vision 
of Muslim world and the West can be likened to Erbakan‘s conceptualization of the 
‗self‘ and ‗other‘ in foreign affairs. Turkey‘s Erbakan was one of the leading political 
Islamists of MENA who appears to be the ‗romantic Islamist‘ of his own generation 
(Özdamar 2011).  
Ghannouchi has the highest level of cooperative approach towards his ‗out-
group‘ among three MENA leaders (I-1= 0,51). Moreover, when the references 
Ghannouchi made in his speeches are dissected, it appears that his relationship with his 
‗in-group‘ is more cooperative than his stance on Western world and Israel and US 
foreign policy. However, since he is a Type A leader, Ghannochi is expected to believe 
that optimism is warranted in international system and view the conflict as temporary 
phenomenon that transpiring because of human misunderstanding and misperception 
(Holsti 1977). 
On the other hand, Ennahda‘s leader possesses the lowest level of self‘s ability 
to control historical developments (P-4a= 0,19). Tunisia‘s historical encounters with 
colonialism and Western imperialism played a role in Ghannouchi‘s very low sense of 
self‘s historical control. Tunisian homeland became a property of imperial powers in the 
20
th
 century due to (1) its proximity to European continent and the predatory empires of 
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the era and (2) its strategically important geography in the North Africa (Anderson 
1986). Considering these historical facts on the ground, Ghannouchi‘s attribution of 
historical control to ‗other‘ outstrips even the P-4a score for Meshaal whose view of the 
political universe is profoundly shaped by the Israeli aggression and the desolation of 
the Gaza for decades. 
In general, Ghannouchi‘s rhetoric is very critical of Zionism, Israeli foreign 
policy and also the autocratic regimes in Muslim world such as Mubarak‘s Egypt, al-
Asad‘s Syria and particularly Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes in Tunisia. Ghannouchi‘s 
critiques on other foreign policy actors operating in the MENA region confirm his 
relatively low P-1 score (0,25). Regarding the P-1 beliefs, nevertheless, Ghannouchi has 
a mid-level of trust for his out-group in comparison to Gaza‘s Meshaal (0,18) and 
Egypt‘s Morsi (0,28). 
Ghannnouchi‘s depiction of his in-group is the largest of all MENA leaders 
which includes almost all Muslim countries of the region. His in-group is composed of 
‗oppressed Muslim people‘, generally both Shia and Sunni counties of MENA such as 
Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Gulf Monarchies and especially Turkey under AK Party government 
whose political vision and party mobilization are taken as a model and/or source of 
inspiration by Ennahda movement.
83
 Ghannouchi views the Turkish example as an 
instructive playbook to follow in Tunusia‘s domestic and foreign affairs in the sense of 
maintaining the movement‘s Islamist character and following democratic and mildly 
                                                          
83In his interview with the Financial Times, Ghannouchi pointed that ―Our thought is similar to that of the 
AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey.‖ The transcript can be reached at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24d710a6-22ee-11e0-ad0b-00144feab49a.html#axzz2vUlHkJvr (Last 
accessed 20.10.2013). 
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secular principles at the same time and actively engaging with the political system to 
avoid resorting to violence and terrorism from the periphery (Tamimi 2001). More 
specifically, Ghannouchi‘s in-group involves the MENA countries which accommodate 
the MB organization and give political space to its offshoots across the region e.g., 
Jordan, Gaza Strip, Qatar.   
In a similar vein, Ghannouchi‘s definition out-group is the narrowest among all 
leaders which includes the Zionists, oppressive autocratic regimes in MENA e.g., Syria, 
Egypt after the downfall of Morsi regime, and Saudi Arabia. Ghannochi always 
critiques the autocratic and extremely secular regimes in MENA i.e., Syria and Saudi 
Arabia for not espousing a moderate version of political Islam and democratic 
principles in their countries. His out-group lastly includes a number of Western 
countries due in part to their unconditional support for Israeli foreign policy and in his 
statements Ghannouchi mainly refers to the US as the sponsor of Israel‘s military 
operations against the Muslim world.
84
  
Ghannouchi‘s sense of isolation is the lowest of all leaders owing to fact that 
after the Tunisian revolution in 2011 his party received a tremendous support from both 
the Western powers, such as the US and European Union, and regional players like 
Turkey and Gulf countries. In addition, Ghannouchi‘s Tunisia does not take part in the 
power competition between major Sunni and Shia countries in the region because of its 
geography and the economic and political clout. Ghannouchi-led Tunisia pursues a 
                                                          
84
Regarding that subject matter, Ghannouchi penned an op-ed titled ―Palestine as a Global Agenda.‖ It 
can be reached at: http://www.missionislam.com/nwo/globalagenda.htm (Last accessed 20.10.2013). 
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cooperative foreign policy towards almost all Sunni and Shia governments on the one 
hand, and Arab and non-Arab MENA countries on the other.  
Likewise, Ghannouchi is prone to establish good relations with many European 
countries especially with the France and Britain despite Tunisia‘s early experiences of 
Western imperialism and French conquests of North Africa in early 1880s. This 
anomaly in Ghannouchi‘s state of mind can be explained by his belief-changing life 
experiences in France and then in his exile to Britain where he met the Western life-
style and the principles of pluralist democracy (Tamimi 2001). Hence, it is safe to argue 
that Ghannouchi‘s vision of moderate Islamism was burgeoned in those years. In this 
context, Ghannouchi‘s take on the Western countries and their foreign policy is very 
much affected by his individual experiences which are postulated to generate a benign 
perception of ‗other‘ and the emergence of positive-sum mentality in Ghannouchi‘s 
political leadership. These predictions are substantiated by the highest I-1, lowest P-4a 
and moderate P-1 scores for Ghannouchi.  
Apart from Tunisian foreign policy-making, it can be argued that Ghannouchi‘s 
moderate operational code beliefs have an impact on Ennahda party‘s policies at home 
and its bargaining and/or negotiation behaviors towards other political groups in 
Tunisia. The Ennahda government‘s adoption of a new constitution through negotiating 
with secular and liberal opposition parties showcases Ghannouchi‘s conciliatory 
leadership and use of cooperative tactics to achieve political objectives.
85
 Tunisia‘s new 
constitution, put into effect in January 2014, stands out as one of the most progressive 
                                                          
85
The BBC News Portal: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25878534 (Last Access: 20.05.2014). 
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constitutions in contemporary MENA that is rooted in the principles of liberal 
democracy.
86
 Therefore, Ennahda‘s top leadership and its cooperative behaviors in the 
making of Tunisia‘s new constitution were widely lauded by regional and world leaders 
who hailed the new-born constitution as a ―model for Arab world‖ with a particular 
reference to other post-revolutionary MENA countries i.e., Egypt and Libya.
87
 
 
 
6.3. Khaled Meshaal: One Leader, Multiple Foreign Policy Behaviors 
 
Meshaal hails from a modest background and he was raised within a religious family 
and conservative neighborhood where he got involved in religious institutions.
88
 
Consequently, Meshaal adamantly went up against established secular orders in his 
country and the greater MENA. His Islamism is a blend of Arab nationalism, a strong 
criticism of Western foreign policy and modern life style, and a vitriolic anti-Zionist 
rhetoric towards Israeli colonization of Palestine. He utilized this strong mixture of 
Islamism and Arab nationalism as a mainstay of his political mobilization tactics 
(Picucci 2008). In that sense, his understanding of Islamism and Islamist foreign policy 
is more akin to Morsi‘s mindset rather than Ghannouchi‘s.  
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The OpenDemocracy Platform: http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/zaid-al-ali-donia-ben-
romdhane/tunisia%E2%80%99s-new-constitution-progress-and-challenges-to- (Last Access: 
20.05.2014). 
87
The Al Jazeera News Portal: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/foreign-leaders-hail-
tunisia-constitution-201427144047687702.html (Last Access: 25.05.2014). 
88For further insights on Meshaal‘s personal background, see the report published by Council on Foreign 
Relations:http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-khaled-meshal-aka-khalid-meshaal-khaleed-
mashal/p11111#p2 (Last accessed 15.11.2013). 
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Meshaal has the lowest P-1 score of all leaders (0,18) but still it appears to be a 
positive score and it remains somewhere close to the P-1 score for the average leader 
(0,30). His low P-1 score is unsurprising because of the ongoing Palestinian plight 
under Israeli occupation and Hamas‘ inherently hostile relations with Israel and the 
West and the organization‘s notorious status in the international community which is 
still branded as a ‗foreign terrorist organization‘ by several major countries including 
the US, the European Union, Japan, Canada etc.
89
 Thus, it can be argued that Meshaal‘s 
political career revolves around his criticisms of Zionism and Western foreign policy. 
Meshaal‘s I-1 score is the lowest (0,40) of all leaders from which it can be 
inferred that Meshaal has the lowest level of cooperative approach towards his out-
group. Yet, his score is still positive and unexpectedly it is also equal to the I-1 score for 
the average leader (0,40). Therefore, it can be predicted that even if he has a somewhat 
friendly view towards political universe (P-1), he is prone to pursue cooperative 
strategies and eschew from the immediate use of military force and conflict-escalatory 
behavior. However, considering where his operational code corresponds within the 
ranges of TIP
90
, it appears that his preference ordering can change depending on the 
character of ‗other‘, and/or the political context, and/or the immediacy of the problem.91 
For example, Meshaal is expected to subscribe to the proposition 2, which encapsulates 
the Assurance strategy, towards the Egypt‘s Islamist regime headed by Morsi in post-
                                                          
89
For the country reports on Terrorism published by the US Department of State, see: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20050511025028/http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm (Last accessed 
15.09.2013). 
90
For further information on varying operational code of a single leader depending on the context, timing 
and the issue area see Walker et al. (1998). 
91
The reasons of the variance in Meshaal‘s operational code and especially in his preference ordering is 
specified and discussed in the previous pages of this chapter. To recall, please see the tables 5 and 6 
above. 
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2011 revolution era. Nonetheless, it is assumed that he will be disposed to follow the 
Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy, depicted in proposition 5, towards Netanyahu of Israel in 
the aftermath of Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008.  
Furthermore, since Meshaal always perceives his other‘s preference orderings to 
be domination (4), over settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1), it leads 
to two alternative foreign policy scenarios with three strategic options in total. First, if 
Meshaal follows the proposition 5 (Prisoners‘ dilemma strategy) towards Israel (which 
is more likely behavior) and also perceives Netanyahu to pursue the proposition 5, it 
will result in the classic Prisoners‘ dilemma game in which the ‗deadlock‘ always 
persists (Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008). Second and less likely scenario is: if 
Meshaal follows the preposition 2 (Assurance strategy) and again perceives Israel‘s 
Netanyahu to subscribe to preposition 5, it leads to two alternative strategic options 
(Walker 2000). Initial option is a persistence of the ‗deadlock‘ resulting from Israel‘s 
escalatory and non-cooperative strategy towards Hamas‘ leadership.  
Second option in this scenario is a continuation of ‗cooperation‘ if the Israeli 
leader acts first towards Gaza through following non-conflictual tactics and constructive 
dialogue which may prompt Hamas leadership to alleviate the misperceptions for Israeli 
behavior, then Meshaal will follow suit and there will be an outcome of ‗settlement‘. In 
other words, from the standpoint of Meshaal, the Israeli initiative and the assurance for 
cooperation are needed for him to pursue the Assurance strategy and opt for the 
‗settlement‘ since the Assurance strategy essentially means a ‗conditional cooperation‘ 
(Malici and Buckner 2008). The upshot of these predictions is that Meshaal will either 
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follow the strategy of Assurance or Prisoners‘ dilemma towards the ‗other‘ foreign 
policy actors depending on political context and the order of actors‘ ‗sequential moves‘ 
in a game of strategic interactions (Brams 1994). 
While he is a leader with the highest P-4a (0,22) score among three MENA 
Islamists, his sense of self‘s historical control is also tantamount to the mean score for 
the norming group (0,22). Additionally, since his P-4a score is within one standard 
deviation (0,13) of the world average, he does not perceive a disproportionate power 
relationship between his leadership and other actors such as far stronger American and 
Israeli leadership. Meshaal‘s non-outlier scores for his philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs are evidence that Gaza is not governed by an irrational and inherently hostile 
leader at all.
92
 On the contrary, Hamas‘ leader shows a cooperative foreign policy 
strategy and rational tactical intensity that is very similar to the average world leader. 
However, the definition of in-group for Meshaal is the narrowest one in 
comparison to other MENA leaders analyzed in this study. In his speeches, Hamas‘ 
leader usually refers to followers of the Sunni sect of Islam; not including all Muslim 
world and Arabic-speaking nations of MENA. Meshaal views Shia regimes in Iran and 
Iraq as his ‗other‘ while perceives Sunni-dominated countries like Turkey and Egypt 
within his in-group. Therefore, Meshaal‘s in-group seems to include only the Sunni 
countries that have good relations with the MB movement and regimes that champion 
political Islam in their domestic politics such as Turkey under AK Party, Egypt and 
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Meshaal himself said, in his with Foreign Policy magazine, these words: ―We are not fanatic killers,‖ 
and ―I am not bloodthirsty or against Jews.‖ The transcript of interview can be reached at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/14/exclusive_interview_khaled_meshaal_hamas_syria_isr
ael_gaza (Last accessed 10.02.2014). 
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Tunisa under MB-affiliated leadership (Tianshe 2010). His in-group lastly includes the 
sympathizers of MB‘s vision of Islamism such as Qatar, Yemen and Kuwait where 
Meshaal has taken refuge or visited several times in his early political career. 
Meshaal‘s out-group is, therefore, is the largest of all three leaders including not 
only most of the Western countries and Israel but also the Shia countries, and the 
relatively secular governments in the MENA whose common denominator is their anti-
MB rhetoric and policies. This very broad out-group is composed of Western world, 
Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, some Gulf Monarchies, and lastly Egyt.
93
 Correlatively, 
owing to fact that Hamas usually resorts to violence and military force, it can be argued 
that Meshaal‘s sense of isolation is also the highest among three MENA leaders. 
Meshaal‘s view of Western civilization and Western foreign policy is immensely 
critical and biased. Particularly, Meshaal is highly critical of the American foreign 
policy towards the MENA and Western countries‘ unconditional support for Israel‘s 
revisionist policies in the region for decades.
94
 The Hamas‘ linchpin views virtually all 
Western-originated international organizations e.g., the NATO, the IMF and the World 
Bank as tools for exploitation of Muslim world. Meshaal‘s mostly virulent rhetoric 
against the Western ‗other‘ and high levels of distrust even for the neighboring Muslim 
nations are verified by Meshaal‘s relatively low I-1 and P-1 scores. 
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Ironically, current Egyptian regime led by military commander al-Sisi declared Hamas as terrorist 
organization proscribed its activities in the country as of 2014. For further information see, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-egypt-hamas-idUSBREA230F520140304 (Last Accessed 
8.3.2014). 
94For Meshaal‘s perception of the West and its support for Israeli aggression can be retrieved from: 
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com.tr/2009/01/edited-transcript-of-khaled-meshaals.html (Last Accessed 
20.10.2013). 
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6.4. A Neo-Islamist’s Conundrum: Morsi’s Foreign Policy Torn between His 
Ideology, Egypt’s National Interests and the post-2011 Conjuncture 
 
Mohamed Morsi comes from the epicenter of MB-oriented Islamism that exhibits all 
hallmarks of the common ideology characterizing the new leadership in MENA. In that 
sense, Morsi‘s political belief system and his conceptualization of foreign policy are 
imbued with Egypt-based MB teachings (Al-Awadi 2013). That said, Morsi was not the 
first choice of MB for Egypt‘s presidential elections and he was nominated at the last 
moment when the deputy Supreme Guide of MB Khairat al-Shater was disqualified by 
the SCAF
95
 due to ‗technical reasons.‘  
Therefore, Morsi can be seen as the ‗dark horse‘ of the MB leadership whose 
swift rise to political power across the ranks of Egyptian politics stems from his 
personal connection and allegiance to the Supreme Guide led jointly by Mohammed 
Badie and Khariat al-Shater.
96
 Morsi‘s Islamism appears to lie in between of other two 
MENA leaders and it comprises a strong Arab nationalism compounded by anti-
imperialist rhetoric, a vision of Muslim solidarity under the banner of MB, and a fierce 
criticism of Zionism and Israel. Yet, like Ghannouchi and Turkey‘s Erbakan, Morsi also 
aims to, at least in his public statements, attain the scientific and industrial development 
                                                          
95The abbreviation ‗SCAF‘ stands for Supreme Council of Armed Forces in Egypt which was leading the 
transition period singlehandedly after the demise of Mubarak regime in 2011. 
96
For further information on ―Who is who in Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood‖ see the Washington Institute 
Report at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/whos-who-in-the-muslim-
brotherhood (Last Accessed 20.10.2013). 
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achieved by Western countries with the idea of making Egypt a peer competitor of the 
Zionist Israel and Christian West.
97
 
Morsi has the second highest I-1 score (0,45) in the group which suggests a 
‗definitely cooperative‘ approach towards his counterparts in the domain of foreign 
policy despite his generally critical stance on Israeli and American foreign policy. The 
root cause of this contrast can be attributed to his relatively high P-1 score (0,28) within 
the group. Moreover, his low P-4a score (0,20) which is lower than the average score 
for the norming group (0,22) must have contributed to Morsi‘s imperatively cooperative 
foreign policy behavior. Put differently, since Morsi has a benign view towards political 
universe and attributes the bulk of historical control to more powerful ‗other‘, Morsi is 
inclined to follow de-escalatory foreign policy and employ non-conflictual strategy 
although he is highly critical and one-sided about Israel and Western foreign policy. 
The P-1 score for Morsi (0,28) is the highest of all leaders studied in this 
research; almost equal to the P-1 score for average world leader (0,30). Hailing from the 
MB‘s central zone and assuming the top executive office at one the largest and most 
influential countries in the MENA can be the contributing factors, albeit indirect, for his 
positive view of the political universe through augmenting his sense of control over 
power following the post-2011 Islamist grip on Egypt. Morsi‘s P-4a score (0,40) is the 
second highest in the group and it is located within one standard deviation (0,13) of the 
mean for the norming group (P-4a= 0,22). Therefore, Morsi does perceive a rather 
                                                          
97You can find the excerpts of Morsi‘s speech exposing his perceptions of Egypt, the Muslim solidarity 
and the West here: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/world/middleeast/selected-excerpts-of-president-
mohamed-morsis-speech.html?pagewanted=all (Last accessed 20.10.2013). 
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symmetrical power relationship between himself and other foreign policy actors just the 
same as the perceptions of an average world leader.  
Similar to Meshaal, Morsi‘s definition of in-group is quite limited which differs 
from Ghannouchi‘s conceptualization of the ‗self.‘ In his statements, Morsi‘s in-group 
generally refers to firstly all oppressed Muslim people in the world e.g., Palestinians 
and Rohingya Muslims and secondly a few Sunni Muslim countries that have warm 
relations with the local offshoots of MB including Turkey, Qatar, Tunisia, Jordan, Gaza, 
Yemen, Kuwait etc. In fact, Morsi‘s public statements, by and large, accentuates the 
possibility of full-fledged cooperation among Muslim countries in the MENA
98
 which 
confirms his high and positive I-1 score. His references to Islamic solidarity and 
cooperation emanate from his adherence to Arab nationalism which is fraught with anti-
imperial sentiments. However, Morsi also does not shy away from criticizing other 
Muslim governments situated within his perceived in-group. For example, Morsi openly 
criticized the Hamas government in Gaza and closed down the strategic tunnels between 
Egypt‘s northern Sinai region and the Gaza Strip following the string of terrorist attacks 
in the Sinai against Egyptian troops in 2012.
99
 
Considering his speeches, Morsi specifies his out-group very broadly which 
includes first the Zionists and Western backers of Israeli foreign and security policies 
i.e., the US and Europe; secondly the Shia-led countries of MENA and these are Iran, 
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On this subject, see President Mohamed Morsi‘s speech in Tahrir Square in June 2012 published by 
Ikhwan-web the statement can be reached at: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30153 (Last 
Accessed 10.02.2014).  
99
For further insights on Hamas-Egyptian relations during Morsi‘s term in office see the Washington 
Institute report at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-should-not-
romanticize-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-rule (Last accessed 15.02.2013). 
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Iraq, and Syria; some antagonist Sunni regimes which disown the MB ideology and 
confront the local MB offshoots in their countries such as Gulf Monarchies with the 
exception of Qatar as a sympathizer of the MB. In this respect, it is posited that Morsi‘s 
conceptualization of ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ is analogous with Meshaal‘s but dissimilar to 
Ghannouchi‘s sense of political universe. Here, Egyptians‘ deep-seated and strong Arab 
nationalism interwoven with anti-colonialist sentiments and Palestinians‘ grim 
experiences with Western colonialism and Israeli occupations must have contributed to 
Meshaal‘s and Morsi‘s much broader definition of their out-group.  
According to many observers, Morsi‘s one year rule in presidential palace shows 
that his foreign policy was unlooked for since new Egyptian foreign policy did not 
deviate from the trajectory laid by Mubarak‘s leadership (Gold 2013; Özkan 2013). In 
other words, Morsi‘s foreign policy in general does not necessarily reflect the ‗old 
philosophy‘ of MB concerning the conceptualization of foreign policy and strategies 
and tactics for achieving political objectives (Özdamar 2011; Özdamar and Canbolat 
2012). This line of argument cites many foreign policy events including (1) the 
continuation of Camp David peace accords with Israel; (2) Morsi‘s numerous high-level 
visits to Western capitals where he pledged more political and economic cooperation; 
(3) lastly the inception of thaw, albeit a fleeting one, in Iranian-Egyptian relations with 
the 16
th
 Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) Summit in Tehran as an examples of 
potential inconsistencies with the MB‘s conceptualization of foreign policy (Guirguis 
2012; Gerges 2013; Sharp 2013). 
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On the other hand, another group of scholars argues that Morsi-led Egyptian 
foreign policy was monopolized under a certain control of MB‘s Guidance Bureau 
which circumvents other bureaucratic institutions including the ministry of foreign 
affairs (Haber and Ighani 2013; Grimm and Roll 2012). In a similar vein, given that 
only Morsi is fully in charge of foreign policy without delegating such authority to 
Guidance Bureau, it is tenable to argue that Morsi‘s political beliefs and perceptions are 
heavily influenced by MB‘s age-old ideology in his making an Egypt‘s Islamist foreign 
policy (Haber and Ighani 2013). In order to evaluate these competing arguments 
systematically and to untangle the causal mechanism in explaining Egyptian foreign 
policy under Morsi, the following section focuses on the linkage between Morsi‘s 
operational code and Egypt‘s foreign policy behavior during Morsi‘s short-lived 
presidency between June 2012 and July 2013.  
First, the Egyptian-Israeli relations did not sever and the previous status-quo was 
largely maintained in security partnership during Morsi‘s term in office which 
confounded the expectations of international decision making elites (Haber and Ighani 
2013). Although Morsi did not make any high-level visits to Israel, main 
communication channels were open and both sides upheld full commitment to the Camp 
David Peace treaty. Additionally, Morsi officially announced that he will respect all of 
Egypt‘s international treaties hinting at the Camp David peace accords despite the fact 
that the MB has always rejected the peace treaty and also the State of Israel. Morsi‘s 
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stance on Camp David induces Middle East analysts to conclude that Morsi‘s team 
simply replicated the Mubarak‘ foreign policy when it came to the US and Israel.100  
Gold argues that, contrary to Israeli government‘s apprehension, ―security and 
intelligence cooperation between Israel and Egypt actually thrived during Morsi‘s 
presidency.‖101 Morsi‘s operational code beliefs confirm the Egyptian cooperative 
foreign policy towards Israel in this period since Morsi is postulated to follow 
Assurance strategy and perceive the Israeli leadership to subscribe to a Prisoners‘ 
Dilemma strategy. Likewise Ghannouchi and Meshaal, the scores for Morsi are Self (I-
1= 0,45; P-4a= 0,20) and Other (P-1= 0,28; P-4b= 0,80) which respectively correspond 
to proposition 2 for ‗self‘ and proposition 5 for ‗other‘ specified in TIP. Therefore, 
Morsi‘s preference ordering is settlement (4), over deadlock (3), over domination (2), 
over submission (1) while his perceived preference ordering of Netanyahu is as follows: 
domination (4), over settlement (3), over deadlock (2), over submission (1).  
In his leadership assessment manual, Walker (2000) outlines (from bottom to 
up) all levels of foreign policy decision-making of the leaders associated with 
Assurance and Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy. Building on this framework, firstly, the 
preferred behaviors of Morsi will be ‗reward‘ and/or ‗promise‘ while Netanyahu‘s 
behaviors are perceived to be ‗threaten‘ and/or ‗punish.‘ Second, the moves of Morsi all 
focus on ‗cooperation‘ while Netanyahu‘s moves are expected to be ‗mixed.‘ Third, 
                                                          
100
For more insights on this subject, see the op-ed written by Dina Ezzar at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/76837/Egypt/0/Morsis-foreign-policy-failures.aspx 
(Last Accessed 20.12.2013). 
101Zack Gold, ―Why Israel Will Miss Morsi‖ Foreign Affairs, 20 August 213. The op-ed can be reached 
at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139835/zack-gold/why-israel-will-miss-morsi (Last Accessed 
20.12.2013). 
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whereas Morsi favors the tactics of ‗reward‘ and ‗deter‘, he perceived Netanyahu to 
follow the tactics of ‗compel‘ and ‗punish.‘ Regarding the strategic orientation, Morsi‘s 
tactical intensity and moves are associated with the Assurance strategy towards Israel 
while he perceives Netanyahu to embrace the Prisoner‘s Dilemma strategy in his 
foreign policy towards Egypt. Walker and Schafer (2006) further elaborated on the 
prediction template and added the ‗levels of interaction‘ typology to the TIP. 
 According to this typology, Morsi‘s initial solution strategy to a foreign policy 
crisis will be ‗non-zero-sum‘ whereas Netanyahu is expected to pursue a ‗zero-sum‘ 
strategy. Therefore, Morsi‘s restructuring strategy will be ‗cooperation‘ although he 
anticipates Netanyahu‘s later strategy to be ‗conflictual.‘ Following this analytical 
framework, the anatomy of Morsi‘s two significant foreign policy decisions towards 
Israel is performed: (1) the continuation of Camp David peace treaty, (2) making 
cooperation with Israel on Sinai at the expense of Hamas-Egyptian relations. 
Initially, Morsi demonstrated full cooperation in his posturing on Camp David 
and favored the tactic of reward as a part of his Assurance strategy towards the Israeli 
state. While the decision of nullifying the treaty would fulfill the MB‘s old philosophy 
regarding Zionist Israel, Morsi anticipated the risks of such radical decision. Above all, 
by abrogating the treaty, Morsi will jeopardize the national interests of Egypt for the 
sake of Islamist ideology and this decision will most likely pit the Egyptian bureaucracy 
and military establishment against Morsi regime since the Egyptian military is given a 
supreme constitutional authority over the issues of war and peace (Al-Awadi 2013). 
Secondly, Morsi was preoccupied with the internal disturbances and collapsing 
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Egyptian economy which threatened the very survival of his regime and therefore the 
conjuncture was not suitable for making a ‗revolutionary foreign policy.‘102  
On the contrary, Morsi strove to have a balanced relationship with Israel to not 
antagonize the Western powers because of the immediacy of Egypt‘s economic 
considerations. Acknowledging the various risks of scraping the Camp David, Morsi 
himself declared a tentative approval of the peace treaty. The decision of maintaining 
Egyptian allegiance to Camp David accords can be explained by Morsi‘s preference 
ordering and his perception of Netanyahu‘s potential strategic interaction. Morsi‘s 
preference ordering of the self suggests that he prioritizes a settlement towards other 
actors particularly whose perceived control over historical developments is greater. 
Morsi perceives Netanyahu‘s preference ordering as proposition 5 that favors 
domination first and then if there is a window of opportunity for two sides through 
cooperative dialogue Netanyahu will opt for a settlement.  
Alternatively, since Morsi clings to Assurance strategy characterized by the 
tactics of Reward and/or Deter his overall strategy substantively means a strategy of 
‗conditional cooperation‘, if Netanyahu moves first and initiate cooperation towards 
Egypt, Morsi will follow suit. This prediction is drawn upon the Theory of Moves 
(TOM) developed by Brams (1994: 28) who argues that ―if it is rational for one player 
to move and the other player not to move from the initial state, then the player who 
moves takes precedence, its move overrides the player who stays, so the outcome will 
                                                          
102On Egypt‘s non-revolutionary foreign policy, see Mohamed Morsi‘s Speech at Cairo University 
published by Ikhwan Wed. The statement can be reached at: 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30156 (Last Accessed 20.12.2013). 
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be induced by the player who moves.‖ Therefore, Netanyahu‘s policy initiative will 
serve as a correcting arm to amend Morsi‘s misperceived preference ordering he 
attributes to Netanyahu in the first place. In the final analysis, Morsi‘s decision to 
maintain the peace with Israel is an outcome of his Assurance strategy in which he 
favored the tactic of Reward towards Netanyahu because the communication channels 
between Egypt and Israel were wide open. Moreover, Israel exhibited signals of 
cooperation and policy initiative in Egypt‘s suppression of extremist groups in the Sinai 
which reassured the both sides of Camp David about the significance of maintaining the 
treaty (Aftandilian 2013). This particular decision elucidates the Morsi‘s conundrum in 
foreign policy decision-making that is fractured along the lines of the MB‘s ideology, 
the exigencies of the office, and the combination of internal and external realities facing 
Morsi‘s presidency. 
Second foreign policy case is related to Morsi‘s approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict together with Morsi‘s policies toward Hamas and Israel in the wake 
of rising terrorism in the Sinai region. Considering this case, it is observed that Morsi‘s 
foreign policies toward Gaza and Israel have laid bare a stark discrepancy between the 
MB‘s philosophy of international relations and the gravity of Egyptian national 
interests. Even though the MB leadership always proclaims support for Palestinians 
against the ‗Zionist usurpers‘, Morsi‘s behaviors towards Israel and Gaza appear to 
subordinate the MB‘s ideology to the priorities of the president‘s office.  
In this context, Morsi government took two controversial foreign policy 
decisions: the continuation of cooperation with Israel to contain extremism in Sinai, and 
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the indecision to lift the blockade on Gaza‘s border with Egypt and closure of 
underground tunnels between Gaza and Northern Sinai. First, after a terrorist attack 
claimed the lives of 16 Egyptian soldiers in the turbulent Sinai region in August 2012, 
Morsi‘s government first called for minor changes of the Camp David peace treaty to 
remove limitations on the deployment of Egyptian troops in the Sinai (Aftandilian 
2013). However, after Israel opposed to a revision of the treaty and pressured the 
Egyptian government for its deployment activities, Morsi chose to cancel military 
deployments and he maintained the tacit cooperation with Israel at the expense of 
Hamas.
103
 Then, Israel signaled a more cooperative behavior and engaged in a 
constructive dialogue to coordinate Israeli and Egyptian security policies in accordance 
with Camp David accords to stamp out the extremist attacks in the Sinai (Sharp 2013).  
Morsi‘s decision in this case was an outcome of his pursuit of Assurance 
strategy in which he used the tactics of ‗appeasement‘ and ‗reward‘ towards Netanyahu 
while he perceived Netanyahu to follow Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy and the tactic of 
‗compel‘ before two actors reach a ‗settlement.‘ When Morsi moved first and demanded 
a revision of treaty, Netanyahu subscribed to and escalatory foreign policy and 
employed the tactic of ‗compel‘ since proposition 5 suggests that he is prone to 
dominate the other in the first place. After perceiving Netanyahu‘s escalatory move, 
Morsi‘s operational code regressed to the tactic of appeasement because Morsi 
attributes the bulk of historical control to Netanyahu rather than himself (P-4a= 0,20).  
                                                          
103Zack Gold, ―Why Israel Will Miss Morsi‖ Foreign Affairs. 
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In the second part of Morsi‘s foreign policy decision, following the Israeli 
government‘s signals of positive dialogue for coordination and Netanyahu‘s de-
escalatory move, Morsi altered his tactical intensity by favoring the tactic of ‗reward.‘ 
Subsequently, Morsi exhibited very cooperative behavior to coordinate the military 
deployments with the Israeli intelligence and respecting the peace treaty with Israel 
which resulted in a ‗settlement‘ in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Following the logic of 
settlement, Morsi shied away from removing the siege on Egypt‘s border with Gaza 
Strip which contradicted the MB‘s ideological affinity toward Hamas and Palestinian 
cause.  
More radically, in 2013, Morsi decided to close down a series of underground 
tunnel along the Gazan-Egyptian border in coordination with Israel to eliminate the 
smuggling of weapons between Gaza and the Sinai (Haber and Ighani 2013). Morsi‘s 
key advisor Essam el-Haddad overtly expressed the government‘s policy of closing the 
tunnels by arguing that ―we don‘t want to see these tunnels used for illegal ways 
smuggling either people or weapons that can really harm Egyptian security‖104 This 
statement alone highlights the subordination of MB‘s ideological objectives to the 
priorities of Egyptian national interests and the exigencies of the post-2011 conjuncture 
in MENA.  
In a nutshell, these exemplar foreign policy cases confirm the contention that 
Morsi confronted with a conundrum during his short-lived tenure in which his foreign 
                                                          
104For further insights on Morsi‘s decision to close down the tunnels, see Taylor‘s and Saleh‘s piece 
published by Reuters at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/us-palestinians-tunnels-egypt-
idUSBRE91H0JA20130218 (Last accessed 20.12.2013). 
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policy was torn between the MB‘s old ideology, the imperatives of the presidential 
office, and the new conjuncture materialized following the 2011 revolution. This study 
contends that the operational code approach presents an exceptional explanatory and 
predictive power to make sense of Morsi‘s intriguing foreign policy behavior from a 
vantage point of decision-making theory informed by the universal principles of 
cognitive psychology. 
 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempts to connect the operational code results for three MENA leaders to 
the real-life foreign policy events transpiring in the contemporary MENA politics. 
Accordingly, the operational code analysis of MB-originated Islamist leadership in 
MENA provides a blend of mainly confounding and slightly anticipated results. These 
insights allow us to generate a cognitive framework to search for the general patterns of 
Islamist foreign policy and to make sense of new MENA leaders‘ political strategies 
and tactics for accomplishing foreign policy objectives.  
Considering three MB-affiliated MENA leaders‘ cognitive diagnostic and 
prescriptive beliefs together, it boils down to the argument that the new MENA 
leadership is expected to prefer cooperative strategies. However, since all three leaders 
subscribe to an Assurance strategy they will exhibit a strategy of ‗conditional 
cooperation‘ (Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008). Strikingly, in contrast to popular 
narrative in Western mass media and many academic circles about MB organization and 
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its leaders, Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi do not subscribe to a confrontational 
strategy. On the contrary, they all perceive the Western world and Zionists e.g. the US 
and Israel as imperialistic and hostile powers whose ultimate objective is to jeopardize 
the survival of their respective regimes in MENA.  
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CHAPTER 7:  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The concluding chapter engages in four major tasks: (1) providing the most condensed 
version of the study‘s motivation and the phases of research, (2) succinctly reviewing 
the analysis results and revisiting the main hypotheses, (3), summarizing the theoretical 
and policy-relevant implications of this thesis, and finally (4) indicating a few 
worthwhile avenues for future research in a similar vein.  
 
 
7.1. Motivation and Building Blocks of the Research 
 
I aim to achieve two main research objectives in this thesis: (1) broadening the 
geographical coverage of North America-originated operational code analysis by 
applying it to MENA context and (2) challenging the conventional wisdom held in the 
Western world with regards to MB-defined Islamism and its political leadership. This 
study compiles three leaders‘ foreign policy speeches as the data for analyzing their 
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operational code profiles. Next, leadership assessment tools, the VICS method and the 
automated content analysis program Profiler Plus, are employed to systematically 
generate statistical evidence for the leaders‘ political beliefs. By using the state-of-the-
art content analysis software, it is possible to get 100 percent coding reliability for the 
analysis and to perform comparative statistical applications (Schafer and Walker 2006). 
After the operational code profiles of three MENA leaders are described, I reflected on 
the analysis results and discussed the implications of the findings where a connection 
between the leaders‘ belief systems and their foreign policy behaviors is also 
established.  
 
 
7.2. Re-visiting the Results 
 
An operational code analysis of MB-originated Islamist leadership in MENA yields 
interesting and challenging results that confound the conventional images of Islamist 
leaders held in the Western world. An analysis of foreign policy belief systems of three 
Islamist leaders from 2011 to 2013 discloses some general patterns in how Islamism 
and particularly the MB as an ideology and actor reasserted themselves and conducted 
foreign policy in the post-Arab uprisings era. The most prevalent theme in MENA 
leaders‘ public speeches is anti-Western rhetoric. From these speeches, it is inferred that 
all three leaders are very critical of all sorts of Western intervention towards the MENA. 
Their indignation at the Western foreign policy towards MENA and the foreign and 
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security policies of Israel are verified by relatively low P-1 and P-4a scores which, 
together, represent their somewhat high level of distrust towards ‗other.‘   
Moreover, MB-affiliated Islamist leaders share a common perception of 
disparity in historical control because their statements appear to reflect a notably low 
level of historical control attributed to ‗self‘. Their personal encounters with ‗Zionists‘, 
‗Imperialists‘, and ‗Colonizers‘ and their ideological reading of the MENA‘s history are 
the contributing factors for their sense of loose command over political developments 
which confirm their somewhat low P-4a scores. Regarding the direction of strategies, 
the analysis shows that the MB-Islamists speak with one voice in their tactical intensity 
and their foreign policy behaviors generally resonate in harmony.  
The general theme is that if tactical opportunities emerge, the MB-Islamists 
prove cooperative in varying degrees from somewhat (Meshaal and Morsi) to definitely 
cooperative (Ghannouchi). Substantively, the three leaders are very cooperative towards 
their in-group. Nonetheless, the breadth of their definition of in-group changes from one 
leader to another. While Meshaal has the narrowest definition of in-group, Ghannouchi 
has the most inclusive in-group and Morsi‘s perception of ‗us‘ appears in-between of 
this in-group spectrum. Meshaal proved relatively more frustrated (and/or angry) and 
confrontational due to Palestinian territories status and his antagonistic relations with 
Israel and the Western countries allied with Israeli government. All in all, however, the 
new MENA leaders including Meshaal see themselves as cooperative towards both their 
in-group and, albeit to a lesser extent, their out-group. 
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Building on these results, firstly it is observed that the operational codes of three 
MB-affiliated MENA leaders are highly similar which put all three MB-Islamists into 
the Type A leadership quadrant and identify their other in the foreign policy realm as 
Type C leaders. Here, the bottom line is that Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi are 
expected to show very similar foreign policy behaviors. The results are interesting since 
three MENA countries‘ regime types are different in which the MB-affiliated leaders 
experience very distinct and diverse political and structural limitations existing at the 
state and international levels. Put together, the first group of findings supports the 
Hypothesis 1b which contends that all three Islamist leaders exhibit very similar foreign 
policy behaviors despite their quite different country-wise backgrounds.  
Secondly, a comparative analysis of the operational code scores of new MENA 
leaders with the average world leader substantiates the Hypothesis 1a: the strategic and 
philosophical beliefs of three MENA leaders are notably similar to the political beliefs 
of world leaders included in the norming group. Therefore, the policy-oriented 
recommendation for the US foreign policy towards MENA region is as follows:  Three 
MENA leaders‘ non-outlier scores for his philosophical and instrumental operational 
code beliefs are evidence that Egypt, Tunisia, and Gaza Strip are not governed by an 
‗irrational‘ or ‗inherently hostile‘ or ‗rogue‘ leaders at all.105 In contrast, the new 
MENA leaders are predicted to pursue cooperative foreign policy strategies centered on 
rational tactical orientation when a window of opportunity appears and these are 
                                                          
105The concept of ‗rogue leader‘ and its usage for the particular non-Western leaders in the context of US 
foreign policy under George W. Bush presidency is drawn from the studies of Malici (2007) and Malici 
and Buckner (2008), although it originally did not refer to the MB-affiliated Islamist leaders in the 
MENA. 
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evocative of the behaviors exhibited by an ‗average leader‘ in world politics (Schafer 
and Walker 2006). 
Thirdly, in terms of the preference orderings of new MENA leadership, the 
upshot of analysis is that while the new MENA leadership‘s perception of other‘s 
preference ordering corresponds to conditions specified in proposition 5 in TIP 
(Prisoners‘ Dilemma Strategy), their preference ordering for the self fits to the 
conditions specified in proposition 2 (Assurance Strategy). That said, three MENA 
leaders‘ perceptions of the other meet the conditions of Prisoners‘ Dilemma strategy 
which also appears to be one of the two preference orderings that Meshaal attributes to 
himself. Therefore, Ghannouchi, Meshaal and Morsi perceive their other as a hawkish 
leader who always attempts to dominate and prefer rather conflictual strategies although 
the ‗other‘ does not exert an inordinate amount of historical power over the leaders of 
Tunusia, Gaza and Egypt.  
 
 
7.3. Theoretical and Policy-Relevant Implications 
 
The theoretical and policy-oriented implications of such particular study on new MENA 
leaders are manifold. First, it can be argued that North America-originated cognitive 
approaches to foreign policy can be applied to non-Western cases as well and these 
approaches have a lot to offer for researchers to gain a nuanced view towards regional 
and international politics. Particularly, the analysis results showcase the top-notch 
explanatory and predictive profiling tools of operational code approach in studying the 
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new MENA leadership from a vantage point of an independent decision-making theory 
informed by the canonical principles of political psychology. Second, this thesis is 
another testimony to those subscribing to a notion that the human beings occupy the 
epicenter of international politics (Hudson 2005). The use of stereotypical and 
dichotomous portrayals of the Islamist regimes in MENA like the perceptions of 
‗rogue‘, ‗irrational‘, ‗crazy‘, ‗inherently hostile‘ cannot account for how the non-
Western leaders comprehend the outside world and which approaches they use to cope 
with their out-group.  
In contrast, the leadership assessment tools, such as the operational code 
construct, provide systematical evidence as to leaders‘ distinct personal characteristics 
and engage in comparative analysis of these differences. The empirical findings of this 
study do not confirm the simplistic and popular appraisals in the West regarding the 
new MENA leaders and the sources of the Islamists‘ foreign policy. Next, a 
comparative analysis of a group of MENA leaders with a sample of 35 diverse world 
leaders hailing from both small/weak and major/strong provides the opportunity to put 
new MENA leadership into broader and most systematic perspective. This comparative 
statistical application implies that it is now possible for researchers to gain a better 
perspective of how the leaders studied here think about and behave towards the 
inherently convoluted political universe compare to the average ‗world leader.‘  
Prior to outlining the policy-relevant implications, here it is apt to make two 
disclaimers concerning the theoretical conclusions of this research. First, although it 
suggests an explicit linkage between leaders‘ psychological particularities and their 
countries‘ foreign policy behaviors, this study refrains from contending a sole and direct 
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causal mechanism between leaders‘ beliefs and the foreign policy outputs i.e., ultimate 
decisions. By following the arguments of Kaarbo (1997) and Kesgin (2011), this study 
postulates that the impact of a leader‘s belief system on foreign policy can be best 
attributed to the decision making process rather than foreign policy outputs. Kaarbo 
(1997: 572) suggests that personality features ―affect process the most, outcomes the 
second, and outputs the least.‖ Similarly, the second disclaimer of this thesis is also 
drawn from the leadership studies literature. As Rosati (1984) and also Walker (1977) 
argue, the cognitive research programs do not claim an outright marriage between 
leaders‘ beliefs and their behaviors that can account for all foreign policy decisions of 
the states. This study also avoids from the contention that all foreign policy decisions 
can be traced to a nexus between individuals‘ beliefs and their political behavior. In 
contrast, as Kaarbo (1997: 577) points out ―any direct translation from individual level 
variables to foreign policy is difficult.‖ In many foreign policy cases, multi-level 
analysis can still be more instrumental with the aim of eluding reductionist overdose 
through incorporating more systemic and sub-systemic variables into a research.  
With regards to policy-relevant implications, this study offers an instructive 
point of view for decision makers in charge of conducting Western and/or American 
foreign policy towards MENA countries and their leadership. Considering three MB-
affiliated MENA leaders‘ cognitive diagnostic and prescriptive beliefs together, the 
whole discussion boils down to the argument that the new MENA leadership is 
expected to prefer cooperative strategies when conciliation opportunities arise. That 
said, since all three leaders subscribe to an Assurance strategy, they will exhibit a 
strategy of ‗conditional cooperation‘ rather than an unconditional acquiescence towards 
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their out-group (Malici 2007; Malici and Buckner 2008). Strikingly, in contrast to the 
mainstream narrative in Western mass media and many academic circles regarding the 
MB movement and its leadership, Ghannouchi‘s, Meshaal‘s and Morsi‘s foreign policy 
cannot be reduced to the allegations that describe the MB‘s approach to foreign affairs 
as a ‗dyed-in-the-wool‘ inimical.  
This thesis challenges the commonplace assumption that the MB‘s deep-rooted 
hostile ideology towards the Western countries is the sole source underlying an Islamist 
foreign policy in MENA. All three leaders analyzed in this study do not appear as 
irrational and parochial foreign policy leaders and they do not necessarily conduct an 
ideology-bounded foreign policy through the pursuit of non-cooperative and escalatory 
strategies. On the contrary, they all perceive major Western powers and also the Israeli 
governments as interventionist and hostile actors ill-disposed towards Islamist 
governments of MENA. In other words, from the standpoint of new MENA leadership 
the international powers and particularly the US appear to be threatening powers whose 
ultimate foreign policy objective is to remove the fledgling Islamist regimes in the post-
Arab awakening MENA. 
 
 
7.4. Avenues for Future Research 
 
The first potential trajectory for future studies is advancing on the research topics of 
psychological and behavioral empathy within the fields of foreign policy and conflict 
resolution studies. In addition to psychological empathy, the importance of behavioral 
empathy is also underscored within the leadership studies literature with reference to a 
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chess game logic in explaining strategic interactions between decision makers (White 
1991). Due to its limited scope, this thesis focuses heavily on ‗realistic empathy‘ which 
is recognized as one of the main strands of psychological empathy and it attempts to 
apply this significant concept to understand new MENA politics by getting into the 
minds of key individuals (White 1984). Therefore, future studies on non-Western 
leaders can tap into this understudied area in the field of political psychology. 
Behavioral empathy necessitates the prediction of other actor‘s future behaviors to 
provide a better strategic roadmap for the resolution of conflicts and/or foreign policy 
crises. In other words, there is a need for analyzing the operational codes of both leaders 
of the two countries that locked into a foreign policy crisis to assume a behavioral 
empathy in future studies.  
Additionally, to suggest decision makers a full-fledged strategic perspective for 
the aim of preventing the escalation of foreign policy crises scholars may need to 
incorporate both psychological and behavioral empathy into their studies. The upside of 
such scholarly works will be the use of beliefs and perceptions as the basis of game 
theory modeling of strategic interactions between conflicting states instead of taking the 
decision makers and their preferences as given (Lake and Powell 1999). For instance, in 
order to gain a more profound understanding of Arab-Israeli conflict, foreign policy 
analysis scholars may examine the operational codes of both Israeli prime ministers and 
political leaders of Hamas and Fatah and then plug the relevant leaders‘ political beliefs 
into a realistically modeled strategic game. Such game theoretic model that rests on 
leaders‘ idiosyncrasies is meritorious because it does theorize every inch of a strategic 
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interaction between Israel and Palestine from the micro-behavioral variables to a macro-
state level interaction. For the current issues in the conflict, researchers can choose from 
many foreign policy cases in the post-2000 era e.g., the 2006 Lebanon war, the 
Operation ‗Cast Lead‘ in 2008, and most recently the Operation ‗Pillar of Defense‘ in 
2012. 
Another promising vein of research will be the simultaneous use of multiple ‗at-
a-distance‘ methods of leadership analysis in one study to provide the most detailed 
profile of an individual leader. It is likely that studies as such make a notable 
contribution to the FPA field since there are quite few studies that employ more than 
one leadership assessment tools (Kesgin 2011). In his research, Kesgin utilizes both 
LTA and operational code methods to examine the personalities of all Turkish and 
Israeli prime ministers since the early 1990s and describes the use of two approaches of 
leadership studies at a time as the strong suit of his dissertation. A particular research 
design incorporating manifold measures of leadership yields further insights about the 
leaders‘ profiles, which constitutes a greater basis for comparison between distinct and 
diverse theoretical and policy-relevant implications of the analysis. In addition to LTA 
(Hermann 1980; 1984; 2003; Hermann et al. 2001), future studies can draw on many at-
a-distance constructs including role theory (Holsti 1970; Walker 1987), cognitive style 
(Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Tetlock 1983), cognitive maps (Axelrod 1976), and image 
theory (Herrmann 1984; Cottam 1985) and potentially employ them to profile same 
political leader(s) together with the operational code analysis.  
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Next, this study focuses exclusively on the last generation of political Islamists 
operating in MENA rather than a broader group of Islamist leaders since it would go 
beyond the scope of a single research project. Moreover, Islamist foreign policy in 
distinct time periods and various Islamist leaders have been studied in the relevant 
literature (O‘Reilly 2007; Picucci 2008; Özdamar 2011; Özdamar forthcoming). Yet, 
there is still much work to be done to draw fuller picture of political leadership in 
MENA region. For example, a comparative analysis of belief systems of new generation 
of Islamists with the beliefs of ―older generation‖ will allow researchers to put Islamists 
and their foreign policy into broader and more systematic perspective (Özdamar 2011; 
Özdamar and Canbolat 2012).  
Furthermore, since political Islamism is not a static and monolith movement 
there is a need to study other political organizations in MENA which claim to be ‗true‘ 
representatives of Islamism such as Salafi al-Nour Party of Egypt or terrorist 
organization al-Qaeda. Future studies may fulfill the void in the literature on non-
Western leaders by profiling particular leaders affiliated to different strands of political 
Islam and then comparing their personalities with the leaders‘ studied before. Such 
undertaking will help expanding the North America-originated leadership studies 
literature to other strategically important countries in the non-Western world. 
Finally, rarely do foreign policy scholars make an effort to link psychological 
characteristics of leaders with large-N foreign policy behaviors data for a broad 
collection of countries. This study attempts to correlate the belief systems of MB-
affiliated Islamist leaders with foreign policy behaviors of three MENA countries 
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without using state level data due to its very demanding technical procedures and event 
data scarcity for the post-2011 MENA. In the literature, there are only a handful of 
studies that integrated systematic political psychology insights and foreign policy event 
data and directly linked operational codes with foreign policy behavior (Picucci 2008, 
Kesgin 2011). Thus, the huge part of this task still remains to be done by the 
prospective studies on FPA. In this particular niche of foreign policy studies, however, 
the scholarly objective should be the ―marriage between individual and state level data‖ 
(Kesgin 2011: 7).  
To accomplish this marriage, researchers can use event datasets to measure the 
state foreign policy behavior as a dependent variable of the study while leadership 
characteristics taken as the independent variables. The event data, which based on a 
coding scheme called Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO), can be 
obtained from Penn State Event Data System (PSEDS).
106
 The use of event datasets 
from PSEDS to analyze state behavior in foreign affairs is commended and suggested 
by many prominent scholars of FPA (Hudson 2005; 2007; Walker and Schafer 2006; 
Breuning 2007). A better-established linkage between political psychology variables 
and large-N foreign policy behavior data can be potentially a breakthrough in foreign 
policy studies with the integration of individual and state levels of analysis which will 
rid the FPA field of many problems and criticisms lingering today. 
  
                                                          
106
Penn State Event Data System/Project (PSEDS) was formerly known as Kansas Event Data System 
(KEDS). It was renamed the PSEDS after one its founders Philip Schrodt (with Deborah Garner) started 
his tenure in Pennsylvania State University in 2010. The datasets can be reached at: 
http://eventdata.psu.edu (Accessed 20.04.2014). 
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